Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner 
vs
Jennifer Cagandahan, Respondent

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth.  During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized.  She likewise has no breast nor menstruation.  Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen.  According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.  She filed a petition at Regional Trial Court Branch 33  in Siniloan, Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
 
HELD:
 
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.  Supreme Court  is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.  As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male.  Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.  It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. 

Supreme Court: " In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case."

​G.R. No. 148560 , November 19, 2001
Joeseph Ejercito Estrada, Petitioner 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and  People of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner, Former President Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), assailed the constitutionality of the said law based on the following grounds: (1) the law suffers from vagueness; (2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and (3) it abolishes the element of mens rea or criminal intent in the crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The foregoing, according to Estrada, violated his fundamental rights to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?

Ruling: 
​ No. The plunder law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.  Republic Act 7080 also known as Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7569, provides for comprehensive guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ in application. However, the questioned law is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein or because of the employment of terms without defining them. The petitioner’s reliance on “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is clearly misplaced. It can only be invoked against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. Being one of the senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and due observance to the constitution

GR 152895 JUNE 15, 2004

​
OFELIA V.  ARCETA, Petitioner
vs.
The Honorable Ma. Celistina C. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court , Navotas, Metro Manila, Reespondent

FACTS:
Petitioner, Ofelia V. Arceta issued a check amounting to 740,000 to Oscar Castro even with full knowledge that her account has no sufficient fund for the said amount. The check was subsequently dishonoured by the bank for reason “DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS”(DAIF). The City Prosecutor of Navotas charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). Petitioner did not move to have the charge against her dismissed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional in the arraignment.
However, in the petition filed to the Supreme Court, Arceta indirectly attacked the constitutionality of the said law.

​ ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of BP 22 is the Lis Mota of the case.

RULING:
Supreme Court held that the constitutional question raised by the petitioner is not the very lis mota of the case. Every case has in its favor presumption of constitutionality, and to say otherwise, there must be an apparent and clear breach of the constitution. Based on the contentions of the petitioners, they still have to convince the Court that BP 22 or its implementation violated any provision of the Constitution. As stressed in Lozano vs. Martinez, BP 22 does not punish the non-payment of debt per se and does not intend or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. It is the act of making worthless checks and putting them in circulation that is being punished. 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. vs.
ASCENSION P.  OLARTE                             
G.R. No. L-22465
​
Facts:

•  Ascension P. Olarte, respondents , wrote certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris
• On January 7, 1956: Visitacion lodged the corresponding charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan
• and then, February 22, 1956: Visitacion filed complaint for libel with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan
• July 3, 1956: Case forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
• Court of First Instance ruling: case dismissed due to expiration of prescriptive period of two years for libel

Issue:
 Was the statute of limitations suspended by the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court? 

Held:
Yes. The filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.

​GR 131124             MARCH 29, 199

Osmundo G. Umali, Petitioner 
vs.
Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Et al. , Respondents  

FACTS:
Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue by Former President Fidel Ramos. After almost a year, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director.
Afterwards, Former President Ramos authorized the preventive suspension of OsmundoUmali and referred the complaint to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) for investigation wherein the commission issued a resolution to support the charges against the petitioner for gross disobedience and falsification of official documents. Fidel V. Ramos then dismissed Umali from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. Osmundo Umali then filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court dismissed the petition. Upon presenting a motion for reconsideration, Umali raised that the "PCAGC" is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against him.

ISSUES:
Whether petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot raise the issue of constitutionality in its motion for reconsideration since it was certainly too late to raise it for the first time at such late stage of proceedings. The constitutional question should be raised at the earliest opportunity such that if not raised in the pleading, it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised before the trial, it will not be considered on appeal.