Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner 
vs
Jennifer Cagandahan, Respondent

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth.  During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized.  She likewise has no breast nor menstruation.  Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen.  According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.  She filed a petition at Regional Trial Court Branch 33  in Siniloan, Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
 
HELD:
 
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.  Supreme Court  is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.  As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male.  Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.  It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. 

Supreme Court: " In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. vs.
ASCENSION P.  OLARTE                             
G.R. No. L-22465
​
Facts:

•  Ascension P. Olarte, respondents , wrote certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris
• On January 7, 1956: Visitacion lodged the corresponding charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan
• and then, February 22, 1956: Visitacion filed complaint for libel with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan
• July 3, 1956: Case forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
• Court of First Instance ruling: case dismissed due to expiration of prescriptive period of two years for libel

Issue:
 Was the statute of limitations suspended by the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court? 

Held:
Yes. The filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner vs.
 ISAGANI D. BOBIS, Respondent
GR No. 138509
July 31, 2000
 
Facts:

• October 21, 1985:Respondent, Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier
• January 25, 1996: Respondent contracted a second marriage with Imelda Marbella-Bobis without the first marriage being annulled, nullified or terminated
• February 25, 1998: Isagani Bobis charged with bigamy before Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City
• Respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
• Regional Trial Court judge suspends criminal case pending decision in civil action

Issue:

1. Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy? and
2. Is ignorance of Article 40 of the Family Code a valid defense for contracting second marriage?

 
Ruling:

1. No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
2. No. Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law.

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner  vs.
Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles, Respondents
G.R. No. 92326
24 January 1992
 
 
Facts:

• February 2, 1988:  Ms.Zenaida C.  Bobiles filed a petition to adopt 6-year-old Jason Condat.
• February 15, 1988, Trial court found petition sufficient in form and substance
•  Copies sent to father of the child (Salvador Condat), and the social worker assigned to the court. 
• March 28, 1988: Nobody appeared in to contest petition
• August 3, 1988: Family Code takes effect. It states that joint adoption by husband and wife becomes mandatory under new law
• RTC grants petition to adopt the minor Jason Condat to Ms Zenaida Bobiles
• CA ruling: affirms RTC ruling

 
Issue:

1. Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Ms. Zenaida Bobiles and (2) should the petition to adopt Jason be granted considering only Zenaida Bobiles filed the petition?

 
Ruling:

1. No. Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. (2) Yes. In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 

​G.R. NO. 179799               September 11, 2009
Zenaida R. Gregorio, Petitioner  vs
Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc., and Emma J. Datuin, Respondents.
 
Facts: August 18, 2000 , Zenaida Gregorio filed a civil suit before the RTC Branch 12, Ligao, Albay against Sansio Philippines and Emma Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for violation of BP Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that petitioner never gave the opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because respondents stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio was arrested, detained and released only after her husband posted a bond. In the course of investigation Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance and subsequently the criminal case was dismissed.  March 20, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in the civil case directing Sansio and Datuin jointly and solidarily to pay Gregorio damages. The RTC expressly stated that the complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on malicious prosecution. Aggrieved by the Decision, Sansio and Datuin appealed to the CA.
 On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered Decision granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of the damage suit of Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said decision but the same was denied in the appellate court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2007. It was then Gregorio filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
 
Issue: Whether or not  the civil suit filed by petitioner is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution and can claim damages?
 
Ruling: Yes. The petition is granted. The decision dated January 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are reversed and set aside.  Gregorio’s civil complaint is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 , Gregorio’s right to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin. Gregorio was acting within her right when she instituted against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper.
 

​G.R. NO. 160273               January 18, 2008
Cebu Country Club, Inc. , Sabino R. Dapat, Ruben D. Almendras, Julius Z. Neri, Douglas L. Luym, Cesar T. Libi, Ramontito E. Garcia and Jose B. Sala, Petitioners,                 vs
Ricardo F. Elizagaque, Respondents.
 
Facts:
Respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent's application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent's application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI's corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, responden again sent CCCI a letter... inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed a Civil Case No. 67190.
the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent,
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial court's Decision with modification,... Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter's application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque... injuria.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to
Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When respondent's application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his... application was disapproved.
 
Issue: Whether in disapproving respondent's application for proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint and several.
 
Ruling:
Yes. Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of... his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that... is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for... the damage.
We believe respondent' testimony that he suffered... mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the... same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[8] Taking into consideration the attending circumstances here, we... hold that an award to respondent of P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
 
As to petitioners' reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of... a person's right, as in this case.

​G.R. NO. 174238    July  07, 2009
Anita Cheng, Petitioner                vs
Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy, Respondents.
 
Facts:
Anita Cheng filed two(2) estafa cases before the RTC-Manila against William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce checks no. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
 
Petitioner on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two(2) cases for violation of BP 22 before the MeTC-Manila. On March 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Later, the MeTC dismissed the BP 22 cases on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against Sy’s before the RTC Manila, a complaint for collection for sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP 22 cases.
 
RTC-Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg 22 cases.
 
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied in its Order dated June 5, 2006
 
Issue:
 
Whether petitioner can recover the loaned sum of money and damages?
 
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner may recover under the principle of unjust enrichment. There is unjust enrichment when a person is unjustly benefited, and such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of the respondents

​G.R. NO. 186006    October 16, 2009
G.R. NO. 186006    October 16, 2009
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona , Petitioner              vs
Commission on Elections and Malik T. Alingan, Respondents.
 
Facts:
Petitioner Norlainie Limbona , her husband, and respondent Malik Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao Del Norte. After filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition of disqualifying the husband of petitioner for non compliance with the one year residence requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed the same petition, this time against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC granted the disqualification of petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate for her husband which was approved by COMELEC. Respondent yet again sought Petitioner’s disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying , sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.
​
Issue: Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one year residency requirement and qualify to run for the office mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte?
 
Ruling:
No. Petitioner failed to qualify the one-year residence requirement. In order to acquire domicile by choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain there, and intention to abandon the old domicile. A person’s domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
 
The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of origin is Manguing, Lanao Del Norte, which is his also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapusan, Marawi City. Hence, failure to comply with the residence requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.  

​G.R. NO. 133743    February 6, 2007
Edgar San Luis, Petitioner              vs
Felicidad San Luis, Respondents.
 
 
G.R. NO. 133743    February 6, 2007
Rodolfo San Luis, Petitioner              vs
Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, Respondents.
 
 
 
Facts:
 Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. He contracted three marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, but Virginia died on 1963. On May 1, 1968, He married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. But on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce at State of Hawaii which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody of December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, He married Felicidad Sagalongos. He had no children but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of administration before RTC Makati. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she only a mistress of his father because at the time of death, he was still married to his second wife. Felicidad presented the evidence that prove the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry lee had already been dissolved. And she claimed that Felicisimo had the capacity to marry her by virtue of par. 2 Article 26 of the family code.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s state.
Ruling:
Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status that as a surviving wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner under the Art. 144 of the Civil code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as he may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.