IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, Petitioner vs.
 ISAGANI D. BOBIS, Respondent
GR No. 138509
July 31, 2000
 
Facts:

• October 21, 1985:Respondent, Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce B. Javier
• January 25, 1996: Respondent contracted a second marriage with Imelda Marbella-Bobis without the first marriage being annulled, nullified or terminated
• February 25, 1998: Isagani Bobis charged with bigamy before Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City
• Respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage
• Regional Trial Court judge suspends criminal case pending decision in civil action

Issue:

1. Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy? and
2. Is ignorance of Article 40 of the Family Code a valid defense for contracting second marriage?

 
Ruling:

1. No. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
2. No. Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law.

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner  vs.
Court of Appeals and Zenaida C. Bobiles, Respondents
G.R. No. 92326
24 January 1992
 
 
Facts:

• February 2, 1988:  Ms.Zenaida C.  Bobiles filed a petition to adopt 6-year-old Jason Condat.
• February 15, 1988, Trial court found petition sufficient in form and substance
•  Copies sent to father of the child (Salvador Condat), and the social worker assigned to the court. 
• March 28, 1988: Nobody appeared in to contest petition
• August 3, 1988: Family Code takes effect. It states that joint adoption by husband and wife becomes mandatory under new law
• RTC grants petition to adopt the minor Jason Condat to Ms Zenaida Bobiles
• CA ruling: affirms RTC ruling

 
Issue:

1. Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption filed by Ms. Zenaida Bobiles and (2) should the petition to adopt Jason be granted considering only Zenaida Bobiles filed the petition?

 
Ruling:

1. No. Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. (2) Yes. In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. The rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the consent of his natural parents. 

​G.R. NO. 179799               September 11, 2009
Zenaida R. Gregorio, Petitioner  vs
Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc., and Emma J. Datuin, Respondents.
 
Facts: August 18, 2000 , Zenaida Gregorio filed a civil suit before the RTC Branch 12, Ligao, Albay against Sansio Philippines and Emma Datuin for filing against her criminal charges for violation of BP Blg. 22; that respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that petitioner never gave the opportunity to controvert the charges against her, because respondents stated an incorrect address in the criminal complaint. Gregorio was arrested, detained and released only after her husband posted a bond. In the course of investigation Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance and subsequently the criminal case was dismissed.  March 20, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision in the civil case directing Sansio and Datuin jointly and solidarily to pay Gregorio damages. The RTC expressly stated that the complaint was one for damages based on quasi-delict and not on malicious prosecution. Aggrieved by the Decision, Sansio and Datuin appealed to the CA.
 On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered Decision granting the petition and ordering the dismissal of the damage suit of Gregorio. The latter moved to reconsider the said decision but the same was denied in the appellate court’s Resolution dated September 12, 2007. It was then Gregorio filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
 
Issue: Whether or not  the civil suit filed by petitioner is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution and can claim damages?
 
Ruling: Yes. The petition is granted. The decision dated January 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are reversed and set aside.  Gregorio’s civil complaint is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 , Gregorio’s right to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin. Gregorio was acting within her right when she instituted against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper.
 

​G.R. NO. 160273               January 18, 2008
Cebu Country Club, Inc. , Sabino R. Dapat, Ruben D. Almendras, Julius Z. Neri, Douglas L. Luym, Cesar T. Libi, Ramontito E. Garcia and Jose B. Sala, Petitioners,                 vs
Ricardo F. Elizagaque, Respondents.
 
Facts:
Respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent's application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent's application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI's corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, responden again sent CCCI a letter... inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed a Civil Case No. 67190.
the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent,
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial court's Decision with modification,... Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter's application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque... injuria.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to
Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When respondent's application for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his... application was disapproved.
 
Issue: Whether in disapproving respondent's application for proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint and several.
 
Ruling:
Yes. Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of... his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that... is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for... the damage.
We believe respondent' testimony that he suffered... mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the... same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[8] Taking into consideration the attending circumstances here, we... hold that an award to respondent of P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
 
As to petitioners' reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of... a person's right, as in this case.

​G.R. NO. 174238    July  07, 2009
Anita Cheng, Petitioner                vs
Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy, Respondents.
 
Facts:
Anita Cheng filed two(2) estafa cases before the RTC-Manila against William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce checks no. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
 
Petitioner on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two(2) cases for violation of BP 22 before the MeTC-Manila. On March 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. Later, the MeTC dismissed the BP 22 cases on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against Sy’s before the RTC Manila, a complaint for collection for sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP 22 cases.
 
RTC-Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg 22 cases.
 
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied in its Order dated June 5, 2006
 
Issue:
 
Whether petitioner can recover the loaned sum of money and damages?
 
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner may recover under the principle of unjust enrichment. There is unjust enrichment when a person is unjustly benefited, and such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of the respondents

​G.R. NO. 186006    October 16, 2009
G.R. NO. 186006    October 16, 2009
Norlainie Mitmug Limbona , Petitioner              vs
Commission on Elections and Malik T. Alingan, Respondents.
 
Facts:
Petitioner Norlainie Limbona , her husband, and respondent Malik Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao Del Norte. After filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition of disqualifying the husband of petitioner for non compliance with the one year residence requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed the same petition, this time against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC granted. The COMELEC granted the disqualification of petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate for her husband which was approved by COMELEC. Respondent yet again sought Petitioner’s disqualification.
Petitioner claimed that she has been staying , sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower Kalangaan.
​
Issue: Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one year residency requirement and qualify to run for the office mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte?
 
Ruling:
No. Petitioner failed to qualify the one-year residence requirement. In order to acquire domicile by choice, there must be residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain there, and intention to abandon the old domicile. A person’s domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
 
The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of origin is Manguing, Lanao Del Norte, which is his also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapusan, Marawi City. Hence, failure to comply with the residence requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.  

​G.R. NO. 133743    February 6, 2007
Edgar San Luis, Petitioner              vs
Felicidad San Luis, Respondents.
 
 
G.R. NO. 133743    February 6, 2007
Rodolfo San Luis, Petitioner              vs
Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, Respondents.
 
 
 
Facts:
 Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. He contracted three marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, but Virginia died on 1963. On May 1, 1968, He married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son. But on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce at State of Hawaii which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody of December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, He married Felicidad Sagalongos. He had no children but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of administration before RTC Makati. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she only a mistress of his father because at the time of death, he was still married to his second wife. Felicidad presented the evidence that prove the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry lee had already been dissolved. And she claimed that Felicisimo had the capacity to marry her by virtue of par. 2 Article 26 of the family code.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s state.
Ruling:
Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status that as a surviving wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner under the Art. 144 of the Civil code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as he may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
 

G.R. NO. 182836    October 13, 2019
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation, Petitioner             vs
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan Montaño and Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation, Respondents.
 
Facts:
 Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
 
 
Issue:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.
 
Ruling:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

​LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL. V. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-63915  
April 24, 1985
 
Facts: 
 
Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus compelling the respondents to publish all presidential decrees that are not published yet, regardless if these decrees were able to provide for their own effectivity.The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
 
Issue:
 
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette or any other form of  is required before any law to take effect?
 
Ruling: 
 
Yes, the court agreed that it's essential for any law or statute to be published first before they become effective as it's unconstitutional for someone to be punished for violating a law which he received no notice about, and there would be no basis for the application of Article 3, thus prevents due process to take place. As a result, the court ordered the repondents to publish all unpublished presidential issuances in the Official Gazette—until then, these presidential issuances will not take effect. 

Executive Secretary vs Court of Appeals          429 SCRA 781

​Facts: 
​Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on 15 July 1995. Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter Inc (ARCO-Phil) filed petition for declaratory relief. The alleged that:

Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction.
The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are, therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.

In their answer to the petition, they contend that ARCO-Phil has no legal standing, it being a non-stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in the action. It is service-oriented while the recruitment agencies it purports to represent are profit-oriented.

Issue: Whether or not ARCO-Phil has legal standing to assail Republic Act 8042?

Decision: The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents. However, the respondent has no locus standi to file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled workers. We note that it even failed to implead any unskilled workers in its petition.

"Locus standi" (place of standing) - the right of the party to appear and be heard before court, or the right of a party to commence an action.

​LAW

​SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 114791, May 29, 1997 ]
 
NANCY GO AND ALEX GO, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HERMOGENES ONG AND JANE C. ONG, RESPONDENTS. 
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
No less than the Constitution commands us to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family.[1] In our society, the importance of a wedding ceremony cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the family and, therefore, an occasion worth reliving in the succeeding years.

It is in this light that we narrate the following undisputed facts:

Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondents’ return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record of their wedding, private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, to wit:
 “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby granted:

1.       Ordering the rescission of the agreement entered into between plaintiff Hermogenes Ong and defendant Nancy Go;

2.       Declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong for the following sums:

a)           P450.00, the down payment made at contract time;

b)           P75,000.00, as moral damages;

c)           P20,000.00, as exemplary damages;

d)           P5,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and

e)           P2,000.00, as litigation expenses;

Defendants are also ordered to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.”
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence they presented to prove that they acted only as agents of a certain Pablo Lim and, as such, should not have been held liable. In addition, they aver that there is no evidence to show that the erasure of the tape was done in bad faith so as to justify the award of damages.[2]

The petition is not meritorious.

Petitioners claim that for the video coverage, the cameraman was employed by Pablo Lim who also owned the video equipment used. They further assert that they merely get a commission for all customers solicited for their principal.[3]

This contention is primarily premised on Article 1883 of the Civil Code which states thus:
“ART. 1883.  If an agent acts in his own name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such persons against the principal.

In such case the agent is the one directly bound in favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own, except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.

xxx                                                                        xxx                                                                               xxx”
Petitioners’ argument that since the video equipment used belonged to Lim and thus the contract was actually entered into between private respondents and Lim is not deserving of any serious consideration. In the instant case, the contract entered into is one of service, that is, for the video coverage of the wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the object of the contract was the video equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video equipment of another person is of no consequence.

It must also be noted that in the course of the protracted trial below, petitioners did not even present Lim to corroborate their contention that they were mere agents of the latter. It would not be unwarranted to assume that their failure to present such a vital witness would have had an adverse result on the case.[4]

As regards the award of damages, petitioners would impress upon this Court their lack of malice or fraudulent intent in the erasure of the tape. They insist that since private respondents did not claim the tape after the lapse of thirty days, as agreed upon in their contract, the erasure was done in consonance with consistent business practice to minimize losses.[5]

We are not persuaded.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering that private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the lapse of thirty days was unjustified.

In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”

In the instant case, petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover the latter’s wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for damages.

The grant of actual or compensatory damages in the amount of P450.00 is justified, as reimbursement of the downpayment paid by private respondents to petitioners.[6]

Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because this case is not among those enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also constitute a quasi-delict.[7] Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the breach of contract which was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppresive or abusive.[8]

Petitioners’ act or omission in recklessly erasing the video coverage of private respondents’ wedding was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.

As the appellate court aptly observed:

“Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the appellees moral damages albeit in the amount of P75,000.00, which was a great reduction from plaintiffs’ demand in the complaint, in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the appellees suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.”[9]

Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar, the award of exemplary damages by the trial court is justified[10] to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their affairs.

The award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses are likewise proper, consistent with Article 2208[11] of the Civil Code.

Finally, petitioner Alex Go questions the finding of the trial and appellate courts holding him jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed. He argues that when his wife entered into the contract with private respondent, she was acting alone for her sole interest.[12]

We find merit in this contention. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.[13]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment award. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.


[1] Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.

[2] Rollo, pp. 15-23.

[3] Ibid., p. 7.

[4] Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states, "(t)hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."

[5] Rollo, p. 19.

[6] Article 2200, Civil Code of the Philippines.

[7] PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines, V, 1990, pp. 995-996, Singson v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 23 SCRA 1117 (1968).

[8] TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V, 1995, p. 656.

[9] Rollo, p. 37.

[10] Article 2232, Civil Code of the Philippines.

[11] "ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1)        When exemplary damages are awarded;

xxx         xxx         xxx"

[12] Rollo, p. 23.

[13] Article 1311, Civil Code of the Philippines.

​SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 164026, December 23, 2008 ]
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,
VS. GMA NETWORK, INC., RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) assails the Decision[1] dated February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163, which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.'s (GMA's) application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term.

The undisputed facts as narrated by the appellate court are as follows:
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC, for brevity). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000.

Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC's Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.

On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term.

On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.

On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioner's Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed.

On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.

Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment, the dispositive portion of which states:

"In light of the foregoing, we believe that the questioned assessment is in accordance with law. Accordingly, you are hereby required to comply with the required filing fee."

An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent SEC was subsequently taken by the petitioner on the ground that the assessment of filing fees for the petitioner's application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.

On September 26, 2001, following three (3) motions for early resolution filed by the petitioner, the respondent SEC En Banc issued the assailed order dismissing the petitioner's appeal, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Appeal is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.[2]
In its petition for review[3] with the Court of Appeals, GMA argued that its application for the extension of its corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of incorporation. It further averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, which the SEC used as basis for assessing P1,212,200.00 as filing fee for the extension of GMA's corporate term, is not valid.

The appellate court agreed with the SEC's submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new articles of incorporation.

However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity.

The appellate court denied reconsideration in a Resolution[4] dated June 9, 2004.

In its Memorandum[5] dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that it issued the questioned memorandum circular in the exercise of its delegated legislative power to fix fees and charges. The filing fees required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the transacting public and are essential to its supervisory and regulatory functions. The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore, require no publication.

For its part, GMA points out in its Memorandum,[6] dated September 23, 2005, that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fees for amended articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate existence. The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to filing fees for articles of incorporation. Thus, GMA argues that the former circular, being the one that specifically treats of applications for the extension of corporate term, should apply to its case.

Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the latter did not take effect and cannot be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for the reasons that it was neither filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as required under existing laws.

It should be mentioned at the outset that the authority of the SEC to collect and receive fees as authorized by law is not in question.[7] Its power to collect fees for examining and filing articles of incorporation and by-laws and amendments thereto, certificates of increase or decrease of the capital stock, among others, is recognized. Likewise established is its power under Sec. 7 of P.D. No. 902-A to recommend to the President the revision, alteration, amendment or adjustment of the charges which it is authorized to collect.

The subject of the present inquiry is not the authority of the SEC to collect and receive fees and charges, but rather the validity of its imposition on the basis of a memorandum circular which, the Court of Appeals held, is ineffective.

Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the amendment consists in extending the term of corporate existence, the SEC "shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation."[8] As is clearly the import of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.

The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law and other pertinent laws,[9] issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock but not less than P200.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations without par value, for the filing of amended articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate existence.

Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting the maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, such that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof but not less than P500.00.

A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed pertain to different matters, as GMA points out. SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fee for the amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life, while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the filing fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the former circular, being squarely applicable and, more importantly, being more favorable to it, should be followed.

What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the same fees for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of incorporation to reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No. 3531 provides an unmistakable standard which should guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its rates and fees. If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court would have been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as outlined in the questioned memorandum circular, GMA's argument notwithstanding.

However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."

In Tañada v. Tuvera,[10] the Court, expounding on the publication requirement, held:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.[11]
The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the Administr ative Code of 1987.[12]

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[13] Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the National Administrative Register.

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of R.A.

No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as interpretative in nature merely is the fact the SEC's assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this case, the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an extension of its corporate term.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a person's right to property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163, dated February 20, 2004, and its Resolution, dated June 9, 2004, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio Morales, *Chico-Nazario and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.




* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order.

[1] Rollo, pp. 10-19; Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Arturo D. Brion (now an Associate Justice of this Court).

[2] Id. at 11-12.

[3] Id. at 91-115.

[4] Id. at 57.

[5] Id. at 196-221.

[6] Id. at 231-249.

[7] Sec. 139 of B.P. Blg. 68 authorizes the SEC to collect and receive fees as authorized by law or by rules and regulations promulgated by it.

[8] An Act to Further Amend Section Eighteen of the Corporation Law.

x x x

The Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall be entitled to collect and receive the sum of ten pesos for filing said copy of the amended articles of incorporation: Provided, however, That where the amendment consists in extending the term of corporate existence the Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under existing law for the filing of articles of incorporation.

x x x

R.A. No. 3531 took effect on June 20, 1963.

[9] Presidential Decree 902-A, R.A. No. 1143, and the Revised Securities Act.

[10] 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

[11] Id. at 535.

[12] Executive Order No. 292, Book VII, Chapter 2, Sec. 3 thereof states:

Sec. 3. Filing.--(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

[13] 408 Phil. 270 (2001) cited in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE) v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 520.
 

​THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 173918, April 08, 2008 ]
 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), Petitioner,
vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.[1] The appellate court reversed the Decision[2] dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987,[3] which requires the publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities.[4]

The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.[5]

Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at reasonable prices.[6]

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the OPSF.[7]

On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable levels.[8]

On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that respondent’s contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,[9] which provides that:
2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty days.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)
On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter[11] to respondent advising the latter of its additional underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.

In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.[12]

On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.[13]

In a letter[14] dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the period December 1989 to October 1991.

In a letter[15] dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due. Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondent’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.

On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996. While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads:[16]
Given the foregoing, the DOE’s implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that administrative regulation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President, which was denied on 28 November 2003.[17]

Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February 2004[18] and 11 February 2004[19] issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not been filed before said office.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.[20]According to the dispositive of the appellate court’s Decision:[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.

ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.
On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following issues were raised:[22]
I

THE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT, MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER
II

ASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.
This petition is without merit.

As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera[23] enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)
Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof specifically providing that:
Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. (Emphasis provided.)
Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,[24] the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 – filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center – for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 2004[25] and 9 February 2004[26] issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.

In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,[27] this Court emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified several instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances, which failed to observe the proper requirements, to have no force and effect:
Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they “shall take effect immediately.” These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not likewise filed with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; (3) Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People’s Republic of China; (5) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees; and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders.

In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand, in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time. The Court emphasized therein that “publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect.”
Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents’ underpayment is based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.

Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:
In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation on the ERC’s proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon.

However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.[28] (Emphasis provided.)
Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is irrelevant in the present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned requirements.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

​
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Tinga, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

* Assigned as Special Member.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zeñarosa with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. Rollo, pp. 55 -74.

[2] Id. at 301-303.

[3] Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that:

Filing.— (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.

[4] Rollo, p. 63.

[5] Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956 states that:

SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Special Account in the General Fund to be designated as Oil Price Stabilization Fund for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or an increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.

The Fund may be sourced from any of the following:

(a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad-valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;
(b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations under Presidential Decree No. 1931, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;
(c) Any additional tax to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment by persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products.

The Fund created herein shall be used to reimburse the oil companies for cost increases on crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil.

The Fund shall be administered by the Ministry of Energy.

[6] Rollo, p. 301.

[7] Id. at 56-57.

[8] Section 1 of Executive Order No. 137 provides that:

SECTION 1. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1956 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Trust Account in the books of accounts of the Ministry of Energy to be designated as Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or changes in world market prices on crude oil and imported petroleum products.  The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) may be sourced from any of the following:
a)
Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem  tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under  this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined  by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

b)
Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the  Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

c)
Any Additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment  the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be  issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment by persons or companies  engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing  petroleum products;

d)
Any resulting peso cost differentials in  case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of  crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed  using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of  Energy.

The Fund herein created shall be used for the following:

1. To reimburse the oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil; 
2. To reimburse the oil companies for possible cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products.  The magnitude of the underrecovery, if any, shall be determined by the Ministry of Finance.  ‘Cost underrecovery’ shall include the following:

1. Reduction in oil company take as directed by the Board of Energy without the corresponding reduction in the landed cost of oil inventories in the possession of the oil companies at the time of the price change;
2. Reduction in internal ad valorem taxes as a result of foregoing government mandated price reductions;
3. Other factors as may be determined by the Ministry of Finance to result in cost underrecovery.

The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) shall be administered by the Ministry of Energy.”

[9] Rollo, p. 77.

[10] Id. at 76.

[11] Id. at 78.

[12] Ministry of Finance (MOF) Order No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 provides for payment of foreign exchange risk charge “based on the actual peso value of the foreign exchange payment for the shipment” and Ministry of Energy (MOE) Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985 prescribing supplemental rule and regulations to MOF Order No. 11-85 which provides, among others, that the risk charge “shall cover all crude oil and imported finished petroluem fuel credits outstanding xxx.” Id. at 79-80.

[13] Id. at 302.

[14] Id. at 81-82.

[15] Id. at 98.

[16] Id. at 303.

[17] Id. at 304.

[18] Id. at 231.

[19] Id. at 230.

[20] Id. at 72-73.

[21] Id. at 73-74.

[22] Id. at 349.

[23] Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 453-454.

[24] Id.

[25] Rollo, p. 230.

[26] Id. at 231.

[27] National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 163935, 2 February 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 519-521.

[28] Id. at 521.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
 G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
 
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,

vs.
 
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
 
 ESCOLIN, J.:
 
 Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
 
 a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829- 1840, 1842-1847. b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275- 283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594- 1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789- 1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163- 2244. e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494- 507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80- 81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
 
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
 
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course. The issue posed is not one of first impression.
As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error' No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character. The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
 
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette
 [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ... The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5 The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."

The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6 It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7 : In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court. Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. InPesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
 
WHEREFORE,

 the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
 
Relova, J., concurs. Aquino, J., took no part. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave. Separate Opinions FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
 
 There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. I shall explain why. 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.

​However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes. 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
 
 The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
 
 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights. PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification): The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazetterequired by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette. DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof. Separate Opinions FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. I shall explain why. 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes. 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 
 TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights. PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification): The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazetterequired by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 
 GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette. DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof. Footnotes 1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. 2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. 3 16 Phil. 366, 378. 4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179. 5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146. 6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150. 7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion. 8 308 U.S. 371, 374. 9 93 Phil.. 68,. 10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances. 11 129 SCRA 174. Fernando, CJ.: 1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A 2 Ibid, closing paragraph. 3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960). 4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924). 5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433. 6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172. Teehankee, J.: 1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras. 2 Notes in brackets supplied. 3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15. Plana, J.:
 
* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.