Del Castillo v. People, 664 SCRA 430 (2012) 

FACTS:
 Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
 
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
 
 
ISSUE: 
 Whether there was violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizures
 
RULING:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
 
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.



​

Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil 33 (1937) 

FACTS:
*On June 3, 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. 

*With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. 


ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the search warrant obtained is illegal.
 
RULING:
YES, In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
                That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but whereby, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, but is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;
That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night; at the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure; and
That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an effective, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.
 

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Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil 141 (1940) 

FACTS:
In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as may be found, and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, at 10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers and articles seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. Under the date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying that the search warrant and the seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated 24 July 1939. A similar motion was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on 27 October 1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an information dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November 1939.

​The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued three days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them as evidence in the criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves. 
 
ISSUE/S: 
Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the personal knowledge of the witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to determine probable cause in issuing the warrant. 
 
RULING:
Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious rate of interest, because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and records containing its transactions relative its activities as money lender and the entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be not as their were stated under oath. That the existence of probable cause had been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board, Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does believe, that the above described articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law." 

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Pasion vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 68 (1938) 

FACTS:
 
Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, for "certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store, certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de Garcia in Victoria and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents seized. By motion, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. By resolution, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order. Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
 
ISSUE: 
 
Whether or not the warrant is valid by reason of waiver of constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 
RULING:
 
No. Warrant was declared null and void.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac. In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

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People v. Mamaril, GR 147607, 22 January 2004  

 
FACTS:
 
·        SPO2 Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly searched, which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search.
·        The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.
·        Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was at his parent’s house when the search was conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly search was his.
 
ISSUE: 
 Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant. 
 
RULING:
 Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause.
·        Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
·        In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
a.  The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally
b.  The examination must be under oath
c.  The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers
·        The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.
·        When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available records kept in their office, he was only able to present before the court the application for search warrant and supporting affidavits. Neither transcript of the proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing was presented. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.
·        Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
·        No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant.


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Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1 (2000) 

FACTS:
A complaint for murder  was filed before the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and six other persons in connection with the death of a certain Abdul Dimalen, the former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that the Abdulas paid the 6 other persons the total amount of P200,000.00 for the death of Dimalen. Acting on this complaint, the Provincial Prosecutor of Maguindanao, Salick U. Panda, in a Resolution dated 22 August 1994, dismissed the charges of murder against the Abdulas and five other respondents on a finding that there was no prima facie case for murder against them. Prosecutor Panda, however, recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents, a certain Kasan Mama. Pursuant to this Resolution, an information for murder was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before the sala of Judge Japal M. Guiani. In an Order dated 13 September 1994, the Judge ordered that the case, be returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation. In this Order, the judge noted that although there were 8 respondents in the murder case, the information filed with the court "charged only 1 of the 8 respondents in the name of Kasan Mama without the necessary resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion." As such, the judge reasons, the trial court cannot issue the warrant of arrest against Kasan Mama. Upon the return of the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Maguindanao, it was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw for further investigation. In addition to the evidence presented during the initial investigation of the murder charge, two new affidavits of witnesses were submitted to support the charge of murder against the Abdulas and the other respondents in the murder complaint. Thus, Prosecutor Dimaraw treated the same as a re-filing of the murder charge and pursuant to law, issued subpoena to the respondents named therein.

On 6 December 1994, the Abdulas submitted and filed their joint counter-affidavits. After evaluation of the evidence, Prosecutor Dimaraw, in a Resolution dated 28 December 1994, found a prima facie case for murder against the Abdulas and 3 other respondents. He thus recommended the filing of charges against the Abdulas, as principals by inducement, and against the 3 others, as principals by direct participation. Likewise in this 28 December 1994 Resolution, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda, who conducted the earlier preliminary investigation of the murder charge, added a notation stating that he was inhibiting himself from the case and authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the case without his approval. The reasons he cited were that the case was previously handled by him and that the victim was the father-in-law of his son. On 2 January 1995, an information for murder dated 28 December 1994 was filed against the Abdulas and Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama before Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, then the sala of Judge Guiani. This information was signed by investigating prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw. A notation was likewise made on the information by Provincial Prosecutor Panda, which explained the reason for his inhibition. The following day, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the Abdulas. Upon learning of the issuance of the said warrant, the Abdulas filed on 4 January 1995 an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for the setting aside of the warrant of arrest on 4 January 1995. In this motion, the Abdulas argued that the enforcement of the warrant of arrest should be held in abeyance considering that the information was prematurely filed and that the Abdulas intended to file a petition for review with the Department of Justice. A petition for review was filed by the Abdulas with the Department of Justice on 11 January 1995. Despite said filing, the judge did not act upon the Abdulas' pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest.

The Abdulas filed the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Supreme Court.
 
ISSUE: 
 Whether the judge may rely upon the findings of the prosecutor in determining probable cause in the issuance of search or arrest warrant.
 
RULING:
 No. The 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions. Herein, the Judge admits that he issued the questioned warrant as there was "no reason for (him) to doubt the validity of the certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor that a preliminary investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to exist as against those charged in the information filed." The statement is an admission that the Judge relied solely and completely on the certification made by the fiscal that probable cause exists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendations. He adopted the judgment of the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause as his own. Clearly, the judge, by merely stating that he had no reason to doubt the validity of the certification made by the investigating prosecutor has abdicated his duty under the Constitution to determine on his own the issue of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest.
Hence, the warrant of arrest should be declared null and void.

Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

FACTS:

• In pursuant to Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines, publications and other reading materials that are alleged to be obscene, pornographic and indecent were seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks and later burned in public at the University belt along CM Recto Avenue Manila in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. One of which was Pinoy Playboy magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita, the plaintiff.

 

• The plaintiff then filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narciso Cabrera (superintendent of Western Police District of the City Manila), seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming such materials is a decent, artistic and educational magazine and that publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

 

• Then, an Urgent Motion was filed by the petitioner for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and was later granted.
• In defense of Mayor Bagatsing, he claimed that the confiscation and seizure was done in pursuant to PD No 960 which the materials were voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities and the plaintiffs’ establishment was not raided.

 

• While, the plaintiff filed his Memorandum raising the issues as to whether or not the defendants and/or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not".

 

•  The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscene per se or not". Later, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to be given three days to file a reply to the defendant's opposition; however, after following such order, the plaintiff’s motion was denied and the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

 

•  The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:

1.  The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
 
2.   The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure was constitutional
 
RULING:
No. As strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
​
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
 The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, the Court defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.

Soliven v. Judge Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) 

FACTS:
Luis Beltran was a columnist for the newspaper Philippine Star. Maximo Soliven was the paper’s editor-in-chief. They were sued for libel by then President Corazon Aquino due to an article written by Beltran wherein he alleged that the president “hid under the bed” during a bloody coup attempt staged by military rebels in December 1989. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Ramon Makasiar. Judge Makasiar then issued a warrant of arrest against Beltran et al. Beltran et al filed a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court alleging, among others, that (1) the warrants of arrest against them were irregularly issued due to the fact that Judge Makasiar did not personally examine the complainant (President Aquino) and her witnesses before issuing the arrest warrants, and (2) President Aquino cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her presidential immunity from suit; A president cannot be sued, however, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
 
ISSUE: 
 Whether or not a judge is required to personally examine the complainant and/or his witnesses in determining probable cause prior to issuing a warrant of arrest.
 
RULING:
 No. Sec. 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: “xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce…”. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

​

Paderanga v. Drilon, GR 96080, 19 April 1991 ​

FACTS:
In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from including the former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for... multiple murder, through a second amended information, and to restrain them from prosecuting him.
In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused.  Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988.  The trial court, in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City
Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.

Issue:
Whether the Fiscal have the jurisdiction to determine the probable cause of the accused

Held:
Yes, Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court.
​Hence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.  The fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses concerned

People v. Salanguit, GR 133254, 18 April 2001 

FACTS:
Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of shabu, and the second, for possession/use of marijuana.  Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the RTC of Cavite a warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.

The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s door but the same was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside the house and they began to force their way inside the house. They indicated their authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.
 Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the operatives ate their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.

The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.
 
ISSUE/S: 
1. Whether or not the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. Whether or not the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to plain view doctrine.
 
RULING:
 1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in plain view when it was seized.

1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two different provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias. Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.
 

​

Laud v. People, GR 199032, 19 November 2014

 
FACTS:

• The PNP, through Police Senior Superintendent  Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death Squad” may be found. In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.hanrobleslaw
• Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant which was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination with the members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements of probable cause and particular description were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated.
 
RULING: 
No. The SC held that in this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
The Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That a “considerable length of time” attended the search warrant’s application from the crime’s commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the search warrant’s application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
 
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of “the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
“[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.

People v. Molina, GR 133917, 19 February 2001 

FACTS:
On June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received information about a marijuana pusher in Davao. Paguidopon first saw the pusher in person on July of the same year, when his informer identified Mula as the driver of a motorcycle who just passed by them. Molina, on the other hand, was never identified prior arrest. 
 
In the morning of August 8, 1996, Paguidopon received information that the drug pushers will pass by at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning, so he called for assistance from the PNP. A team composed of SPO4 Cloribel, SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of Marino), and SPO1 Pamplona were dispatched to proceed to Marino's house where they'll wait for the drug pushers will pass by. Two hours later, a "trisikad" identified by Paguidopon as carrying Molina and Mula passed by. So, the team boarded their vehicle, overtook the trisikad and accosted the two. At that point, Mula was holding a black bag. He handed the same to Molina. Pamplona, introducing himself as a police officer, asked Molina to open the bag, to which Molina replied "Boss, if possible, we will settle this."-Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed. Mula and Molina filed a Demurrer to Evidence, saying that the marijuna was illegally seized from them, therefore it is inadmissible. The trial court denied this. The two waived presentation of evidence, and opted to file a joint memorandum. Later, the trial court still found them guilty, and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. Pursuant to Art. 47 of the RPC and Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the ROC, the case is elevated to the SC on automatic review. The SolGen moved for the acquittal of the two.
 
ISSUE/S: 

1. Was the arrest of Mula and Molina fall under the exception of in flagrante delicto in warrantless arrests.
2. Whether or not the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence for having been seized in violation of appellants’ constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures

 
RULING:
 
1.       No. The law mandates that searches be carried out with a search warrant upon the existence of probable cause. Likewise, the law protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and holds evidence taken from such incidents as inadmissible as evidence. There are exceptions to this, the first being seizure conducted incidental to a lawful arrest
For this, there should be a lawful arrest first, before a search can be made. It doesn't work the other way around. Likewise, as a rule, an arrest is legitimate if it's with a valid warrant of  arrest. However, a police officer may conduct warrantless arrests:
D.      In flagrante delicto - When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
E.                   Arrest effected in hot pursuit - when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
F.                   Arrest of escaped prisoners - when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 
In this case, the trial court found that the warrantless arrest and seizure were valid apparently because they were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the prohibited drugs. In flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify in flagrante delicto arrests
 
2. Yes. In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. The response of Molina that “Boss, if possible we will settle this” is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mula’s name and address after the arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence.

People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)

FACTS: 
 

• Chua Ho San was found guilty of transporting without appropriate legal authority the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15,[1] Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The antecedent facts are as follows:

 

• In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call ataround 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. 

 

• According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was about to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag and then he thereafter walked towards the road. 

 

• Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed his direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers but Chua did not understand what they were saying. The officers resorted to the use of “sign language”, Cid motioned using his hands for the man to open his bag. 

 

• The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastic containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.  Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.

 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted which produced the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride is valid
 
HELD:
No, the warrantless search and seizure conducted which produced the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine hydrochloride is not valid. The Constitution provides the  inviolable right to privacy of home and person and their right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Also enshrined in the Constitution is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
 
While a search without a warrant is generally not valid, there are notable exceptions to this, namely:  (a) search of moving vehicles, (b) seizure in plain view, (c) customs searches, (d) waiver or consent searches, (e) stop and frisk situations and (f) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
 
In an in flagrante delicto arrest, one instance of a valid arrest without a warrant, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances which is constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means that there is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the given facts, there does not appear to be any indication that Chua participated in an ongoing criminal enterprise that would justify the conduct of such an obtrusive search. In other words there is no probable cause for an in flagrante arrest to be done and therefore no valid instance to search the accused without a warrant.
 
Also, the contention of the prosecution that there was a consented search is likewise without merit. No valid waiver could have been made by Chua in the given situation since he could not fully understand what the police officers were saying. All that was used was sign language and as such it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the “sign language” that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search.
 
Given that the arrest of Chua without a warrant does not fall within one of the valid instances provided by the Rules of Court for a valid warrantless arrest, the arrest of the accused is therefore not valid. Following the exclusionary principle therefore, the evidence obtained via the invalid search is therefore fruit of the poisonous tree and is not admissible.

Chandler v. Miller, D-96-126, 15 April 1997

FACTS:
Under a Georgia statute, all candidates for elected state office must pass a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to their qualifying for nomination or election. Chandler, on behalf of several state office nominees from the Libertarian Party, challenged the statute's constitutionality, naming Georgia's governor and two other regulatory officials as defendants. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
 
ISSUE: 
Did Georgia's drug testing statute violate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against illegal search and seizures.
 
RULING:
Yes. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court noted that while the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits officials from conducting search and seizures without individualized suspicion, there does exist a narrowly defined category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. The Court held, however, that Georgia's statute did not fall in this exceptional category, since it failed to show why its desire to avoid drug users in its high political offices should outweigh candidates' privacy interests. In addition to Georgia's failure to provide evidence of a drug problem among its state officials, the Court concluded that even if such a problem did exist, the affected officials would most likely not perform the kind of high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, which might justify the statute's proposed incursion on their individual privacy rights.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) 
FACTS:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the search warrants are null and void and violated the constitution and the rules of court.
 
RULING:
YES. warrants for the search of 3 residences null and void; searches and seizures made are illegal. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.  The warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent.

Bache & Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)

FACTS:
 

• ·                      Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.
• ·               The next day, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and accordingly issued.
• ·               A few days later petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void.

 
ISSUE:  
 Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office
 
RULING:
 The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 andSection 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.

Coronel et al.  vs People (2017)
G.R. No. 214536
 
FACTS:
Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez were arrested during a police operation where they
conducted a search of a building with the accuses found to be inside. During the search, the team recovered, among others, transparent plastic sachets, aluminum foils, containers of white crystalline substance and white powdery residue, disposable lighters, improvised plastic scoops and assorted moneys (in bills and coins).
The arrested suspect was brought to the PDEA Headquarters for investigation and mandatory drug
test. Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez all tested positive for shabu use.
RTC found them guilty of illegal use of drugs and being visitors of drug den, dive or resort. The
portioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The portioners then filed a motion for reconsideration on the Supreme Court contending that this
Court did not address the prosecution's failure to establish both a continuous and unbroken chain of custody of the subject evidence, that the house, where petitioners were apprehended, was a drug den, or that petitioners were aware that said house was a drug den and that they visited it knowingly.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution has established that the petitioner knowingly visited a drug den
(penalized under Section 7b of RA 9165)
 
RULING:
No, the drug test results which was the basis of the prosecution to imply that petitioners were
aware of the nature of the place as a drug den before visiting it despite that the drug tests were conducted
right after their arrest is not justifiable and insufficient.
The prosecution assumed that the petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den before their arrest, however there was no showing of evidence if how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den or
how long drugs had been in their system. There is no basis to assume that the petitioners used drugs at the
moment immediately before arrest and thus, at the location of the arrest.
Furthermore, there was no attempt to show that the petitioners knew the nature of the alleged
drug den or even that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in possession
of any drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody found in the act of using, selling or buying illegal
drugs nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same. There were no acts alleged or evidence found
which would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den.

Therefore, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was granted. As a result, petitioners were
acquitted of violation to Sec. 7 of the R. A. No. 9165. However, petitioners were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge of violation of Sec. 15 Art. II of the said Republic Act.

People v. Jaafar, G.R. No. 219829, January 18, 2017
 
Facts:
In an Information, accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong and Ahmad Gani y Idjirani
were charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165. According to the prosecution, at 8:00 a.m. on
September 10, 2009, a male civilian informant reported to Chief of Police, Police Superintendent
Alberto Capacio Larubis that a certain "Mana" was selling methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) at the port area barangay located just beside the police station. Mana was later identified
as Jaafar, who sold shabu between 12:00 m.n. and 4:00 a.m. to facilitate the sale of the drug and
evade arrest. Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his house. Chief Larubis instructed SP04 Enrico
Morales to form a team composed of SPO3 Tabunyag, PO3 Perez, P03 Hasim, PO2 Canete, PO2
Bobby Rey Bucoy, POl Insang, and PO1 Marlon Takazi M. Look and to schedule a buy-bust
operation the next day. He also instructed the team to coordinate with agents from the PDEA. PO1
Look was designated as the poseur-buyer while PO2 Bucoy and PDEA Agent Mark Dela Cruz
were designated as the arresting officers. On September 11, 2009, the buy-bust team left the police
station at 1:45 a.m. and went to Jaafar's house. Jaafar met PO1 Look and the informant at the door
of his house and asked them if they were buying shabu. PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and
gave Jaafar a marked ₱500.00 bill. Jaafar called for Gani inside the house. Gani came out and
handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit
a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team. The police officers rushed
to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to escape. Eventually, the arresting officers caught up with him
30 meters away from his house. In his defense, Gani testified that he was at an internet cafe located
near the police station at 2:00 a.m. on September 11, 2009. After stepping out of the establishment,
Gani was suddenly apprehended by unknown persons, who later identified themselves as PO1
Look and P02 Bucoy. Meanwhile, Jaafar testified that he was at the internet cafe at 12:00 m.n. on
September 11, 2009, watching people play video games. He left after two hours and made his way
home. Upon entering an alley, Jaafar saw six persons headed towards him. One of them pointed a
gun at him and told him not to run. Out of fear, he ran towards the main road. However, the six
persons, who turned out to be police officers, caught up with him. They conducted a body search
but found nothing since Jaafar was only wearing boxer shorts and at-shirt. Jaafar was detained
after his arrest and brought to the Office of the City Prosecutor at the City Hall of Isabela the next
day. In its Decision dated May 15, 2012, the RTC convicted Jaafar for violation of Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. However, it acquitted Gani for insufficiency of evidence.
Jaafar filed an appeal before the CA and raised the following errors: (1) the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the arresting team violated the chain of custody
rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The CA ruled that although the sachet of shabu
was not formally offered in evidence during trial, it was nevertheless identified by PO1 Look and
the forensic chemist. Being part of their direct testimonies, the shabu formed part of the records of
the case. Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court did not err in considering
the shabu as evidence.
 
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite
the non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
 
Ruling:
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
not fatal to the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by
the existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule. This Court finds that the
 prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would warrant non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Although the buy-bust team
marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of shabu, the records do not show
that the seized sachet had been photographed. Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to show
that the physical inventory was done in the presence of accused-appellant or his representative,
representatives from the media and the DOJ, and an elected public official. The buy-bust team had
an entire day within which to coordinate with the persons required by law to be present during the
physical inventory of the seized drugs. The Chief of Police received the confidential tip early in
the morning. He immediately instructed SP04 Morales to form a buy-bust team and coordinate
with agents from the PDEA. The buy-bust team had ample time to contact an elected public official
and representatives from the media and the DOJ. The prosecution established during trial and on
appeal that the buy bust operation had been carefully planned by narrating the events with intricate
detail. However, at the same time, the prosecution relied heavily on the exception to the chain of
custody rule. Worse, the prosecution did not even offer any explanation on why they failed to
comply with what was mandated under the law. Indeed, if the police authorities had carefully
planned the buy-bust operation, then there was no reason for them to neglect such important
requirements. They cannot feign ignorance of the exacting standards under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. Police officers are presumed and are required to know the laws they are charged with executing.
 
Accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

People vs. Santos
G.R No. 243627 November 27 2019
 
FACTS
 
On January  16,2016, accussed-appellant was arrested for Illegal sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. Operatives from Anti-Illegal Drug-  Special Operation task group of the Valenzuela City police conducted a buy bust operation after receiving an information that accussed-appellant was said to be in possession of illegal drugs.  They recovered two plastic sachet of crystalline substance and were tested positive for shabu. The officers brought accused-appellant to the police station where they allegedly marked, inventoried and photographed the seized items. 
 
ISSUE
 
Whether or not accussed-appellant is liable for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs
 
HELD
 
No, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of RTC Valenzuela in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused, appealed that there was a non-compliance in the chain of custody. Police officers failed to immediately mark the items at the place of arrest without reasonable ground makes the evidence inadmissible. As a defense, they accomplished the marking, inventory and photography at the police station. However the CA observes that there is still deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct. Of inventory and photography was not witnessed by a representative or media. Police officers  stated that there was no available at the time of arrest. The court finds that they fail to show earnest effort to comply with the said requirement. Therefore, CA acquitted, Xandra Littaua  from violation of Illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 
 

Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655 (2014) 

FACTS:
·         Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas

·         That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused after agents and special investigators of the (NBI-CEVRO), received a complaint that several unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs
·         According to the prosecutor, a team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City
·         The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by Corazon
·         Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan
·         Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology (Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006
·         The defense presented the petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents
·         When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
·         Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months
·         Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its admission
·         First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict him.
·         CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
​
RULING:
No. We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.

Unilab vs. Isip

Facts:
Petitioner, UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely:
(a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order;
(b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and
(c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
​
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

​Notes on Property
Art 414 – all things may be considered as

1. Immovable or real property
2. Movable or personal property

• (consumable or non-consumable)

Property – all things which are or may be the object of appropriation.
 
Rules of Acquisitive Prescription:
Movable property
-4 years in good faith uninterrupted possession otherwise 8 years
Immovable property
-10 years in good faith otherwise 30 years
 
Art 415 – Immovable Property ( does not define but enumerates)
 
A. By Nature – which by their essence and nature are immovable
1.Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil
8.     Mines, quarries and slug dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters              either running or stagnant
 
B. By Incorporation – those which are treated as immovable by reason of their attachment to an immovable.
2. Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land of form an integral part of an immovable.
3. Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
7. Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land
  
C. By Destination – which are essentially movable, but by the purpose for which they have been placed, partake of the nature of the immovable.
       4. Statutes, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements.
      5. Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried o in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
      6. Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included
     9. Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast         
               
D. By Analogy – par 10 Art 415.
      10. Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.
 
Rule if the building is erected on a land by another person – law makes no distinction whether the building is owned by the owner of the land, building is an immovable property regardless of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner or erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee.