Montesclaros vs. Comelec, GR 152295 (2002) ​

FACTS: 
​Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of  age for membership in the SK. 

ISSUE: 
 Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents. 

DECISION:  Denied 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners.  Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. 

 
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari finding respondent Cezar Durumpili David, Jr. (respondent) to have been illegally dismissed, and holding petitioner Buenaflor Car Services, Inc. (petitioner) solely liable for the monetary award. Respondent was employed as Service Manager by petitioner, doing business under the trade name “Pronto! Auto Services”. In such capacity, he was in charge of the overall day-to-day operations of petitioner, including the authority to sign checks, check voucher, and purchase orders. In the course of petitioner’s business, with respect to the purchase and delivery of automotive parts and products, it was company policy that all checks should be issued in the name of the specific supplier and not in “cash”, and that said checks are to be picked up from the petitioner’s accounting assistant, Marilyn A. Del Rosario, at the company’s office in Muntinlupa City.
 
On August 8, 2013, Chief Finance Officer Cristina S. David of petitoner’s affiliate company, Diamond IGB, Inc., received a call from the branch manager of ChinaBank, SM City Bicutan Branch, informing her that the latter had cleared several checks issued by petitioner bearing the words “OR CASH” indicated after the payee’s name. An investigation was conducted thereafter. On August 22, 2013, petitioner, through its president, Exequiel Lampa, along with Helen Lee, Human Resource Manager, confronted Del Rosario on the questioned checks. Del Rosario readily confessed that upon respondent’s instruction, she inserted the words “OR CASH” after the name of the payees when the same had been signed by all the authorized signatories. Along with respondent, Del Rosario also implicated De Guzman, Purchasing Officer, and Caranto, petitioner’s messenger/driver, who she alleged, were also under the respondent’s direct supervision and co-conspirators. Del Rosario’s confession was put into writing in two (2) separate letters both of even date. (Extrajudicial Confession) The ensuing investigation revealed that there were 27 checks with the words “OR CASH”, all signed by respondent in the total amount of P1,021,561.72. As a result, respondent, together with Del Rosario, De Guzman, and Caranto, were placed under preventive suspension for a period of 30 days and directed to submit their respective written explanations. Respondent, for his part, vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he has no control over the company’s finance and billing operations, nor the authority to instruct Del Rosario to make any check alterations, without the permission and authority of either Buenaflor, vice-president of operations, or Vasay, Chief Finance Officer.
 
On September 20, 2013, respondent and his co-workers were served with their respective notices of termination after having been found guilty of violating the company’s code of conduct and behavior, particularly serious misconduct and willful breach of trust. Respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of damages and attorney’s fees against petitioners and Buenaflor. In the meantime, Lee, on behalf of petitioner, filed a criminal complaint for 27 counts of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Documents against respondent, De Guzman, Caranto and Del Rosario, supported by Buenaflor and Vasay’s affidavits attesting that the checks they signed did not bear the words “OR CASH”, and that they did not authorize its insertion after the payee’s name. Respondent, De Guzman, Caranto, and Del Rosario were indicted. LABOR ARBITER RULING: In a decision dated September 29, 2014, The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto were illegally dismissed, and consequently, awarded backwages, separation pay and attorney’s fees.
 
The LA observed that petitioner failed to establish existence of conspiracy among respondent, De Guzman, Caranto and Del Rosario in altering the checks and that the latter’s extrajudicial confession was informally made and not supported by evidence. Petitioner appealed this decision to the NLRC. NLRC RULING: In a decision dated November 28, 2014, the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA’s decision, finding that De Guzman and Caranto have been dismissed for cause, but sustained the illegality of respondent’s termination from work. NLRC held that since De Guzman prepared the purchase orders, and Caranto encashed the checks despite knowledge of the company policy, they could not be discounted from the scheme. Having his motion for partial reconsideration denied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. COURT OF APPEALS RULING: CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in holding that respondent was illegally dismissed. CA ruled that Del Rosario’s extrajudicial confession only bound her as confessant but constitutes hearsay with respect to respondent and the other co-accused. CA noted that at the time the checks were signed by respondent, the words “OR CASH” were not yet written on thereon.
 
Issue:
Whether substantial evidence is only needed to prove the validity of the dismissal?

Held:
Yes. Substantial evidence is only needed in proving the validity of a dismissal in a labor suit. In the case at bar, Court of Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the NLRC’s ruling that respondent was illegally dismissed. SUPREME COURT RULING: The petition is meritorious.
 
Article 297 of the Labor Code, as renumbered, enumerates the just causes for termination of an employee, to wit: ART. 297. Termination by Employer. An Employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in conncetion with his work (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. The respondent’s termination was grounded on his violation of petitioner’s code of conduct and behaviour, which was supposedly tantamount to (a) Serious Misconduct and/or (b) willful breach of trust reposed in him by his employer.
 
Petitioner’s claims was hinged on respondent’s alleged directive to petitioner’s accounting assistant, Del Rosario, to insert the word “OR CASH” in the checks payable to the suppliers. While the respondent denies these allegations, but, given his position of trust, although his statements may be true, the court observes that it is highly unlikely that respondent did not have any participation in the above-mentioned scheme to defraud petitioner. No checks would have been issued if no purchase orders were made, which the respondent must approve before the payment process can even commence. Case law states that “Labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the validity of the dismissal.” Based on such, the court is convinced that substantial evidence exists to support petitioner’s allegations against respondent.
 
The Doctrine of Independently Relevant Statements was the basis of SC in considering the extrajudicial confessions of Del Rosario as more than mere hearsay and is highly relevant to the issue of the case. Petition Granted. Respondent is held to be validly dismissed, and thus, not entitled to backwages, separation pay, as well as attorney’s fees.
 
 

Facts:
 
Padilla, a Marketing Associate was retrenched by Am-Phil Concepts, a corporation engaged in the restaurant business. The latter claimed that it was suffering business losses which necessitated the retrenchment of Padilla, who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Am-Phil did not submit financial reports during the proceedings and only after the Labor Artiber rendered a decision that Petitioner sought to present its audited financial reports to prove its losses. decision of the Labor Arbiter that the retrenchment was illegal.

Issue:
Whether or not Padilla was illegally dismissed?

Held:
​Yes. Am-Phil Concepts failed to established that it had complied with the requisites for a valid retrenchment. As correctly pointed out by the Petitioner, retrenchment is a n exercise of the management prerogative to terminate the employment of its employees en masse, to either minimize or prevent losses or when the company is about to close or cease operations for causes not due to business losses.
 
Retrenchment is used interchangeable with the term “lay-off”. It is the termination of employment initiated by employer. There is no fault on the part of the employee. This is resorted to by the management during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations. In simple terms, it is an act of the employer of dismissing employees because of losses in the operation of a business, lack of work, and considerable reduction on volume of business. This is a right that recognized and affirmed by the court.
 
However, this right is not absolute. It cannot be exercised in a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner. In case of business losses, such losses must be actual and real or reasonably imminent. Imagined or undocumented business losses cannot justify retrenchment. Thus, retrenchment is a measure of last resort when other less dramatic means have been tried and have been found inadequate.

Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered in the Philippines engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs. 4 Respondents were its regular and permanent employees, but were affected by petitioner's retrenchment and voluntary retirement programs.
 
On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon, 5 Luna, 6 Badayos, 7 Dela Cruz, 8 and Comandao 9 received a uniformly worded Memorandum of dismissal. As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissed effective March 31, 2004, together with fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in demand.  PCMC, however, claimed that they availed of the company's voluntary retirement program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.
Respondent employees also insisted that their acceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case. PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the services of respondents being a necessary management prerogative.
The LA found no flaw in respondents' termination as they voluntarily opted to retire and were subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then regularized, terminated from employment and were paid separation benefits. NLRC sustained the decision of LA and emphasized the application of the principle of laches for respondents' inaction for an unreasonable period.
In reversing the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years.
 
 Issue:
1. Whether principle of laches apply in this case?
 
2. Whether waivers, releases and quitclaims can bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal
 
Held:
1.         No. Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. . . . Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law." An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants' rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 33 of the Civil Code. Respondents' complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well within the prescriptive period.
 
2.         No. "As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel." The circumstances show that petitioner's misrepresentation led its employees, specifically respondents herein, to believe that the company was suffering losses which necessitated the implementation of the voluntary retirement and retrenchment programs, and eventually the execution of the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim.
 
 

Facts:
On August 23, 1997, TTCI retrenched some of its employees effective 30 days from September 16, 1997 due to financial heavy losses. For a second time, on October 17, 1997, TEU declared a strike against TTCI, but the DOLE issues a return-to-work order of the Labor Secretary. For disregarding the said return-to-work order, Santiago issued two notices of termination dated October 26, 1997 terminating some 106 workers and a revised list dated November 24, 1997 increasing the number of dismissed employees to 119, for participating in the illegal strike.
 
On May 14, 1998, petitioners Estrañero et.al filed several complaints against TTCI and MENCORP before the NLRC. However, this case was withdrawn on March 4, 1999 upon motion by the TEU’s counsel which was given due course on March 22, 1999.1
Four years later, several complaints for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney’s fees were filed against TTCI, Santiago, MENCORP and its General Manager Virginia Mendoza before the Labor Arbiter.
 
In response, TTCI asserted that the petitioners’ cause of action had already been barred by prescription. On June 9, 2005, the LA rendered a Decision dismissing the petitioners’ claim for unfair labor practice except for Estrañero et. Al. and money claims on the ground of prescription. The NLRC vacated and set aside the findings of the LA, upon finding that the petitioners’ complaints had already been barred by prescription.
 
In sustaining the NLRC decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the illegal dismissal case was filed only in June 2002 or for more than four (4) years and seven (7) months from the time petitioners received the notices of their dismissal in November and October 1997. Clearly, the four-year prescriptive period has already elapsed. The petitioners contend that the period when they filed a labor case on May 14, 1998 but withdrawn on March 22, 1999 should be excluded from the computation of the four-year prescriptive period for illegal dismissal cases.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners’ complaints for illegal dismissal have already prescribed?

​Held:
The Court ruled that in this case, there is no question about the fact that the petitioners’ complaints for unfair labor practice and money claims have already prescribed.
 
While the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly the same position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The withdrawal of their complaint effectively erased the tolling of the reglementary period.
 
The running of the four-year prescriptive period not having been interrupted by the filing of NLRC RAB-I-01-1007, the petitioners’ cause of action had already prescribed in four years after their cessation of employment on October 26, 1997 and November 24, 1997. Consequently, when the petitioners filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits, and damages in 2002, their claim, clearly, had already been barred by prescription

Facts:
 
This controversy is an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case filed by the respondent against the petitioners.  In the Labor Arbiter’s decision, it recognized respondent’s right to receive form the petitioners back wages and separation pay.  After the decision became final and executory, petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. Petitioner opposed and contended that their obligation had been satisfied by the release of the cash bond.
 
LA ruled that the cash bond posted by the petitioners was insufficient to satisfy their obligation.  NLRC affirmed the LA. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition

Issue:
Whether the computation of respondent’s award of back wages and separation pay should be reckoned from the date when the Labor Arbiter rendered the decision in the main case?

Held:
​No.  The rule is, if the Labor Arbiter’s (LA’s) decision, which granted separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, is appealed by any party, the employer-employee relationship subsists and until such time when decision becomes final and executory, the employee is entitled to all the monetary awards awarded by the LA.
 
The finality of the decision cuts off the employment relationship and represents the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties against each other.
 
Here, respondent remained an employee of the petitioners pending her partial appeal. Her employment was only severed when this Court, in G.R. No. 200490, affirmed with finality the rulings of the CA and the labor tribunals declaring her right to separation pay instead of actual reinstatement.  She is entitled to have her back wages and separation pay computed until 4 October 2012, the date when the judgment of this Court became final and executory.

Facts:
 
Alberto N. Hilongo was illegally dismissed. The CA held that when an appellate court affirms the Labor Arbiter's ruling, it is understood that awards due to the illegally dismissed employee shall be recomputed in order to account for the period of time that has lapsed from the rendition of the Labor Arbiter's decision up to its finality. On the basis of this, Hilongo filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution alleging that the June 11, 2013 CA Resolution had confirmed that the amount of P170,520.31 awarded by the Labor Arbiter is not sufficient, and that there is a need to compute additional monetary awards reckoned from May 1, 2010 up to April 26, 2013 or the date Hilongo presumed as the date of finality of the decision. The Labor Arbiter directed the issuance of a writ of execution and ruled that the award of P170,520.31 as stated in the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated April 30, 2010 prevails.
 
 
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the re-computation of Hilongo's monetary awards? - NO
 
 Held:
No essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared by the Labor Arbiter in that decision. A recomputation (or an original computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law — specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision — that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code.
 
The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.
 
We thus cannot agree with petitioners' contention that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

Facts:
 
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondents against petitioners. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed. The same was affirmed by the NLRC. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was filed which the NLRC granted and dismissed the complaint. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which the latter granted. Respondents moved for re-computation of their award to include their back wages and other benefits from the date of the decision of the LA up to the finality of the decision. The LA then issued an order increasing the amount respondents are entitled.

Issue:
Was the re-computation necessary?

Held:
​Yes. Regarding the claim of violating the rule on immutability of a final and executory judgment, “updating the computation of awards to include as well as back wages and separation pay from LA’s decision up to the finality is not violative of said rule. Even if not expressly provided in the appellate court’s decision, the inclusion by the LA of the 13th month pay is proper.

 
Dario Nacar filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the NLRC against respondents Gallery Frames (GF) and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favour of Nacar and was awarded back wages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of ₱158,919.92. After failing to get a favourable response from NLRC and CA, Gallery Frames sought relief before the Supreme Court but was also denied.
 
Hence, an Entry of Judgment was later issued certifying that the resolution became final and executory   A pre-execution conference was consequently scheduled, but respondents failed to appear. Nacar filed a Motion for Correct Computation, praying that his backwages be computed from the date of his dismissal on January 24, 1997 up to the finality of the Resolution of the Supreme Court. Upon re-computation, the NLRC arrived at an updated amount in the sum of ₱471,320.31.
 
The said amount was rewarded to the Computation and Examination Unit for recomputation, where the judgment award of petitioner was reassessed to be in the total amount of only ₱147,560.19 which Nacar eventually received. Those judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013. But, Nacar then filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the re-computation of the monetary award to include the appropriate interests.
 
Issue:
Whether or not back wages be computed from the time petitioner was illegally dismissed up to when the Resolution of the Court became final and executory and the appropriate interest be granted?
 
 Held:
The Court held that backwages be computed from the time petitioner was illegally dismissed on January 24, 1997 up to May 27, 2002, when the Resolution of the Court became final and executor.
 
As to payment of interest, an interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards, computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction
 
Citing the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the guidelines regarding the manner of computing legal interest, to wit:
 
1.         When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
2.         With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
2.1.      When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2.2.      When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
 
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
2.3.      When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.
 

Facts:
 
Mardy Cabigo and 40 other workers filed with the DOLE a request for payroll inspection of Hacienda Valentin- Balabag and resulted into the discovery of labor standard law violations. The DOLE ordered Hacienda Valentin-Balabag to correct the discovered violations. filed with DOLE Bacolod a Double Verified Special Appearance to Oppose "Writ of Execution" For
Being a Blatant and Dangerous Violation of Due Process, claiming that she did not receive any form of communication, or participate in any proceeding relative to the subject matter of the writ of execution.

Issue:
Whether or not CA was correct in holding that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the appeal of petitioner due to the insufficiency of her appeal bond?

Held:
The CA was correct in holding that public respondent did not commit grace abuse of discretion in rejecting the appeal of the petitioner due to the insufficiency of her appeal bond. The bond should be in the amount equivalent to the monetary award indicated in the order.
 
Under the foregoing Implementing Rules, it is plain that public respondent has no authority to accept an appeal under a reduced bond.
 

Facts:
 
Respondent SS Ventures International, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly engaged in the business of manufacturing footwear products for local sales and export abroad. It is represented in this action by respondents Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn Rayala. Petitioners Andy Balite (Balite), Monaliza Bihasa (Bihasa) and Delfin Anzaldo (Anzaldo) were regular employees of the respondent company until their employments were severed for violation of various company policies.
 
For his part, Balite was issued a Show Cause Memorandum by the respondent company on 4 August 2005 charging him with the following infractions: (1) making false reports, malicious and fraudulent statements and rumor-mongering against the company; (2) threatening and intimidating co-workers; (3) refusing to cooperate in the conduct of investigation; and (4) gross negligence in the care and use of the company property resulting in the damage of the finished products. After respondent found Balite’s explanation insufficient, he was dismissed from employment, through a Notice of Termination on 6 September 2005.
 
Bihasa, on the other hand, was charged with absence without leave on two occasions and with improper behavior, stubbornness, arrogance and uncooperative attitude towards superiors and employees. Bihasa was likewise terminated from the service on 5 May 2006 after her explanation in an administrative investigation was found unsatisfactory by the respondent company.
 
Anzaldo was also dismissed from employment after purportedly giving him due process. The records of the infractions he committed as well as the date of his termination, however, are not borne by the records.
 
Consequently, the three employees charged respondents with illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages, 13th month pay and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter.
 
Issue:
Whether or not the amount of bond of more than 20% of the judgement award is sufficient as provisional bond pending resolution of motion to reduce bond?

Held:
​Balite v SS Ventures International
G.R. No. 195109; February 4, 2015         Respondent SS Ventures International, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly engaged in the business of manufacturing footwear products for local sales and export abroad. It is represented in this action by respondents Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn Rayala. Petitioners Andy Balite (Balite), Monaliza Bihasa (Bihasa) and Delfin Anzaldo (Anzaldo) were regular employees of the respondent company until their employments were severed for violation of various company policies.
 
For his part, Balite was issued a Show Cause Memorandum by the respondent company on 4 August 2005 charging him with the following infractions: (1) making false reports, malicious and fraudulent statements and rumor-mongering against the company; (2) threatening and intimidating co-workers; (3) refusing to cooperate in the conduct of investigation; and (4) gross negligence in the care and use of the company property resulting in the damage of the finished products. After respondent found Balite’s explanation insufficient, he was dismissed from employment, through a Notice of Termination on 6 September 2005.
 
Bihasa, on the other hand, was charged with absence without leave on two occasions and with improper behavior, stubbornness, arrogance and uncooperative attitude towards superiors and employees. Bihasa was likewise terminated from the service on 5 May 2006 after her explanation in an administrative investigation was found unsatisfactory by the respondent company.
 
Anzaldo was also dismissed from employment after purportedly giving him due process. The records of the infractions he committed as well as the date of his termination, however, are not borne by the records. Consequently, the three employees charged respondents with illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages, 13th month pay and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter. Whether or not the amount of bond of more than 20% of the judgement award is sufficient as provisional bond pending resolution of motion to reduce bond,        Held:
 
Yes. An appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal.
 
In McBurnie v. Ganzon, the Court harmonized the provision on appeal that its procedures are fairly applied to both the petitioner and the respondent, assuring by such application that neither one or the other party is unfairly favored. It was pronounced that the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to 10% of the monetary award pending resolution of the motion to reduce appeal bond shall be deemed sufficient to perfect an appeal
 
The ruling in McBurnie was clarified by the Court in Sara Lee Philippines v. Ermilinda Macatlang. Considering the peculiar circumstances in Sara Lee, the Court determined what is the reasonable amount of appeal bond and underscored the fact that the amount of 10% of the award is not a permissible bond but is only such amount that shall be deemed reasonable in the meantime that the appellant’s motion is pending resolution by the Commission. The actual reasonable amount yet to be determined is necessarily a bigger amount. In an effort to strike a balance between the constitutional obligation of the state to afford protection to labor on the one hand, and the opportunity afforded to the employer to appeal on the other, the Court considered the appeal bond in the amount of P725M which is equivalent to 25% of the monetary award sufficient to perfect the appeal.
 
In line with Sara Lee and the objective that the appeal on the merits to be threshed out soonest by the NLRC, the Court holds that the appeal bond posted by the respondent in the amount of P100,000.00 which is equivalent to around 20% of the total amount of monetary bond is sufficient to perfect an appeal. With the employer’s demonstrated good faith in filing the motion to reduce the bond on demonstrable grounds coupled with the posting of the appeal bond in the requested amount, as well as the filing of the memorandum of appeal, the right of the employer to appeal must be upheld. This is in recognition of the importance of the remedy of appeal, which is an essential part of our judicial system and the need to ensure that every party litigant is given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause freed from the constraints of technicalities.

 
Aris Philippines permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995 displacing 5,984 rank-and-file employees. On 26 October 1995, FAPI was incorporated prompting former Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris. Sarah Lee Corporation (SLC), Sarah Lee Philippines (SLP) and Cesar Cruz were impleaded as defendants being major stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris, respectively. On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris employees illegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to P3,453,664,710.86. The judgment award is composed of separation pay of one month for every year of service, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond. They posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond. The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang petition), filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was not perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which is equivalent to the judgment award. While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC prematurely issued an order setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being procedurally infirmed.
 
The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion PETITIONERS' CONTENTION: That by the filing of the motion to reduce the bond and the positing of the bond of Php 4.5m, roughly equivalent to the 10% of the original judgment award is enough to perfect an appeal. That the Confession of Judgement submitted by the Petitioners that is only signed by some of the aggrieved workers instead of the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees and only an amount of P342,284,800.00 is enough as a substitute for a valid compromise agreement that will dismiss the cases in dispute. RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS: That the appeal bond made by Petitioners are not enough to perfect an appeal due to its amount being below the directed amount given by the Courts That the Confession of Judgement submitted by Petitions are not enough to satisfy the claims of Respondents for being grossly inadequate to satisfy their claims and that they lack all of the signatures and/or consent of all the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees running counter to the nature of a compromise agreement.
Whether the Confession of Judgement can be accepted as a valid compromise agreement between the parties?
NO. The Confession of Judgement cannot be accepted as a valid compromise agreement. A confession of judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly due and cuts off all defenses and right of appeal. It is used as a shortcut to a judgment in a case where the defendant concedes liability. It is seen as the written authority of the debtor and a direction for entry of judgment against the debtor. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is an agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing.
 
A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.” A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into.
 
A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the amount offered by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. The judgment award is P3,453,664,710.86 or each employee is slated to receive P577,149.85. On the other hand, the P342,284,800.00 compromise is to be distributed among 5,984 employees which would translate to only P57,200.00 per employee. From this amount, P8,580.00 as attorney's fees will be deducted, leaving each employee with a measly P48,620.00. In fact, the compromised amount roughly comprises only 10% of the judgment award.
 
 
 

Facts:
 
On October 4, 2002, McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against GAnzon et.al. The latter opposed the complaint, contending that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a company for the management of hotels. They did not intend to create an employer-employee relationship.
 
In a Decision, the LA declared McBurnie as having been illegally dismissed from employment. Feeling aggrieved, Ganzon et.al appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC. On November 5, 2004, they filed their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted an appeal bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00. Ganzon et.al. contended in their Motion to Reduce Bond.
 
On March 31, 2005, the NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond, explaining that "in cases involving monetary award, an employer seeking to appeal the [LA’s] decision to the Commission is unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award x x x." Thus, the NLRC required from the respondents the posting of an additional bond in the amount of ₱54,083,910.00.
When their motion for reconsideration was denied, the respondents decided to elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, in view of the respondents’ failure to post the required additional bond, the NLRC dismissed their appeal. The respondents’ motion for reconsideration was also denied.
On February 16, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution granting the respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the respondents’ posting of a bond in the amount of ₱10,000,000.00. McBurnie sought reconsideration but was denied. He then filed with the Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari but was denied.
 
In the meantime, the CA ruled allowing the respondents’ motion to reduce appeal bond and directing the NLRC to give due course to their appeal.
 
Issue:
Whether or not an “Appeal Bond” can be reduced.

​Held:
The Court explained in this case that the posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. “The word "only" makes it clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer is the essential and exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. x x x. Moreover, the filing of the bond is not only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.
 
However, while the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
 
In all cases, the reduction of the appeal bond shall be justified by meritorious grounds and accompanied by the posting of the required appeal bond in a reasonable amount. The requirement on the existence of a "meritorious ground" delves on the worth of the parties’ arguments, taking into account their respective rights and the circumstances that attend the case.
 
By jurisprudence, the merit referred to may pertain to an appellant’s lack of financial capability to pay the full amount of the bond, the merits of the main appeal such as when there is a valid claim that there was no illegal dismissal to justify the award, the absence of an employer-employee relationship, prescription of claims, and other similarly valid issues that are raised in the appeal. For the purpose of determining a "meritorious ground", the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, or from making a preliminary determination of the merits of the appellant’s contentions. In this case, the NLRC then should have considered the respondents’ arguments in the memorandum on appeal that was filed with the motion to reduce the requisite appeal bond.

Facts:
 
Rivera was employed as Unilever’s Area Activation Executive for Area 9 South in the cities of Cotabato and Davao - She was primarily tasked with managing the sales, distribution and promotional activities in her area and supervising Ventureslink International, Inc. (Ventureslink) - Unilever enforces a strict policy that every trade activity must be accompanied by a Trade Development Program (TDP) and that the allocated budget for a specific activity must be used for such activity only. - in 2007, Unilever’s internal auditor conducted a random audit and found out that there were fictitious billings and fabricated receipts supposedly from Ventureslink amounting to P11,200,000.00. It was also discovered that some funds were diverted from the original intended projects. Upon further verification, Ventureslink reported that the fund deviations were upon the instruction of Rivera. - Unilever issued a show-cause notice to Rivera asking her to explain the following charges, to wit: a)Conversion and Misappropriation of Resources; b) Breach of Fiduciary Trust; c) Policy Breaches; and d) Integrity Issues - Responding through an email, Rivera admitted the fund diversions and insisted that the diverted funds were all utilized in the company’s promotional ventures in her area of coverage. - Unilever found Rivera guilty of serious breach of the company’s Code of Business Principles compelling it to sever their professional relations. - Rivera asked for reconsideration and requested Unilever to allow her to receive retirement benefits having served the company for fourteen (14) years already. Unilever denied her request, reasoning that the forfeiture of retirement benefits was a legal consequence of her dismissal from work - Rivera filed a complaint, Labor Arbiter dismissed her complaint and denied her claim for retirement benefits but ordered Unilever to pay a proportionate 13th month pay and the corresponding cash equivalent of her unused leave credits - NLRC partially granted Rivera’s prayer. Unilever was ordered to pay her retirement benefits and separation pay - CA affirmed with modification the NLRC resolution. the CA awarded separation pay in her favor as a measure of social justice.

Issue:
Whether or not Rivera, as a validly dismissed employee, is entitled to an award of separation pay.

​Held:
NO, RIVERA IS NOT ENTITLED - As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 28215 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.16 Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides: Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer.—The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code.
 
The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice. - In exceptional cases the Supreme Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. - Separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible.

Facts:
 
Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), is a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land; respondents were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as Operations Manager. Sometime in October 2007 the commissions received by the respondents were reduced to 7 to 9% from 8 to 10%. This led respondents and other employees of PTI to hold a series of meetings to discuss the protection of their interests as employees. Ranato Claros, president of PTI, made known to Garcia his objections to the formation of a union and in order to block the continued formation of the union, PTI caused the transfer of all union members and sympathizers to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas).
 
The business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment. Hence, the respondent-employees filed complaints against PTI for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. PTI contended that it has nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees.
 
​Issue:
Whether or not the order to reinstate respondents was valid considering that the issue of reinstatement was never brought up before the CA and respondents never questioned the award of separation pay?
 
 Held:
YES. It is clear from the complaints filed by respondents that they are seeking reinstatement. Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The general prayer is broad enough “to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought.”
 
Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. In the instant case, aside from their specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs which are deemed just and equitable