Petitioner, Escobal is a member of the Intellegence Group of the PNP. On March 1990, while he was conducting a surveillance operation on drug trafficking, he somehow got involved in a shooting incident resulting to the death of Rodney Nueca. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and tried in the RTC of Naga City Branch 21.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case reiterating that since he committed the crime in the performance of his duty, the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction over his case. Thus, the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan. However, respondent which is the presiding justice of the case ordered the return of the records and that the case be remanded back to its court of origin, RTC 21.
Petitioner then filed a certiorari.
Whether or not the presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in remanding the case back to the RTC.
No. According to the Supreme Court under P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 7975, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to the salary grade below 27, the RTC or MTC as the case may be, shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Here, the petitioner is occupying a position equivalent to a Police Senior Inspector which has a salary grade of 23 falling short to the requirement of the law, giving the RTC the exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The Republic, through the OMB filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 petitions for the forfeiture of properties unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias’ had allegedly amassed and acquired. The Garcias’ filed motion to dismiss on the ground of Sandiganbayan’s lack of jurisdiction for lack of proper and valid service of summons: (1) Forfeiture I – the corresponding summons on the case were all issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention; (2) Forfeiture II – the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: “I’m receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-named (sic).”
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and her 3 sons.
No. Sandiganbyan did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and her children. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
Requirements as laid down in Manotoc vs Court of Appeals:
- Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different dates.
- Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
- Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioner’s house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
SERANA, Petitioner, vs SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 162059
Petitioner was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the Respondent, Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa, the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27. The offense charged was not committed in relation to her office and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for lack of merit.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Serana’s case.
No, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over this case. The SC held that while the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provisions of law.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606. Thus, her position as a board of regent (UP student regent) is among those enumerated and the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC vs .THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances.
There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels. That the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination. Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.
Whether or not the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing fees, partially restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) constitutional.
Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made by the City Manila by observing the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in the city traceable in great part to the existence of motels. It was said that the liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, public order and safety and are within the scope of the police power of the State. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
Republic of the Philippines
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahan's birth certificate: 1. the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and 2. gender from "female" to "male."
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Whether or not Cagandahan may changed his name and gender from Jennifer to Jeff and from female to male.
Yes. In this case, the Court considered that the plaintiff had allowed “nature to take its course” and had not interfered with what “he was born with”. By not forcing his body to become female, he permitted the male characteristics of the body to develop. Thus the Court rejected the objections of the solicitor general and held that, where no law governed the matter, the Court should not force the plaintiff to undergo treatment to reverse his male tendencies.
The Court held that where the individual was biologically or naturally intersex, it was reasonable to allow that person to determine his or her own gender.
PBM EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION (PBMEO), Petitioner
PBM CO. INC. , Respondent
Petitioner, PBMEO is a legitimate labor union composed of the respondent corporation. The officers and members of PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. Petitioner confirmed that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. PBMEO explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with the Management. The Management informed the petitioner that the demonstration is an alienable right of the union guaranteed by the constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. On March 4, 1969 respondent filed a charge against petitioner for violation of RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act) and of the CBA providing for No Strike and No Lockout. Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Whether or not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged prosecution of local officialdom, the employees and labourers of herein were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution