Luz Farms vs Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 86889 December 4, 1990
 
 
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657.
 
Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989
 
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it.

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."

(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13...

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.

In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . .

​Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is constitutional in including the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
 
Held:
No. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional .

​Robustum Agricultural Corporation vs DAR
G.R. No. 221484, November 19, 2018
 
 
Facts:
Petitioner Robustum Agricultural Corporation is the registered owner of a 50,000-square meter parcel of agricultural land  in Silay City per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15256. The subject land was formerly a part of a 300,000-square meter agricultural estate (mother estate) owned by Puyas Agro, Inc. (PAI), petitioner's predecessor-in­-interest.
 
On December 5, 2013, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II Teresita R. Mabunay, prepared a letter, denominated as "Transmittal of NOC to the Landowner-Transferee/s," addressed to petitioner. The letter sought to furnish petitioner with a copy of a notice of coverage previously issued by the DAR which identifies the mother estate as subject to the agrarian reform program. The letter also aims to inform petitioner that, as a transferee of a portion of the mother estate, it will be included by the DAR as an "alternative land owner and payee" for purposes of documentation of the [claim folder], the issuance of a memorandum of valuation and the payment of compensation proceeds for the mother estate.
 
On August 14, 2014, petitioner filed before the RTC of Silay City a petition for quieting of title and declaratory relief[14] against the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines. Therein, petitioner questioned the efficacy of the notice coverage published by the DAR. Petitioner reckoned such notice as ineffective on two (2) accounts:

1. The notice of coverage - for being merely published in a newspaper of general circulation - was not properly served. The publication of the said notice was not preceded by any attempt on the part of the DAR to effect personal service of the same. Such immediate resort to publication, in turn, violates Section 16 of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 07-11 which prescribes personal service as the "primary" means of serving notices of coverage.

2. Even assuming that the notice of coverage was properly served by publication, the same still cannot be enforced as against the subject land. Such notice remains infirm because it was never posted at a conspicuous place within the subject land and on a bulletin board in the city or barangay hall, where the subject land is located, for seven (7) days, as required under Section 19 of DAR AO No. 07-11.
 
The RTC sided with the DAR and the LBP. On June 11, 2015, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC remained steadfast.
 
Issue:
Whether or not RTC's  lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for quieting of title and declaratory relief. Whether or not RTC have jurisdiction on the case.
 
Held:
RTC have no jurisdiction on the case. DAR maintains the authority to bring the said proceeding into conclusion pursuant precisely to Section 30 of RA No. 9700.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Orders dated June 11, 2015 and September 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, of Silay City in Civil Case No. 2915-69, insofar as they effectively dismissed the petition for quieting of title and declaratory relief filed by petitioner Robustum Agricultural Corporation, are AFFIRMED.
 

​Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eugenio Dalauta
G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017
 
PONENTE: JusticeJose Catral Mendoza
 
FACTS:
Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus, Dalauta received on February 7, 1994 a Notice of Coverage notifying him that his land was subject of expropriation. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected such valuation for being too low.
The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). A summary administrative proceeding was conducted to determine the appropriate just compensation for the subject property. In its Resolution, the PARAD affirmed the valuation made by LBP in the amount of ₱192,782.59.
Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
 
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, which was Land Value (LV) = Capitalized Net Income (CNI) x 0.9 + Market Value (MV) per tax declaration x 0.1, as he had a net income of ₱350,000.00 in 1993 from the sale of the trees that were grown on the said land to Norberto C. Fonacier.
 
On May 30, 2006, the SAC rendered its decision pegging the just compensation in the amount of ₱2,639,557.00, higher than the value made by LBP. Unsatisfied, LBP filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the SAC.
 
Hence, LBP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA, arguing, among others that the SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB decision sustaining the LBP valuation had long attained finality and that the SAC violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, in fixing the just compensation.
 
The CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It ruled that the SAC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.  
 
ISSUES

1. Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD Resolution.
2. Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the subject property.

 
RULING:
Yes. It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void.
Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.
 
No. On Just Compensation

Upon an assiduous assessment of the different valuations arrived at by the DAR, the SAC and the CA, the Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land should be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003). The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Butuan City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, for purposes of computing just compensation in accordance with JMC No.11.

Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative v. Inson
G.R. No. 189162, January 30, 2019
 
PONENTE: Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen

FACTS:      
  Sometime in 2003, a parcel of land owned by Polo Coconut Plantation, Inc. (Polo Coconut) in Tanjay, Negros Oriental was placed under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. A Notice of Coverage was sent to Polo Coconut.
Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) received from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) a Memorandum of Valuation, indicating the amount of P85,491,784.60 as just compensation for the Polo Coconut property. A Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition was then sent to Polo Coconut. Subsequently, a Certificate of Deposit was issued to Polo Coconut for the said amount.
After Polo Coconut failed to reply to the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition, the DAR, after it conducted summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation, affirmed the valuation offered by LBP in the amount of P85,491,784.60.
Meanwhile, Polo Coconut’s title was canceled. Thus, a collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award, with CLOA No. 00114438, was issued and was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-802, in favor of POPARMUCO members whom the Department of Agrarian Reform identified as agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Polo Coconut filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari questioning the propriety of subjecting its property to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program assailing, among others, the eligibility of the identified agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The CA ruled in favor of Polo Coconut. It held that the identified beneficiaries were not qualified as beneficiaries, as they were not tenants of Polo Coconut.
When appealed to the Supreme Court (SC), in its September 3, 2008 Decision, in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Polo Coconut Plantation Company, Inc. (586 Phil. 69) it reversed the CA Decision. It declared the issuance of TCT No. T-802 and CLOA No. 00114438 as valid. The Court further recognized the DAR as the proper authority to identify and select agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The September 3, 2008 Decision became final and executory on November 26, 2008.
Seven (7) months later, on June 30, 2009, Alcantara, et al. filed the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion. They questioned the inclusion of POPARMUCO’s members as beneficiaries and recipients of Certificates of Land Ownership Award. They alleged that the beneficiaries are not qualified under Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
On July 1, 2009, Alcantara, et al. also filed a Petition for Immediate Issuance of a Cease and Desist Order and/or Injunction. Thus, they sought a Cease and Desist Order to preserve their legal rights while the administrative proceedings for the inclusion/exclusion of farmer beneficiaries were pending resolution.
Acting on the Petition, Regional Director Inson issued a Cease and Desist Order directing the Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders to CEASE and DESIST from entering or taking possession of the property pending final determination of the inclusion-exclusion proceedings.
POPARMUCO members, who are Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders, filed a Motion to Quash the Cease and Desist Order. They alleged that the Cease and Desist Order defied the Supreme Court’s September 3, 2008 Decision.
POPARMUCO also filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Contempt against Regional Director Inson, praying that a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued, directing him to cease: (1) from enforcing the Cease and Desist Order in light of the Petition; and (2) from reviewing the beneficiaries, as the SC had decided with finality on the issue. It further prayed that this Court hold Regional Director Inson guilty of contempt of court.
ISSUES:
A.       Whether or not Alcantara et. al. may question the validity of the collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award with CLOA No. 00114438 issued to POPARMUCO.
B.       Whether or not Director Inson’s cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion of farmer beneficiaries, and his subsequent issuance of the Cease and Desist Order constitute contempt of court.
      
RULING:
A.  No.     The September 3, 2008 Decision had already become final and executory. The finality of this Decision meant that:
Nothing is more settled in law than that a judgment, once it attains finality, becomes immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This rule rests on the principle that all litigation must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear; otherwise, litigation will become even more intolerable than the wrong or injustice it is designed to correct [Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, 678 Phil. 879, 908-909 (2011)].
In Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform [526 Phil. 700 (2006)], the Court held that certificates of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents are as indefeasible as transfer certificates of title issued in registration proceedings. Further, it ruled that the transfer certificates of title issued to the petitioners became indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the issuance of the emancipation patents.
Here, by the time the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion was filed on June 30, 2009, the September 3, 2008 Decision declaring the validity of CLOA No. 00114438 had attained finality and TCT No. T-802 had already become incontrovertible. As registered property owners, POPARMUCO’s members were entitled to the protection given to every Torrens title holder. Their rights may only be forfeited in case of violations of agrarian laws, as well as noncompliance with the restrictions and conditions under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
B.       Regional Director Inson’s cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion does not constitute defiance of the September 3, 2008 Decision.
In Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Paruñgao [701 Phil. 444 (2013)], the SC explained the concept of contempt of court:
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, hut such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
Here, Regional Director Inson justified his cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion based on the Department’s exclusive prerogative in the identification, selection, and subsequent re-evaluation of agrarian reform beneficiaries.
However, as earlier stated, the issue on the qualification of the existing Certificate of Land Ownership Award holders had long been laid to rest in this Court’s final and executory September 3, 2008 Decision.
Still, Regional Director Inson’s erroneous cognizance of the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion can only be deemed as grave abuse of discretion, which is more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, not a petition for contempt.
At any rate, whether Regional Director Inson’s actions were improper is not an issue here. What is crucial in contempt proceedings is the intent of the alleged contemnor to disobey or defy the court as held in St. Louis University, Inc. v. Olairez [730 Phil. 444 (2014)]:
In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its character. . . . To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
There is no clear and contumacious conduct on the part of Regional Director Inson. His acts do not qualify as a willful disobedience to this Court nor a willful disregard of its authority.
 

​Limkaichong vs. Land Bank of the Philippines
799 SCRA 139
G.R. No. 158464
August 02, 2016

Facts:
Petitioner Jocelyn Limkaichong was the registered owner of agricultural lands with a total area of 19.6843 hectares situated in Villegas, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental placed under CARP coverage.

On May 28, 1999, the DARAB issued its order affirming the valuation of the lands upon finding the valuation earlier rejected by petitioner as consistent with existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.

On August 19, 1999, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Dumaguete City a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands.

On June 7, 2001, the RTC as the SAC granted the respondents' motion to dismiss. Citing Section 51 and Section 5416 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 11 of Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, it held that the petitioner's complaint should have been filed within 15 days from notice of the assailed order. It dismissed her argument that the case was anchored on violations of her constitutional rights to due process and just compensation, declaring that the controlling ruling was Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, not Republic v. Court of Appeals. Thus, applying the ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank, the RTC concluded that dismissal was proper because she had filed Civil Case No. 12558 beyond the statutory 15-day period.

Court of Appeals  affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court's dismissal of her petition because of her failure to file it before the decision/order of the DARAB became final and executory pursuant to Section 51 of R.A, No. 6657 was fair and proper.

Held:
​No. We cannot fairly and properly hold that the petitioner's complaint for the determination of just compensation should be barred from being tried and decided on that basis. The prevailing rule at the time she filed her complaint on August 19, 1999 was that enunciated in Republic v. Court of Appeals on October 30, 1996. The pronouncement in Philippine Veterans Bank was promulgated on January 18, 2000 when the trial was already in progress in the RTC, At any rate, it would only be eight years afterwards that the Court en banc unanimously resolved the jurisprudential conundrum through its declaration in Land Bank v. Martinez that the better rule was that enunciated in Philippine Veterans Bank, The Court must, therefore, prospectively apply Philippine Veterans Bank. The effect is that the petitioner's cause of action for the proper valuation of her expropriated property should be allowed to proceed. Hence, her complaint to recover just compensation was properly brought in the RTC as the SAC, whose dismissal of it upon the motion of Land Bank should be undone.

​Land Bank of the Philippines vs. De Leon
388 SCRA 537 ,
G.R. No. 143275
September 10, 2002

Facts:
Respondents Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac which was voluntarily offered for sale to the government at P50,000.00 per hectare. DAR made a counter offer of P17,656.20 per hectare, or a total amount of P884,877.54, but the same was rejected. Another offer was made by DAR increasing the amount to P1,565,369.35. In view of the respondents’ failure to respond to the new offer made by DAR, the DARAB took cognizance of the case pursuant to Sec. 16 (d) of RA 6657. Subsequently, the DARAB issued an Order directing LBP to recompute the value of the subject property in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992. LBP arrived at the recomputed value of the aggregate amount of P2,491,731.65 which respondents again rejected.

On October 27, 1994, LBP filed with RTC petition to fix just compensation.On December 19, 1997, RTC fixed just compensation as follows:
a. P1,260,000.00 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland;
b. P2,957,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland.
On March 17, 1998, the DAR filed in the CA a petition for review of the decision of the SAC.
Petitioner LBP also initiated in the CA an appeal of the same decision of the SAC by filing a notice of appeal.

CA dismissed the ordinary appeal instituted by petitioner LBP, reasoning that “the mode of appeal followed by the petitioner was erroneous considering that Section 60 of RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, mandates that appeals from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts should be by petition for review. Therefore, the notice of appeal filed by LBP was ineffectual and did not stop the running of the period of appeal.”

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in ruling that Section 60 of RA 6657 provides the proper mode for the review of the decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts despite Section 61 of RA 6657 which expressly mandates that the rules of court shall govern the review of the decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts by the Court of Appeals.

Held:
No. The case at bar requires an interpretation of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657. The said provisions provide that:
Section 60. Appeals, - An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.
Section 61.- Procedure in Review. Review by the Court of appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals, however, may require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, after which the case is deemed submitted for decision.
Respondent spouses point to Section 60 of RA 6657 to support their view that the mode of appeal initiated by petitioner LBP was erroneous. On the other hand, petitioner LBP believes that the mode of appeal it used is permissible under Section 61 of the same law.What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, in the determination of just compensation an appeal by way of a petition for review or an ordinary appeal.

​Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three modes of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases or multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only application.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Pascual
321 SCRA 629 ,
G.R. No. 128557
December 29, 1999

Facts:
​Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in Gattaran, Cagayan. Pursuant to PD 27 and EO 228, the DAR placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT).
On 11 June 1992 the PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioner LBP to pay private respondent a total amount of P1,961,950.00. Private respondent accepted the valuation.
Petitioner LBP having refused to comply with its obligation despite the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD.

CA ruled in respondent’s favor.

Petitioner LBP asserts that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued where there is another plain, adequate and complete remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner claims that private respondent had three (3) remedies. The first remedy was to ask the sheriff of the DARAB to execute the ruling of PARAD by levying against the Agrarian Reform Fund for so much of the amount as would satisfy the judgment. Another remedy was to file a motion with the DAR asking for a final resolution with regard to the financing of the land valuation. Lastly, private respondent could have filed a case in the Special Agrarian Court for the final determination of just compensation.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent should have filed a case with the Special Agrarian Court for the final determination of just compensation.

Held:
No. Although it is true that Sec. 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts shall have jurisdiction over the final determination of just compensation cases, it must be noted that petitioner never contested the valuation of the PARAD. Thus, the land valuation stated in its decision became final and executory. There was therefore no need for private respondent Pascual to file a case in the Special Agrarian Court.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Celada
479 SCRA 495 ,
G.R. No. 164876
January 23, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Leonila P. Celada, owns agricultural in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol identified in 1998 by the DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the CARP. LBP valued respondent's land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount, but it was rejected.

The matter was referred to DARAB Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation.
While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.

Issue:
Whether or not the SAC a quo erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for determination of just compensation while administrative proceedings is on-going before the DARAB, Region VII, Cebu City.

Held:
No. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.’ This ‘original and exclusive’ jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent’s petition for determination of just compensation.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz
567 SCRA 31 ,
G.R. No. 175175
September 29, 2008

Facts:
​Respondent Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz are Anicia Cruz-Papa, Resurreccion Cruz-Pagcaliwagan, Antonio D. Cruz, Lourdes Cruz-Doma, Lorna Cruz-Felipe, Mamerto D. Cruz, Eduardo D. Cruz and Victoria Cruz-Dumlao. Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated riceland situated in Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan of which 13.5550 hectares was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 277 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228.
Respondents rejected petitioner’s valuation and instituted an action for a summary proceeding for the preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD.
A perusal of the PARAD's Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR regulations to the question of just compensation. The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support of its finding.
The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended, as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation. Pertinently, to obtain the land value, the formula under said regulation requires that the values for the Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax declaration must be shown. Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for Capitalized Net Income,Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid down in the prior regulation.
Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in adopting SAC ruling that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD which did not adhere to the formula prescribed in regulations issued by the DAR

​Held:
YES. The Court held in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 should be applied in computing just compensation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, because the trial court therein based its valuation upon a different formula and did not conduct any hearing for the reception of evidence, the Court ordered a remand of the case to the SAC for trial on the merits.
Hence, the Court ordered that Agrarian Case No. 0058 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Tuguegarao ​City, Cagayan, which is directed to determine with dispatch the just compensation due respondents strictly in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz
567 SCRA 31 ,
G.R. No. 175175
September 29, 2008

Facts:
Respondent Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz are Anicia Cruz-Papa, Resurreccion Cruz-Pagcaliwagan, Antonio D. Cruz, Lourdes Cruz-Doma, Lorna Cruz-Felipe, Mamerto D. Cruz, Eduardo D. Cruz and Victoria Cruz-Dumlao. Eleuterio Cruz is the registered owner of an unirrigated riceland situated in Lakambini, Tuao, Cagayan of which 13.5550 hectares was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 277 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228.

Respondents rejected petitioner’s valuation and instituted an action for a summary proceeding for the preliminary determination of just compensation before the PARAD.
A perusal of the PARAD's Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent on the applicability of the aforementioned DAR regulations to the question of just compensation. The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support of its finding.
The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended, as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation. Pertinently, to obtain the land value, the formula under said regulation requires that the values for the Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax declaration must be shown. Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for Capitalized Net Income,Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid down in the prior regulation.
Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare. On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding.

Issue:
Whether or not the PARAD, in this case, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC

Held:
No. Finally and most importantly, we find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen(15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Martinez
530 SCRA 158 ,
G.R. No. 169008
August 14, 2007

Facts:
After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), on November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez’s 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the proffered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it.
Thus PARAD conducted summary administrative proceedings for thepreliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.

In a September 4, 2002 judgment, PARAD ordered LBP to pay petitioner the recomputed amount of Php12,179,492.50.
LBP filed with RTC petition for fixing just compensation 26 days after it received a copy of PARAD’s decision.
On November 11, 2003, granted respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On February 23, 2004, Office of the PARAD ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.
On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA.

CA found LBP guilty of forum-shopping for not disclosing the pendency of the Motion to Quash and dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the PARAD, in this case, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC

Held:
No. Finally and most importantly, we find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen(15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

​In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.

Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals
322 SCRA 139 ,
G.R. No. 132767
January 18, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-38666, T-38667, T-6236, and T-27591. The lands were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law(R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which on February 23, 1995, dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.

Issue:
Whether or not  a petition for the judicial fixing of just compensation before Special Agrarian Court should be [filed] within the period provided in Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure and before the decision of the DAR Provincial Adjudicator becomes final and executory.

 Whether or not  DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from the decision of the DAR.

Held:
No. The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657 provides:

SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .

​SECTION 57. Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
There is nothing contradictory between the provision of §50 granting the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform," which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the provision of §57 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclusive jurisdiction" over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination of the value of lands placed under land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the landowner of the government’s intention to acquire his land and the valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from receipt of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The landowner, the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is submitted for decision. If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.

To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly §50 thereof, Rule XIII, §11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. — The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.

As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable.

Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.

​Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, §11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.

Concha vs. Rubio
617 SCRA 22 ,
G.R. No. 162446
March 29, 2010

Facts:
The controversy involves the determination of who between petitioners and respondents are qualified to become beneficiaries over a portion of land registered in the name of Lilia E. Gala, Luisita E. Gala and Teresita E. Gala, respectively, with an aggregate area of 33.5006 hectares, more or less.
PARAD dismissed the case, ruling that it had no authority to rule on the selection of farmer-beneficiaries, as the same was a purely administrative matter under the jurisdiction of the DAR.
DARAB set aside PARAD decision.

CA reversed and set aside DARAB decision.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA granted, reinstating DARAB decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the issueinvolving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by the CARP

Held:
No. In Lercana v. Jalandoni, this Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation ofthe CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.

The finding of the MARO declaring petitioners as beneficiaries of the land in dispute must, therefore, be accorded respect. It should also be equally binding on the DARAB for the simple reason that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction over the former: The DARAB cannot review, much less reverse, the administrative findings of DAR. Instead, the DARAB would do well to defer to DAR’s expertise when it comes to the identification and selection of beneficiaries, as it did in Lercana where this Court noted with approval that, in the dispositive portion of its decision, left to the concerned DAR Offices the determination of who were or should be agrarian reform beneficiaries. In fact, this course of action available to the DARAB is now embodied in Rule II of its 2003 Rules of Procedure, thus:
Section 5. Referral to Office of the Secretary (OSEC). − In the event that a case filed before the Adjudicator shall necessitate the determination of a prejudicial issue involving an agrarian law implementation case, the Adjudicator shall suspend the case and, for purposes of expediency, refer the same to the Office of the Secretary or his authorized representative in the locality .

Alangilan Realty & Development Corporation vs. Office of the President
616 SCRA 633 ,
G.R. No. 180471
March 26, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Barangays Alangilan and Patay in Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an Application and/or Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). It averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance (1982 Ordinance), which was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance (1994 Ordinance), reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. Petitioner thus claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP.On May 6, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao issued an Order denying petitioner's application for exemption. The DAR Secretary noted that, as of February 15, 1993, the Alangilan landholding remained agricultural, reserved for residential. It was classified as residential-1 only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural at the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), on June 15, 1988. The qualifying phrase reserved for residential means that the property is still classified as agricultural, and is covered by the CARP.

Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration which the DAR Secretary denied.

On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but OP denied it.

Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the OP decision. CA dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it.

Issue:
Whether or not the power to classify lands is essentially a legislative function that exclusively lies with the legislative authorities, and thus, when the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City declared the Alangilan landholding as residential in its 1994 Ordinance, its determination was conclusive and cannot be overruled by the DAR Secretary.

Held:
No. The exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify landholdings for coverage under the CARP is reposed in the DAR Secretary. The matter of CARP coverage, like the instant case for application for exemption, is strictly part of the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter well within the competence of the DAR Secretary.

As we explained in Leonardo Tarona, et al. v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division), et al.: The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Verily, it is explicitly provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

​Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The factual findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed.

Laguna Estates Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
335 SCRA 29 ,
G.R. No. 119357
July 05, 2000

Facts:
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"On 12 December 1989, some 234.76 hectares of agricultural land situated in Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna belonging to the Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation ("SRRDC", hereafter) was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its adjudicatory arm, public respondent DARAB, under the compulsory acquisition scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), and subsequently, Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA’s) numbered 00130422, 00130423 and 00130424 with TCT Nos. C-168, C-167 and C-169 334 were issued and award to farmers-beneficiaries, private respondents herein, namely: Rosa T. Amante, et al., Rogelio O. Ayende, et al. and Juan T. Amante, et al., respectively. The compulsory acquisition and distribution of the said 234.76 hectares of land in favor of private respondents were effected by virtue of the Decision dated 19 December 1991 issued by public respondent DARAB in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001-00, entitled "Juan T. Amante, et al. vs. Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp."

"It appears that the aforesaid agricultural lands in Bgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna are isolated and/or separated from the rest of the municipality of Cabuyao, and the only passage way or access road leading to said private respondents’ agricultural lands is the privately owned road network situated within the premises of petitioners CSE and LEDC. Subject to reasonable security regulations, the subject road network is open to the public. But after private respondents were awarded the aforesaid agricultural lands under the CARP Law, petitioners CSE and LEDC prohibited and denied private respondents from utilizing the subject road network, thereby preventing the ingress of support services under the CARP Law, provisions for daily subsistence to, and egress of farm produce from, Bgy. Casile where the farmlands awarded to private respondent are located.On motion by private respondents, DARAB issued an Order on 25 May 1993 directing the unhampered entry and construction of support services coming from the national government, and other provisions for the use and benefit of private respondents in Bgy. Casile, and giving private respondents a right of way over the subject road network owned by petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to grant private respondents who are beneficiaries of an agrarian reform program or tenants of adjoining landholdings a right of way over petitioners network of private roads intended for their exclusive use

Held:
​No. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over such issue. For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. Obviously, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without tenancy relations is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.

Sta. Ana vs Carpo
572 SCRA 463 ,
G.R. No. 164340
November 28, 2008

Respondent Leon Carpo and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land situated at Sta. Rosa, Laguna with an area of 91,337 square meters, more or less.
A portion thereof, consisting of 3.5 hectares, pertained to Leon and his wife, respondent Aurora Carpo. It was devoted to rice and corn production (subject land) and wastenanted by one Domingo Pastolero (Domingo), husband of Adoracion Pastolero (Adoracion). When Domingo passed away, Adoracion together with her son Elpidio Pastolero, assumed the tenancy rights of Domingo over the subject land.
However, on December 29, 1983, Adoracion, by executing a notarized Pinanumpaang Salaysay with the conformity of Leon, and for a consideration of P72,500.00, transferred her rights in favor of petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana (petitioner) who, together with her husband, Marciano de la Cruz (Marciano), became the new tenants of the subject land.
Circumstances transpired which abraded the relationship, and on December 1, 1989, respondents filed Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease Rentals.
Respondents alleged that it was their agreement with petitioner and Marciano to increase the existing rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans, and that, if respondents wanted to repossess the property, they only had to pay the petitioner the amount of P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to Adoracion. Respondents further averred that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual rentals from July 1985 to September 1989, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817; and that the subject land had been declared, upon the recommendation of theHuman Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ejected from the subject land and be directed to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.
Petitioner and Marciano denied that there was an agreement to increase the existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a year depending on the availability of irrigation water; that neither was there an agreement as to the future surrender of the land in favor of the respondents; that they did not refuse to pay the rentals because they even sent verbal and written notices to the respondents, advising them to accept the same; and that in view of the latter’s failure to respond, petitioner and Marciano were compelled to sell the harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings Account No. 9166 with the Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of Leon and Marciano. As their special affirmative defense, petitioner and Marciano claimed that Marciano is a farmer-beneficiary of the subject land pursuant to P.D. 27. Petitioner and Marciano prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint and for the declaration of Marciano as full owner of the subject land.PARAD held that petitioner should be ejected for non-payment of lease rentals. It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of the allegation in the complaint, but on the respondents' right of retention:
“The intent of the defendant to subject the said area under PD 27 should pass the criteria set. Foremost is the determination of the aggregate riceland of plaintiff. He must have more than seven (7) hectares of land principally devoted to the planting of palay. Area over seven (7) hectares shall be the one to be covered by PD 27 on Operation Land Transfer (OLT). In the case at bar, defendants failed to prove that plaintiff has more than the required riceland. In fact the subject 3.5 hectares are jointly owned by two. Hence, coverage for OLT is remote.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff is covered by LOI 474, and therefore, he is zero retention of area. In reference to said law, wherein it provides landowner with other agricultural land of more than 7 hectares, or have other industrial lands from where he and his family derived resources, then, the owner cannot retain any riceland. However, this is not applicable in the instant case, as the defendant failed to prove that plaintiffhas other source of income from where they will derive their sustenance.”
DARAB set aside PARAD’s decision, ruling that petitioner and Marciano did not deliberately fail to pay said rentals
CA reversed DARAB ruling and affirmed the factual findings of the PARAD. The CA, however, also held that the subject land had already become a residential, commercial and industrial area based on the vicinity map showing that the land was surrounded by commercial and industrial establishments.


1. WON the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land was no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the respondents.

2. WON CA acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural based on a zoning ordinance of 1981– on the strength of a mere vicinity map

1. YES. Issues with respect to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initiallybeen lodged in an administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Simply put, agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary.
Thus, Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. – The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances, to wit:
3.1 Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform program and the initialissuance of CLOAs and EPs, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of such coverage;
3.2 Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries;
3.3 Subdivision surveys of land under CARP;
3.4 Recall, or cancellation of provisional lease rentals, Certificates of Land Transfers (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall, or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
3.5 Exercise of the right of retention by the landowner;
3.6 Application for exemption from coverage under Section 10 of RA 6657;
3.7 Application for exemption pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44 (1990);
3.8 Exclusion from CARP coverage of agricultural land used for livestock, swine, and poultry raising;
3.9 Cases of exemption/exclusion of fish pond and prawn farms from the coverage of CARP pursuant to RA 7881;
3.10 Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) found unsuitable for agricultural purposes;3.11 Application for conversion of agricultural land to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses and purposes including protests or oppositions thereto;
3.12 Determination of the rights of agrarian reform beneficiaries to homelots;
3.13 Disposition of excess area of the tenants/farmer-beneficiary's landholdings;
3.14 Increase in area of tillage of a tenant/farmer-beneficiary;
3.15 Conflict of claims in landed estates administered by DAR and its predecessors; or
3.16 Such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
2. YES. The CA ruled that the land had ceased being agricultural on the basis of a mere vicinity map, in open disregard of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, since the issue was within the province of the Secretary of DAR.

Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos vs Court of Appeals 327 SCRA 293 ,
G.R. No. 109992
March 07, 2000

Facts:
The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24, 1989. In accordance with said levy on execution, the subject land was sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos, now substituted by his heirs represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia Vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.
Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on October 15, 1990, after private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period.
On April 1, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the DARAB, praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless."
The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an order on April 3, 1992, allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board.
Subsequently, on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. This petition was dismissed.
Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season."
On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Thereafter, on July 1, 1992, the Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio’s motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue raised in the above-mentioned complaint.
On July 8, 1992, intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion to Withdraw Intervenor’s deposited share. The motion was granted and intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of P 174,600.00 harvest proceeds in an Order dated November 18, 1992. Corollarily, the DARAB recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural tenant of the subject land.
Court of Appeals affirmed the April 3, 1992 Order of the DARAB ordering the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing with the Board the proceeds thereof, and the November 18, 1992 Order allowing the withdrawal of intervenor’s share in the proceeds and recognizing him as the duly constituted agricultural tenant.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in ruling that PARAD has jurisdiction over the ancillary matter/s raised by intervenor in DARAB Case No. 369-BUL ‘92.

Held:
No. In the case of Morta v. Occidental, Et Al., this Court held:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties.
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent’s petition for injunction in the first place.
("Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), see definition in Isidro vs. CA)
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject property.

​Significantly, DARAB admitted that the issue before the Regional Trial Court was one of ownership.
The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership.

Isidro vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105586
December 15, 1993
228 SCRA 503

Facts:
Respondent, Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner’s) income to meet his family’s needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a) that the complaint was triggered by his refusal to increase his lease rental; (b) the subject land is a fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of formal demand to vacate exposes the complaint to dismissal for insufficiency of cause of action.
MTC on  30 May 1991, dismissed the complaint, ruling that the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board).
Private respondent filed an appeal before the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, whichaffirmed MTC’s decision in toto. Private respondent appealed to CA.

On 27 February 1992, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, ordering petitioner to vacate the parcel of land in question and surrender possession thereof to private respondent, and to pay private respondent the sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court has the jurisdiction in this case.

Held:
Yes. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land.

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction.
(Reiterates essential requisites of tenancy relationship)
The fact remains that the existence of all the requisites of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner. In the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

Cabral vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 101974
July 12, 2001
361 SCRA 122

Facts: 
On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles issued in favor of private respondents. The patents and titles covered portions of the property owned and registered in the name of petitioner.
Petitioner alleged therein that she was the registered owner of several parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, among which is a parcel of land described therein as Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390. The petition further averred that as early as July 1973, petitioner applied with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the reclassification or conversion of the land for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. The application for conversion, however, was not acted upon. Instead, on April 25, 1988, Emancipation Patents, and, thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title, were issued in favor of private respondents.
On January 19, 1990, petitioner filed with the DAR itself another petition for the cancellation of the same Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles.
On February 11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an order dismissing the petition for cancellation of Emancipation Patents. The Regional Director likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated July 11, 1990.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the DAR Regional Director of Region III acted with jurisdiction when it took cognizance of and resolved the conversion application and/or cancellation of CLT/EP petition of petitioner-appellant.

Held: 
No. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may have had over the cancellation of emancipation patents, it lost with the passage of subsequent laws. And it is amply clear from these provisions that the function of the Regional Office concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws while that of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. Thus, the Regional Director is primarily tasked with "implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations within the responsibility of the agency," as well as the "agency program in the region."
The second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the determination of rights and obligations of the parties. To aid the DARAB in the exercise of this function, the Rules grant the Board and Adjudicators the powers to issue subpoenas and injunctions, to cite and punish for contempt, and to order the execution of its orders and decision, among other powers. The Rules also contain very specific provisions to ensure the orderly procedure before the DARAB, RARADs and PARADs.

​We hold that the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Cuenca
G.R. NO. 154112
439 SCRA 15 , September 23, 2004

Facts:
Private respondent, Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane.

On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657

On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for ‘Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.’

On 05 October 1999, MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.On 12 January 2000, the respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage.

On 14 January 2000, MARO Fortunado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order granting the TRO contending inter alia that the DAR, through the MARO, in the course of implementing the Notice of Coverage under CARP cannot be enjoined through a Temporary Restraining Order in the light of Sections 55 and 68 of R.A. 6657. The motion was denied.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) [thereafter filed before the CA] a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
"It is the submission of the petitioner that the assailed order is ‘in direct defiance… of Republic Act 6657, particularly Section 55 and 68’ thereof, which read:

‘SECTION 55. NO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS – No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection with the application, implementation, or enforcement or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform.’
‘SECTION 68 – IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM COURT’S INTERFERENCE – No injunction, Restraining Order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in the implementation of their program.’

Petitioner contends that by virtue of the above provisions, all lower courts, such as the court presided over by respondent Judge, ‘are barred if not prohibited by law to issue orders of injunctions against the Department of Agrarian Reform in the full implementation of the Notice of Coverage which is the initial step of acquiring lands under R.A. 6657.’
Petitioner also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is purely agrarian in character over which the court a quo has no jurisdiction and that therefore, it had no authority to issue the assailed injunction order.Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respondent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.

Held:
Yes. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters.
Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these cases. First, jurisdiction is conferred by law. And second, the nature of the action and the issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. The defenses resorted to in the answer or motion to dismiss are disregarded; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend entirely upon the whim of the defendant.
Reiterates ruling in Vda. de Tangub vs. CA
Here, the propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
…in case of doubt, the juris prudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies, "even if the questions involved are also judicial in character," as in this case.

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs  Amante
G.R. No. 112526
453 SCRA 432 , March 16, 2005

Facts:
The Canlubang Estate in Laguna is a vast landholding previously titled in the name of the late Speaker and Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Sr. Within this estate are two parcels of land (hereinafter referred to as the "subject property") covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891 measuring 254.766 hectares and part of Barangay Casile, subsequently titled in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC), the majority stockholder of which is C.J. Yulo and Sons, Inc.

On December 6, 1985, Amante, et al., who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 112526 and petitioners in G.R. No. 118838, instituted an action for injunction with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna (Branch 24) against Luis Yulo, SRRDC, and several SRRDC security personnel,docketed as Civil Case No. B-2333. Amante, et al. alleged that: they are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna, which covers an area of around 300 hectares; in 1910, their ancestors started occupying the area, built their houses and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon, and since then, have been peacefully occupying the land; some time in June 3, 1985, SRRDC’s security people illegally entered Bgy. Casile and fenced the area; SRRDC’s men also entered the barangay on November 4, 1985, cut down the trees, burned their huts, and barred the lone jeepney from entering the Canlubang Sugar Estate; as a result of these acts, Amante, et al. were deprived of possession and cultivation of their lands.

While the injunction and ejectment cases were still in process, it appears that in August, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to SRRDC.
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s landholdings covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T-84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the Board.
On December 19, 1991, the DARAB promulgated a decision, affirming the dismissal of the protest of SRRDC against the compulsory coverage of the property SRRDC had filed with the CA a petition for review of the DARAB’s decision. On November 5, 1993, the CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.

Issue:
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of whether the SRRDC properties are subject to CARP coverage.

Held:
No. There is no question that the power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with the DAR Secretary. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The DAR’s jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is two-fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance, while the second is judicial and involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.Pursuant to Section 50 of RA 6657, the DAR adopted the DARAB Revised Rules, Rule II (Jurisdiction of the Adjudication Board), which of which provides:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. – The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws;
b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank;
c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary, lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;
d) Cases arising from, or connected with membership or representation in compact farms, farmers’ cooperatives and other registered farmers’ associations or organizations, related to land covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws;
e) Cases involving the sale, alienation, mortgage, foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws;
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
g) And such other agrarian cases, disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR.
Provided, however, that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.

On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 06-00,89 which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, govern the administrative function of the DAR. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. Section 2 of the said Rules specifically provides, inter alia, that:SECTION 2. Cases Covered. - These Rules shall govern cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following:
(a) Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage;
(b) Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries;
(c) Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP;
(d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the Register of Deeds;
(e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner;…

​Here, SRRDC questions the DARAB’s jurisdiction to entertain the question of whether the subject property is subject to CARP coverage. As the DARAB succinctly pointed out, it was SRRDC that initiated and invoked the DARAB’s jurisdiction to pass upon the question of CARP coverage. It was SRRDC’s own act of summoning the DARAB’s authority that cured whatever jurisdictional defect it now raises. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body, is tantamount to a recognition of that court’s or body’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s or body’s jurisdiction.

Vda. de Tangub vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 9864
191 SCRA 885 , December 03, 1990

Facts:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided.

​In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. He opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26,1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Court of Appeals upheld decision of Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094.

Held:
Yes. RA 6657 echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the power to punishdirect and indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.

Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that --
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ." [Sec. 60]and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by Certiorari* except as otherwise provided . . . within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence." [Sec. 54]
Hence, the DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except on the aspects of (a) just​compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over which regular courts have jurisdiction. Here, the case concerns the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department.

​*[This mode of appeal is sui generis. It is the only instance when an appeal by Certiorari may be taken to the Court of Appeals. Heretofore, appeals by Certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court.]

Fortich vs Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624 (1998)

Facts:
This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.

In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.
In February, 1992, NQSRMDC sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of theBukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
On March 4, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).
On November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries.
Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land.

To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary’s order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction.
On October 23, 1995, CA issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition.
In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary’s decision and approving the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area.

On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
NQSRMDC found out that the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 andhad it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries.
On April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9) for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. RTC issued TRO against DAR and 141 others.
On June 23, 1997, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
On October 9, 1997 alleged farmer-beneficiaries protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President

This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

Issue:
Whether or not the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial can still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.

Held:
No. When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
“After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform​Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioners land.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.

​Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.’’

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, Jun 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295 (2010)

Facts:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous ruleson land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.

On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.

Issue:
Whether or not DAR AO NO. 01-02, as amended violates the local autonomy of local government units.

Held:
No. Department of Agrarian Reform AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure or that DAR’s approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.

The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing therein that, "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."

Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.

Ros v. DAR
G.R. No. 132477, Aug. 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 471 (2005)

Facts:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands.

On 03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balamban’s land use plan and adopted en toto Balamban’s Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. As part of their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications.

Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a letter from Mr. Jose Llames, Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal liabilities.

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City a Complaint dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals  affirmed RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and beyond the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

Held:
​No. The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides that "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657."

​After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 on June 15, 1988 are exempted from conversion.