​Land Bank vs  Celada
G.R. No. 164876, Jan. 23, 2006,
479 SCRA 495

Facts:
Respondent, Celada owns agricultural in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol identified in 1998 by the DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the CARP.
LBP valued respondent's land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount, but it was rejected.
The matter was referred to DARAB Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation.
While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.
SAC set aside petitioner's valuation of respondent's land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. The SAC based its valuation of P354,847.50 solely on the observation that there was a 'patent disparity between the price given to respondent and the other landowners.

Issue:
Whether or not the SAC a quo erred in fixing the just compensation of the land based not on its actual land use but on the valuation of neighboring lands.

Held:
YES. The SAC erred in setting aside petitioner’s valuation of respondent’s land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties.
We note that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657 that "should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter". The SAC further held that said Section 17 "cannot be superseded by any administrative order of a government agency", thereby implying that the valuation formula under DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998 (DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998), is invalid and of no effect.
While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR’s duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.

Land Bank
vs
Colarina
G.R. No. 176410, Sep. 1, 2010,
629 SCRA 614 (2010)

Facts:
Respondent  Colarina manifested his voluntary offer to his sell three (3) parcels of agricultural land to the DAR for coverage under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Disappointed with the low valuation by petitioner and the DAR, respondent filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi, Albay, for the judicial determination of just compensation.
During pre-trial, LBP manifested that the subject properties may be reassessed and revaluated based on the new guidelines set forth in DAR A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994.
The respondent, to support his valuation of the subject properties, presented in evidence his own testimony and that of  Oliva), then Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur and President of the Camarines Chapter of the National Real Estate Association.
Thereafter, the SAC rendered a decision reconciling the conflicting evidence of the parties. The SAC followed the formula of the LBP and its land use classification of the subject properties; the appraisal report on the valuation thereof.

Both parties appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the SAC

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts’ computation of just compensation for the subject properties is correct.

Held:
No. The factors for the determination of just compensation in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, and consequently converted into a formula in A.O. No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994, is mandatory. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, as affirmed by our subsequent rulings, did not equivocate.
We note that A.O. No. 6, Series of 1992 (as amended by A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994) has been superseded by A.O. No. 5, Series of 1998. However, A.O. No. 5, Series of 1998, is not applicable to the present case as the subject properties were assessed and valued prior to its effectivity.
However, the RTC, as well as the CA, was gravely mistaken in using respondent’s valuation of the properties contained in Oliva’s appraisal report. Oliva’s appraisal report did not attach pertinent documents thereto, considering that, as he had testified, he used the productivity approach.
Thus, replacing the valuation of the subject properties pursuant to the determination of petitioner where the LV was pegged using the formula {CNI x 90%} + {MV x 2}, we arrive at a different amount.

Land Bank
vs
Dumlao
G.R No. 167809
Nov. 27, 2008
572 SCRA 108 (2008)

Facts:
Respondents, heirs of the deceased Dumlao, were the co-owners of several parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 32.2379 hectares situated at Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The properties were placed under Operation Land Transfer by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). However, the definite time of actual taking was not stated.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order (EO) No. 228, a preliminary valuation was made by the DAR on the landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 41504 and T-1180 with a total area of 16.3939 hectares.
Finding the valuation to be correct, petitioner bank informed respondents of the said valuation. Payments were then deposited in the name of the landowners.

Issues:
1. Whether or not since the properties were acquired pursuant to PD No. 27, the formula for computing just compensation provided by said decree and Executive Order No. 228 should apply.

2. Whether or not October 21, 1972 (when PD 27 was issued) should be deemed as the date of taking of the subject properties.

Held:
1. The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although the property was acquired under PD No. 27.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Estanislao, the Court ruled that taking into account the passage of RA No. 6657 in 1988 pending the settlement of just compensation, it is that law which applies to landholdings seized under PD No. 27, with said decree and EO No. 288 having only suppletory effect.
Guided by this precept, just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform under PD 27 should adhere to Section 17 of RA 6657.
Section 17 was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by AO No. 11, Series of 1994,72 the pertinent portions of which provide:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by [Voluntary Offer to Sell] or [Compulsory Acquisition] regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of the land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of claimfolder.

2. No. The "taking" of the properties for the purpose of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the date of issuance of emancipation patents, and not on October 21, 1972, as petitioner insists. The nature of the land at that time determines the just compensation to be paid.
It is undisputed that emancipation patents were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the trial court should determine the date of issuance of these emancipation patents in order to ascertain​the date of taking and proceed to compute the just compensation due to respondents, in accordance with RA No. 6657.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI)
vs
PARC
G.R. No. 171101
April 24, 2012
670 SCRA 392 (2012)

Facts:
Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain obligations under the SDP. January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock Distribution Plan(DSP).
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA) contends that if HLI or Tadeco is, at all, entitled to just compensation, the "taking" should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989, the date when the SDP was approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000 per hectare as this was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure that the FWBs will not control the majority stockholdings in HLI.

Issue:
Whether or not in determining the just compensation, the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP [stock distribution plan] "in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBS were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita"

Held:
​We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that "the ‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic." It should be noted, however, that "taking" does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). "Taking" also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of "taking" as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.

Province of Camarines Sur
vs
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993,
222 SCRA 173 (1993)


Facts:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province, through its Governor, Hon.  Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of Php5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
The Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue:
Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program

Held:
No. It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.

Republic vs. Salvador N. Lopez Agri Business Corp.
G.R. No. 178895, Jan. 10, 2011,
639 SCRA 49 (2011)

Facts:
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez AgriBusiness Corporation. Said parcels of land are hereinafter described as follows:Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835 under TCT No. T12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad. 286 of TCT No. T12637 which is already covered under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Scheme and had already been valued by the Land Valuation Office, Land Bank of the Philippines.

On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T12635 covering Lots 1454A and 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter affidavit addressed to the respondent Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.

On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots 1454A and 1296 were taken beyond the operation of the CARP pursuant to its reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District (Heavy Industry) per Resolution No. 39 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional Director denied the Motion.
The petitioner appealed the Regional Directors Orders to respondent DAR. On June 10, 1998, the latter issued its assailed Order affirming the Regional Directors ruling on Lots 1454A and 1296 and further declared Lots 1298 and 1293B as covered by the CARP.
On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent prompting the former to file the instant petition.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T12637 and T12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the Lopez lands) from coverage of the CARL.
However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption withrespect to Lots 1454A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T12635) in Barrio Limot (the Limot lands). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T16356). The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Court’s ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR.

Held:
The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, the Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL.

In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP.In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs, some of which were covered by several certificates of ownership. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business, structures consisting of two chutes where the livestock were kept during nighttime. The existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of the CARL was positively affirmed by the farm workers and the overseer who were interviewed by the MARO. Considering these factual findings and the fact that the lands were in fact being used for SNLABC’s livestock business even prior to 15 June 1988, the DAR Regional Director ordered the exemption of the Lopez lands from CARP coverage. The Court gives great probative value to the actual, on-site investigation made by the MARO as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director. The Court finds that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising.
The tax declarations of the Lopez lands as agricultural lands are not conclusive or final, so as to prevent their exclusion from CARP coverage as lands devoted to livestock-raising. Indeed, the MARO’s on-site inspection and actual investigation showing that the Lopez lands were being used for livestock-grazing are more convincing in the determination of the nature of those lands. In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABC’s use of the area as a "seasonal extension of the applicant’s ‘grazing lands’ during the summer." Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC’s livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable -- and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used -- for agricultural purposes.

Roxas & Co. v. DAMBA-NFSW
G.R. No. 149548, Dec 04, 2009,
607 SCRA 33 (2009)

Facts:
Petitioner, Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by Department of Agrarian Reform in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 petitioner, through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its voluntary offer to sell of Hacienda Caylaway.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Petitioner, filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Petitioner filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.

Issue:
Whether or not  Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non- agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage.

Held:
No. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. It bears emphasis that a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes.
Petitioner, Roxas & Co., can only look to the provisions of the Tourism Act, and not to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, for possible exemption.

DAR vs DECS
G.R. No. 158228, Mar 23, 2004,
426 SCRA 217 (2004)

Facts:
Subject Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.
DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.

June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.
DAR Regional Director Andres, August 7, 1998  approved the recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.
DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director.

Aggrieved, DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.

Issue: 
Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL)

Held:
NO. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz: x x x x x x x x x c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, … , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. x x x x x x x x x Clearly, it shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: a. the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and b. the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes." The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

​Central Mindanao University
vs.
DARAB
G.R. No. 100091, Oct 22, 1992,
215 SCRA 86 (1992)

Facts: 
Central Mindanao University(CMU) is an agricultural university. From its beginning, CMU was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines.

Then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
It was 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called"Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the school were leased to its faculty and employees.  Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the University a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
When  Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the Univertisy in July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued.
Another project was launched o develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision that there would be no tenant-landlord relationship.
The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not. The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.
DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU.

Issue:
Whether or not subject land is covered by CARP.

Held:
NO. The 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
 It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress; It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the Central Mindanao University; and, It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers

Petitioner, was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on January 8, 1960. Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and byproducts of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law.
On June 10, 1988, a new Agrarian Reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its several properties from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms. On December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CAR coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner redocumented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.

The DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived with a recommendation for the exemption of petitioners 316.0422 hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director  Dalugdug issued an Order exempting petitioners 316.0422 hectare property from CARP.

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994. Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a letter appeal with the DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa Baras, Rizal. The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate portions of the property. In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory.

R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881, which was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. On October 22, 1996, the fact finding team formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and Support Services conducted an actual headcount of the livestock population on the property. The headcount showed that there were 448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary  Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioners president, prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.

Applying the animalland ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the infrastructureanimal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of the property.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however, Secretary Garilao denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal before the Office of the President (OP). On February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision reinstating Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the entire 316.0422 hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP.
However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by farmergroups Samahang AnakPawis ng Lagundi and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution dated September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous decision and a new one entered REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal -and and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage.Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR Conversion Order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422 hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use.
The CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration were filed by farmergroups, namely: the farmers represented by Espinas (Espinas group), the Pinugay Farmers, and the SAPLAG. The farmergroups all claimed that the CA should have accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP. Moreover, the farmergroups unanimously intimated that petitioner already converted and developed a portion of the property into a leisure residential commercial estate known as the Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex .

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same token, the Espinas group prayed that this remaining area be covered by the CARP.CA amended its decision and the 162.7373 hectare agricultural portion is declared covered by CARP. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not lands devoted to livestock farming within the meaning of Luz farms and Sutton, and which are thereby exempt from  CARL coverage, are nevertheless subject to DAR’s continuing verification as to use, and, on the basis of such verification, may be ordered reverted to agricultural classification and compulsory acquisition

Held:
YES. The Court held that it is established that that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR Secretary’s competence and jurisdiction. It is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence.

Facts:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.

In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
DAR ignored their request. DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.
DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.
Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government

Issue:
Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are constitutional.

Held:
​YES. In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as:​animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.15
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR16 reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.17 We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term "agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.
A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform.

Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands.

Issue: 
Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are constitutional.

Held:
NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Facts:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as town site reservation.
EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted. DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
Natalia and EDIC protested to this.

Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.

DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision.
Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings
Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.
Hence, this petition.
Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for town site reservation.
OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion

Issue:
Whether or not lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies prior to 15 June 1988, are covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

Held:
NO. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus --
Republic Act no. 6657 states,  Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.

Facts:
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents, instituted a complaint against Hon.  Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.

Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City  rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment.
WON lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
NO. We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus, The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45)
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. .

Issue:
Whether or not  land owner can still exercise their right of retention over subject 4.1685 hectares rice land despite the fact that a previous decision denying petition for exemption under Presidential Decree 27 had long been executory.

Facts:
Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Soriente, Macatulad,  Mediana and  Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers,  Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same rice land, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

On March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed  Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.

DAR Secretary affirmed the decision of the regional director. They appealed to the Office of the President (OP).

Office of the President ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectares of land. The application of the children was still denied. Hence the appeal in CA.

CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.

Held:
YES. Petitioner heirs of  Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 23 , we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657 24 . We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. 25 Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, 
SECTION 6. Retention Limits — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall ​Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares" .
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.

Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co., is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Issues:
1. Whether or not  acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law
2. Whether or not assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, Supreme Court has the power to rule on this issue

Held:
1. No.

2. No. The failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs  Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
Jul 14, 1989,

Facts:

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents.

​The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of rice holding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution

Issue:
Whether or not CARL violates due process because landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain

Held:
NO. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.