Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989),

Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)

FACTS:

• In pursuant to Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines, publications and other reading materials that are alleged to be obscene, pornographic and indecent were seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks and later burned in public at the University belt along CM Recto Avenue Manila in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. One of which was Pinoy Playboy magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita, the plaintiff.

 

• The plaintiff then filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narciso Cabrera (superintendent of Western Police District of the City Manila), seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming such materials is a decent, artistic and educational magazine and that publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.

 

• Then, an Urgent Motion was filed by the petitioner for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and was later granted.
• In defense of Mayor Bagatsing, he claimed that the confiscation and seizure was done in pursuant to PD No 960 which the materials were voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities and the plaintiffs’ establishment was not raided.

 

• While, the plaintiff filed his Memorandum raising the issues as to whether or not the defendants and/or their agents can without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiffs magazine before any judicial finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not".

 

•  The trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscene per se or not". Later, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to be given three days to file a reply to the defendant's opposition; however, after following such order, the plaintiff’s motion was denied and the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

 

•  The petitioner now ascribes to the respondent court the following errors:

1.  The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
 
2.   The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure was constitutional
 
RULING:
No. As strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech. Meanwhile, the Government must allow it (the speech). It has no choice. However, if it acts notwithstanding that (absence of evidence of a clear and present danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for, due process.
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The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
 The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, the Court defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare ." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.