a collections of case digests and laws that can help aspiring law students to become a lawyer.
People vs. Real
G.R. No.93436, March 24, 1995
On March 17, 1978, at around 9:00 a.m., in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and Edgardo Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market table to display their fish. The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpus raised his voice again and said something to appellant. When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation and anger when the victim threw his fish in the presence of so many people.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and costs. Hence, this appeal.
Whether or not the trial court and the Solicitor General are in error when they held that the attendant aggravating circumstance was reiteracion and not reincidencia
Yes. In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind from that for which he was previously tried and convicted. Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Article 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Article 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Article 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill- treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the same title of the Code. Appellant is therefore convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
People vs. Baldogo
G.R. No.128106, January 24, 2003
Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife had four children, which include a fourteen-year old Jorge and twelve-year old Julie. He and his family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Accused-appellant and Bermas, inmates of the penal colony, were assigned as domestic helpers of the Camacho family. One evening on February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner in the house of the Camachos. Afterwards, Julio Sr. left the house. Only Jorge and Julie were left in the house. Momentarily after Julio Sr. had left, Julie was perturbed when she heard a loud sound. This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She was appalled to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face down and bloodied. Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo. The accused-appellant overtook Julie, tied her hands at her back and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help. The three then proceeded to climb the mountain. The moment when Bermas and accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return to the lowlands and sought help from a certain Nicodemus who turned over Julie to police officers. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, and recidivism.
Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, and quasi-recidivism
Yes. While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the rulings of the trial court that the crime was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the colony. Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge. What is clear is that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. The Court has previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by treachery. Furthermore, quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code is alleged. In the present case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide by the trial court with a penalty which he was serving at the penal colony. The excerpt of the prison record is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible, absent proof that the original of the judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. Therefore, the aggravating circumstance of quasi- recidivism cannot be appreciated in this case.
People vs. Glino
G.R. No.173793, December 04, 2007
At around 7:20 p.m., On November 15, 1998, Spouses Domingo and Virginia Boji hailed a passenger jeepney and sat on the two remaining vacant seats on opposing rows of the jeepney. Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia alighted. Accused-appellant Conrado Glino took her place. He was reeking of liquor. As the jeepney ran its normal route, Virginia noticed accused-appellant inching closer to her. His head eventually found its way on Virginia's shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought accused-appellant's attention and asked him to sit properly, citing adequate space. Accused-appellant angrily replied, "Oh, kung ayaw mong may katabi, bumaba ka, at magtaxi ka!" Virginia decided to ignore his snide remarks. After the heated verbal tussle, accused-appellant and Baloes appeared to have calmed down, confining themselves to whispering to one another.
When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village, Baloes turned to the driver and told him that he and Glino were about to alight. As the jeepney ground to a halt, Baloes unexpectedly drew an improvised knife and stabbed Domingo in the chest. Accused-appellant then unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife and joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo. Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack, Domingo failed to offer any form of resistance to the duo's vicious assault. Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo from his assailants. She tightly embraced Domingo. Virginia's efforts, however, all went for naught as accused- appellant Glino and Baloes were unrelenting. When the senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself bloodied from incised wounds in her fingers.
1.Whether or not Glino must have a lower penalty because it was Baloes who stabbed Domingo 2.Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of homicide and attempted homicide only, not murder and attempted murder, due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery
1. No. Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Baloes who inflicted the fatal stab, accused- appellant cannot escape culpability. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof that accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support a conviction. In conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. The act of one is the act of all; hence, it is not necessary that all the participants deliver the fatal blow. Tersely put, each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. The acts of Glino and Baloes before, during and after the killing of Domingo are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment.
2. No. Treachery or alevosia’s presence is incontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying circumstance is the sudden and unexpected attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. The attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. Concededly, Domingo was caught unaware that an attack was forthcoming. Although he had a verbal exchange with accused-appellant and Baloes, the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected. All of the passengers inside the jeepney, including Domingo, thought all along that the tension had ceased and that Glino and Baloes were about to alight.
People vs. PO3 Fallorina
G.R. No.137347, March 04, 2004
On September 26, 1998, at around 2:30 p.m., Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside this carinderia was a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.
Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the roof. Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent and Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the roof. Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.
Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability with his affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or intention of causing it
No. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. In this case, the appellant failed to prove his defense. First, when the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the appellant relating to the pictures, the latter refused to answer. Second, the appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim. There is no evidence showing that the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist. Third, the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the trigger, the gun would not fire if the hammer is moved backward with the safety lock in place. Fourth, the gun accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire and neither was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to move forward. Fifth, after the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid from the investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house of his friend. The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was accidental and that he was not negligent. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that he would choose to flee and keep himself out of sight for about three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act was deliberate and intentional.
People vs. Sarcia
G.R. No.169641, September 10, 2009
Sometime on December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her cousin and two other playmates, was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree. Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited AAA to go with him to the backyard of Crisologo’s house. Upon reaching the place, appellant removed AAA’s shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered AAA to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into AAA’s private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). AAA felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
At home, AAA did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, AAA called for her cousin. AAA’s cousin came to their house and told AAA’s mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of AAA. AAA’s mother, however, did not say anything. At that time, AAA’s father was working in Manila. After almost four years, AAA’s father filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape. On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for further review.
Whether or not the suspension of sentence under the R.A. No.9344 is applicable to the appellant.
No. While Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21. Accused-appellant was about 31 years of age on the date of the appeal, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence was already moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 (Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities) of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children: “A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.”
People vs. Deliola
G.R. No.200157, August 31, 2016
Sometime in the month of June, 2002 and on or about the 1st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, accused, Deliola, 15 years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein victim who was less than eighteen years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one MMM, a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the damage and prejudice.
Afraid of accused appellant's threats of killing her, MMM kept mum and did not disclose to anyone the tragedy that happened to her. MMM' s grandmother noticed that there was something unusual in the way MMM was walking. This prompted her to confront MMM. Upon learning of what happened to MMM, the victim's aunt, brought the former to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros Occidental for examination, and thereafter to the police authorities, before whom the victim executed her sworn statement.
1) Whether or not the minor accused-appellant shall be held criminally liable for the crime
2) Whether or not the accused-appellant shall be confined in a regular penal institution
1. Yes. The Supreme Court in A.M. No. 02-l-18- SC49 defined the age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child, 15 years and one (1) day old or above but below 18 years of age, commits an offense with discernment. In this case, that the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the victim as demonstrated by the following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by penetrating the victim from behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened. Accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape.
2. No. Due to the accused-appellant’s age when the crime was committed, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. In accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on the matter, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the ruling of the lower courts was affirmed and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was qualified for suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A. 9344 provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of 21 years old.
Baxinela vs. People
G.R. No.149652, March 24, 2006
SPO2 Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him.
The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him. Baxinela then got Lajo’s wallet and fled the scene with Regimen.
The RTC and CA accepted the prosecution’s version. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the justifying circumstances of self- defense of in the alternative the lawful performance of official duty under Article 11 paragraphs 1 and 5, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code.
No. In order to avail justifying circumstance of lawful performance of an official duty under Article 11, Paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.
People vs. Rubiso
G.R. No.128871, March 18, 2003
On November 6, 1992, According to the accused, while he was welding a tiller Serafin Hubines, Jr. passed by and kicked it. When he confronted appellant, the latter asked, "Why, do you want to fight?" Then Hubines boxed appellant on his chest. He fell down on a sitting position. At that point, Hubines pulled his gun. Appellant immediately stood up and held Hubines’ hands. They grappled for its possession and both fell on the ground. Then the gun exploded. According to appellant, he was not sure who "caused" the shot. He noticed that many people approached them. Appellant lied down on his stomach and covered his ears. That was the time he heard three or more shots. He stood up and saw Hubines lying on the ground full of blood. He walked a few steps and met PO3 Danilo Opong. Appellant told the latter that he was only defending himself. Patrolman Opong then arrested him and brought him to the Pavia Police Station for investigation. Meanwhile, Romeo Zuspa, a worker in the compound, took the firearm and gave it to Patrolman Opong who, in turn, "surrendered" it to his station.
Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that accused failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense despite the fact that the accused proved the three elements of self-defense.
No. To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must prove the existence of the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the person being attacked to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self- defense. It contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person defending himself must have been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of weapon. Appellant insists that when the victim pulled out his gun, both grappled for its possession. They fell and there were bursts of gunfire. He must have killed the victim but he was only defending himself. Assuming that Hubines had a gun and pulled it, however, records show that he did not manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled the life and limb of herein appellant. It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of one’s hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that one’s life was in imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. Another factor which militates against appellant’s claim of self-defense is the nature and number of wounds suffered by the victim. Further, the location and presence of gunshot wounds on the body of the victim eloquently refute appellant’s allegation of self-defense. It is an oft repeated rule that the presence of a large number of wounds, their location and their seriousness would negate self-defense. Instead, they indicate a determined effort to kill. The appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Nacnac vs. People
G.R. No.191913, March 21, 2012
On February 20, 203, Petitioner, the victim and a number of other police officers were on duty. Petitioner, being the highest ranking officer during the shift, was designated the officer-of-the-day. In the evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Basilio, took the patrol tricycle from the station grounds. When petitioner saw this, he stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. The victim told petitioner that he (the victim) needed it to go to Laoag City to settle a previous disagreement with a security of a local bar. Petitioner still refused. He told the victim that he is needed at the station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was drunk. This was not received well by the victim. He told petitioner in Ilocano: "Iyot ni inam kapi" (Coitus of your mother, cousin!). The victim alighted from the tricycle. SPO1 Basilio did the same, went inside the office, and left the accused-appellant and the victim alone. The victim took a few steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was tucked in a holster on the right side of his chest. Petitioner then fired his armalite upward as a warning shot. Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun. Petitioner then shot the victim on the head, which caused the latter’s instantaneous death. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime charged and held that the claim of self-defense by the accused was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the trial court and held that the essential and primary element of unlawful aggression was lacking.
Whether or not the justifying circumstances of the petitioner’s acts constitute as valid self- defense.
Yes. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. "Without unlawful aggression, self- defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present." Ordinarily, there is a difference between the act of drawing one’s gun and the act of pointing one’s gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. Even if we were to disbelieve the claim that the victim pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that in this specific case, it would have been fatal for the petitioner to have waited for the victim to point his gun before the petitioner fires back. The petitioner was therefore acquitted of homicide on reasonable doubt.
Velasquez vs. People
G.R. No.195021, March 15, 2017
On May 24, 2003 in the evening, Velasquez (accused) while armed with stones and wooden poles, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit Jesus del Mundo inflicting upon him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus commenced a felony directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to his damage and prejudice.
The accused invoke the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code reiterating that it was Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well as on Mercedes. The accused thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks, leading to his injuries.
Petitioners Nicolas Velasquez and Victor Velasquez, along with four others -Felix Caballeda, Jojo Del Mundo, Sonny Boy Velasquez, and Ampong Ocumen - were charged with attempted murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo.
Yes. A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon another person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor.
The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own merits:
It is settled that when an accused admits harming the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he harmed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
People vs. Salvador
G.R. No.201443, April 10, 2013
On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado with Plate No. UTJ-112 and drove out of the Coliseum’s parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car, while behind was a Toyota Hi-Ace van. Upon reaching Imelda Avenue, the Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow suit, but the Hi-Ace suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey approached the Civic, which was just about two to two and a half meters away from Albert, pointed their guns at the driver, who turned out to be Pinky, and motioned for her to step out of the car and ride the Hi-Ace. Two men ran after the "watch-your-car" boy in a nearby parking lot, but Albert no longer noticed if the two still returned to the Hi-Ace. Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert to likewise alight from the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.
Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark sunglasses. The men took Albert’s wallet containing Php9,000.00, his driver’s license and other documents. They also took his Patek Philippe watch which costs Php400,000.00. Albert and Pinky stayed in the house and were fed food mostly bought from Jollibee until they were rescued on April 12, 2002.
Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. of April 12, 2002. Some time after lunch, a police line-up with about 15 men was presented. Albert identified seven persons, to wit, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and Roger, as among his abductors. Around an hour later, Betty arrived and introduced herself as the owner of the house. She inquired why the police officers were shooting at her house. She was invited by the police to Camp Crame to answer queries anent why a crime was committed in her house. While in Camp Crame, Albert and Pinky identified her as the person who brought them food while they were detained in the safehouse. Betty was thus arrested.
Whether or not the accused-appellants conspired in the commission of the crime.
Yes. The SC believes that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the essential elements comprising the crime of kidnapping for ransom were present and that the accused-appellants conspired in its commission. In the case at bar, Monico’s assistance extended to Albert when the latter descended the basement stairs and Betty’s visit to the safehouse to bring food could not automatically be interpreted as the acts of principals and conspirators in the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, their house in Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision has a basement. It can be reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. Albert's detention was accomplished not solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where escape became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's presence therein during Albert's arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits to bring food reasonably indicate that they were among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in the execution of the criminal design.
Serrano vs. People
G.R. No.175023, July 05, 2010
A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the herein petitioner, Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Anthony Galang claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate.
The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the nature or gravity of the wound”.
Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.
Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner.
Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. The court considered the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative
Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.
On April 25,1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan, the accused who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
As seen by Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Whether or not accused is guilty of consummated statutory rape.
No. Accused is guilty of attempted rape and be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years 4 months and 10 days of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
Petitioner, Gemma Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a check amounting to Pho 10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam. However, instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she deposited it to her bank account. The check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and CA ruled that the petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari to SC.
Whether or not petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others, overtook a policecar and a maroon Honda CRV. With intent to kill, treachery, and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death.
The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and eventually die.
Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up arresting Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan.
CA affrimed the decision of RTC.
Whether or not Adriano is responsible for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, a bystander.
YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano’s intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan’s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequences of Adriano’s felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.