BANAT v COMELEC
 
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party list petitioned in Court for the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondent COMELEC from implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352. Petitioner also assailed the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of the said Republic Act and alleged that they were of questionable application and their validity was doubtful. Petitioner raised the issue whether RA 9369, RA 7166 as amended, being a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which states that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." BANAT also questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated Section 17 or Article VI of the Constitution which specifies that the Senate and the House of Representatives should each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and qualification contests relating to its Members. Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject matter of RA 9369.

 Issue:
Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI.
​
Held:
No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear an unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative, or argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Section 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertained only to the adoption and application of the procedures on the pre-proclamation controversies. It did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "en banc" may entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
“Ang Ladlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that it tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.”

Issue:
Whether or not “Ang Ladlad” party-list application should be denied as the organization allegedly tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
​
Held:
No. The denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion; including its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. “Ang Ladlad” has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Hence, its application as a party-list should be granted.
 

Roque v COMELEC

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award. They contend the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.

Issue:
Is the Poll Automation Law unconstitutional for infringing the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot.
 
Held:
No. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a “three feet” long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded preserving the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.

Penera v COMELEC

Facts:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11 September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
 
Issue:
Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning. May premature campaigning be committed by a person who is not a candidate.
 
Held:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:
x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO


Facts:
 In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines. The second placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the FPJ died during his medical treatment, his widow, Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also contends that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president.

Issue:
 Whether or not may the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case.

Held:
 No. Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
​
An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of President but rather stresses that it is with the “paramount public interest” in mind that she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by her late husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes.

Gador vs Commission on Elections
G.R. No. L-52365
January 22, 1980


Facts:
The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid.

Held:
No. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that “The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980.” It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

Romualdez Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution.

Held:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice

Frivaldo vs COMELEC

Facts:
 Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a petition to COMELEC requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the grounds that he was a naturalized citizen of the United States of America.  Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen in Januray 20, 1983.  Frivaldo admitted but said that he was only forced to do so since the time of Marcos regime he was considered as an enemy and he went to USA seeking refuge and his naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went back after the Marcos Regime to the country to help the restoration of democracy.  He implies that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election.  The case was approved by COMELEC and motion to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was denied to which Frivaldo filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court.

Issue: 
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988.

Held:
No. Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified from serving as the Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the elected Vice-Governor. Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for local elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running. - Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified voter, among other qualifications, must be a citizen of the Philippines.  The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election as the evidence shown from the certification of US District Court of North California stating that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldo’s argument that he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the participation in the election which in his view repatriated him to which the Court refutes that there are proper methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship either through Direct Act of Congress, Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access to. Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective office.

​EFREN ARATEA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012
 
 Facts:
Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
 
However, DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC.
 
Issue:
Who is qualified to hold the office of the mayor, Estela Antipolo, “the alleged second placer” or Efren Aratea, the winning Vice-Mayor.
 
Held:
Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

LBP vs COMELEC

Facts:
The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the party’s official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on “indefinite forced leave.” In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General. However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its officers is within the COMELEC’s jurisdiction.

Held:
The COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers” is a matter that is well within its authority.  The source of this authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample “wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.” However, by giving both wings’ representatives in the election committees, the COMELEC has eroded the significance of political parties and effectively divided the opposition.  The purpose of according to dominant status and representation to a minority party is precisely to serve as an effective check on the majority.  The COMELEC performed a disservice to the opposition and, ultimately, to the voting public, as its Resolution facilitated, rather than forestalled, the division of the minority party. The assailed COMELEC Resolution does not advance, but subverts, this philosophy behind political parties.
 

LUIS A. ASISTIO VS.  AGUIRRE
GR No. 191124 April 27, 2010

Facts :
On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio a Petition for Exclusion before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City alleging that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon verification by private respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered voter of Baranggay 15 but his declared address , in truth, falls under Baranggay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. On January 28, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing notifying Asistio, through his counsel of the scheduled hearings of the case. Asistio filed his Answer alleging that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of lease with Angelina Tengco which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Trial on the merits ensued and on February 5, 2010, Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision directing removal of the name of LUIS AQUINO ASISTIO from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City. An appeal to the MeTC decision was made as it would deprive Asistio of his right to vote . Echiverri, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees; petitioner having paid his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 which was not simultaneous with the filing of his notice of appeal on February 10, 2010 . RTC granted the motion of Echiverri to dismiss Asistio’s appeal of the MeTC decision on the ground of non-payment of the required docket fees.

Issue :
Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of [Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City for failure to comply with the residency required by law evidenced by the declaration of a false or non- existent address.

Held :
No.Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) echoed in Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189) states the qualifications of a voter. From these provisions, the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote.

"Residence," as used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances Domicile is not easily lost.

To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. As to the payment of docket fees, the Court observes, that while Judge Aguirre declares in her Order that the appellate docket fees were paid only on February 11, 2010 , she conveniently omits to mention that the postal money orders obtained by Asistio for the purpose were purchased on February 10, 2010. To the court, Asistio, by purchasing the postal money orders for the purpose of paying the appellate docket fees on February 10, 2010, although they were tendered to the MeTC only on February 11, 2010 already meant substantial compliance with the procedural requirements in filing his appeal. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years and his family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.

​Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his COC for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter do not serve as proof that he has abandoned his domicile or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City. The SC granted Asistio’s petition to reverse and set aside the February 5, 2010 decision of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, and the February 15, 2010 order of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC). Asistio remains a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. 

MAQUILING vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as citizen of United States of America. Sometime in 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted, and he subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. In November 2009, Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the Philippines, with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-American and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been using his American passport even after renunciation of American citizenship. A division of the COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Meanwhile, Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the second highest number of votes.

 Issue:
Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

Held:
Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation, but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of the candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the Constitution are nugatory. Furthermore, there is no second placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced. Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered the highest votes should be declared as winner.

​ Villaber vs COMELEC
GR NO. 148326
 
Facts:
Both petitioner Pablo Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cougas were rival candidate for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao Del Sur dating the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman on Feb. 1, 2001 file Cagas filed his on Feb. 28, 2001. On March 4 , 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao Del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter COC. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the RTC of Manila for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,00.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), he is disqualified to run for any public office. In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Further, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
 
Issue:
Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
 
Held:
Yes, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, because its violation imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contract to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals.

FERMIN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan. Private respondent, another mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition for Disqualification against Fermin. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy. Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC. Dilangalen emerged as the victor over Fermin. The latter subsequently filed an election protest. On 2007, COMELEC ruled that Fermin is a resident of a barangay not a component of the local government unit in which he seeks to be elected as of May 15, 2006 and is therefore not qualified or eligible to seek election as mayor in the said municipality. In its decision, the COMELEC relied on the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before Gov. Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that the petitioner was not a resident

​Held:
The mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation. A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side. WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari are GRANTED.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083.  May 26, 1999
 
Facts:
 
Ernesto Mamaril filed a disqualification case against vice-mayoralty candidate Manzano on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, the second division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code and the Makati charter, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The Commission found out that Manzano was born in 1955, of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother, in San Francisco, California, in the United States. Hence, he is an American citizen, following the jus soli rule, and at the same time, a Filipino citizen for being born of Filipino parents.
 
Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending such motion, the 1998 elections was held and Manzano garnered the highest number of votes for vice-mayor in the city of Makati. His proclamation was suspended, pending resolution of the case. Petitioner Mercado, who garnered the second highest number of votes to Manzano, intervened in the disqualification case. Without resolving Manzano's motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC second division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor. Hence, Mercado filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc.
 
 
Issue:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.
 
No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli.  Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.  Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
 
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli.
 
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
 
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
 
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
 
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.  While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
 
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.  Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”  Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.  Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.


Note:
Under RA 9225 (effective August 29, 2003), the mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is no longer deemed an express renunciation of foreign citizenship in order to run for public office. The candidate for public office with dual citizenship must (1) take an oath of allegiance and (2) execute a renunciation of foreign citizenship.
 

.
CAASI vs CA 
​G.R. No. 88831

Facts:
 Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate of Merito Miguel filed a petition to disqualify the latter from being a candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Pangasinan on the ground that Miguel is a green card holder. On his defense: Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections. COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that the possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite  of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials Petitioner then appealed to CA and prays for a review of the decision, "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the RTC which denied. The Court of Appeals ordered the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. It is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC.
​
 Issue:
Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.

Held:
Yes. Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration” which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,” Permanently.". On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code that states that, “Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.”.

GMA Network vs. COMELEC
 
Facts:
            The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
                Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements and required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guesting and appearances.
Issue:
                Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
 
Held:
                Yes. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms, and programs of government. And this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
                It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
 

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Facts:
 In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines. The second placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal. When the FPJ died during his medical treatment, his widow, Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs. Protestee also contends that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the president.

Issue:
 May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case.

Held:
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee, hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself denies any claim to the office of President but rather stresses that it is with the “paramount public interest” in mind that she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by her late husband. However, nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes.
 
 

AQUINO vs. COMELEC
(248 SCRA 400)
 
FACTS:
 
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
 
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
 
 
HELD:
 
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

Soller vs COMELEC
 G.R. NO. 139853
 
FACTS
 
Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections.  The petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by the municipal board of canvassers.  Private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.  Later, private respondent filed an election protest against petitioner with the RTC.  The COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, while the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion was denied.
Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing private respondent’s election protest.  The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit. Petitioner now questions this decision of the COMELEC en banc.
 
ISSUE:
 
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.
 
HELD
 
The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. In the SC’s view, the authority to resolve petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.

​Office of the Ombudsman vs  Zaldarriaga
G.R. No. 175349 , June 22, 2010
 
Facts:
Zaldarriaga was a Municipal Treasurer, COA conducted an audit examination of the accountabilities of Zaldarriaga's cash and accounts covering November 1997 to November 1998. The audit showed a deficiency of P4.7M. Respondent was asked to restitute the deficiency but he failed to do so. COA filed a Letter-Complaint, but Zaldarriaga contested the finding of the COA auditors alleging that it was inaccurate, incorrect, and devoid of merit. The Provincial Treasurer also conducted its own investigation, but its findings did not indicate any shortage but, instead, pointed out that had the mayor, treasurer, and accountant observed the COA Rules, the irregularity would not have been committed.
Two years later, COA conducted another audit examination. Report showed a zero balance during the last examination conducted. Respondent then sought for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the latest COA report indicated that there was no shortage. However, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing respondent from government service for dishonesty. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the latter hence the said petition for review on certiorari.
 
Issue:
Whether CA erred in holding that the Ombudsman’s dismissal was not based on sufficient evidence.
 
Held:
In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The evidence upon which respondents’ administrative liability would be anchored lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative cases, because the two separate audits conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results. Evidence of shortage in respondents’ cash and accounts, as alleged in the first audit report, is imperative to hold him liable.
In this case, the evidence against respondent could not be relied upon, because the second audit report, which was favorable to him, necessarily puts into question the reliability of the initial audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were already tarnished. Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of liability.
 
Petitioner maintains that the zero-balance reflected in the second report, prepared two years after the first audit, cannot negate the finding of cash shortage, considering that second report is defective.
 
The petition is bereft of merit. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as in civil cases, but such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
Here, the evidence lacked that degree of certainty because the entries in the two audit examinations yielded conflicting results. In the first report, the alleged shortage is 4.7M. However, in the succeeding report was reflected that there was no balance during the last (the first) audit. These discrepancies cannot be ignored. Evidence of shortage is imperative to hold respondent. Here, the evidence could not be relied upon. The second report puts into question the reliability of the first. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two reports were already tarnished. A separate and more thorough audit would be required to dispel any uncertainties and to arrive at respondent’s true and correct accountability. The shortage of funds was clearly not indubitably established. Until such audit is conducted, the two audit reports cannot be used to prove or disprove any shortage in respondent’s cash and accounts.
In the instant case, the evidence submitted to conclude that respondent was administratively liable is sorely wanting.

Montemayor vs. Bundalian
​ G.R. No. 149335

Facts:
Edillio C. Montemayor assails the Decision of the Office of the President which ordered his dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth, as a result of an investigation conducted by the Philippine Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which arrived at the conclusion that the real property he had acquired in California, U.S. was unlawfully acquired for it was manifestly out of proportion to his salary. His dismissal originated from the unverified complaint of the private respondent, Luis Bundalian addressed to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A which were later on indorsed to the PCAGC for investigation. Montemayor, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. He likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman which was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. The PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service.

Issue:
Whether or not he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC.

Held:
​ No, the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process just because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. The petitioner’s active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation.

Evangelista vs. Jarencio
G.R. No L-29274

Facts:
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

​Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein. Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

Issue:
Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

Held:
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rulemaking, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. We recognize that in the case before us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.".

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

Carino vs. Commission of Human Rights
G.R. No. 96681

Facts:
​Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT undertook "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly. Secretary of Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing the DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply. After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied. Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they were denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The CHR issued an order to Cariño to appear and enlighten the Commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter. Sec. Cariño filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the CHR has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.

Issue:
Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, hear or determine, certain specific types of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

Held:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claims of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of the controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the faculty of receiving evidence must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively. The Constitution clearly grants the CHR the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear or determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate. ‘Investigate’ means to examine, explore, inquire, or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of investigation is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy. Hence, the CHR, merely having the power to ‘investigate’ cannot and should not “try and resolve the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in the Striking Teachers case as it has announced it has means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers, their human rights has been transgressed. These matters are within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being in the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him by the Civil Service Law.

Department of Health vs. Philip Morris Philippines
G.R. No. 202943

Facts:
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Inc. (PMPMI), by virtue of Article 116 of RA 7394 applied for a sales promotion permit through BFAD (now, FDA) for its Gear Up Promo. When more than fifteen (15) days elapsed without the BFAD formally acting upon the application, PMPMI inquired about its status. PMPMI was only verbally informed of the existence of a Memorandum issued by DOH prohibiting tobacco companies from conducting any tobacco promotional activities in the country. PMPMI filed another application for a sales promotional permit, this time for its Golden Stick Promo, which the BFAD refused; pursuant to a directive of the BFAD Director that all permit applications for promotional activities of tobacco companies will no longer be accepted.

PMPMI filed an administrative appeal before the DOH Secretary, assailing the BFAD’s denial of its Gear Up Promo and Golden Stick Promo applications. PMPMI maintained that under RA 9211, promotion is not prohibited but merely restricted, and that while there are specific provisions therein totally banning tobacco advertising and sponsorships, no similar provision could be found banning promotion. It also insisted that the denial of its promotional permit applications was tantamount to a violation of its right to due process as well as their right to property. DOH ruled that the intent and purpose of RA 9211 was to completely ban tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship. Aggrieved, PMPMI elevated the matter to the CA.

CA granted the petition and nullified the decision of the DOH. It ruled that the DOH is bereft of any authority to enforce the provisions of RA 9211 in view of the creation of the Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco) under Section 29 of the said law, which shall have the “exclusive power and function to administer and implement the provisions of [RA 9211] x x x”. Thus, the CA ruled that the DOH wrongfully arrogated unto itself the authority given to the IAC-Tobacco to administer and implement the provisions of RA 9211, which includes regulation of tobacco promotions.

Issue:
Whether or not DOH has the authority to rule on the case.

Held:
The Court finds that RA 9211 impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of RA 7394 with respect to the authority of the DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotion. The Court notes that both laws separately treat “promotion” as one of the activities related to tobacco: RA 7394 defines “sales promotion” under Article 4 , while RA 9211 speaks of “promotion” or “tobacco promotion” under Section 4 (l). The Court has judiciously scrutinized the above definitions and finds that there is no substantial difference between the activities that would fall under the purview of “sales promotion” in RA 7394, as well as those under “promotion” in RA 9211, as would warrant a delineation in the authority to regulate its conduct. In fact, the techniques, activities, and methods mentioned in the definition of “sales promotion” can be subsumed under the more comprehensive and broad scope of “promotion.” The Court agrees with the CA, that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities. As such, the DOH’s ruling, including its construction of RA 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void, which, as a necessary consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the same. As it stands, the present applications filed by PMPMI are thus remanded to the IAC-Tobacco for its appropriate action.