PAL vs CA (GR No. 49188, 30 January 1990)

Facts:
Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by Philippine Air Lines (PAL). She filed her complaint in 1967. After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her case. Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as rightfully hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should have been paid from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name. Petitioner PAL filed a petition for review on certiorari the decision of Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) which issued an alias writ of execution against them. Petitioner alleged that the payment in check had already been effected to the absconding sheriff, satisfying the judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not payment by check to the sheriff extinguished the judgment debt.

Held:
​No. The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks. The checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff. In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in money and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights, except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner’s checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt. The check as a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.

​Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).

Tibajia vs CA (223 SCRA 163)

Facts:
A suit for a collection of a sum of money was filed against the petitioner, Tibajia spouses by Eden Tan to whom a favorable decision was rendered by the lower court. The Tibajia espouses delivered to the deputy sheriff the total money judgment in cashier’s check and cash which Eden Tan refused to accept as payment.

Issue:
Whether or not the cashier’s check tendered by petitioners for payment of the judgment debt is “legal tender.”

​Held:
No. A check whether a manager’s check or ordinary check is not legal tender. An offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.

GSIS vs CA (170 SCRA) 23 February 1989

Facts:
Mr. and Mrs. Isabelo R. Racho, together with the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Flaviano Lagasca, executed a deed of mortgage in favor of petitioner Government Service Insurance System and subsequently, another deed of mortgage in connection with two loans granted by the latter in the sums of P 11,500.00 and P 3,000.00, respectively. A parcel of land covered co-owned by said mortgagor spouses, was given as security under the aforesaid two deeds. They also executed a 'promissory note to be jointly, severally and solidarily liable.
The Lagasca spouses executed an instrument denominated "Assumption of Mortgage" under which they obligated themselves to assume the aforesaid obligation to the GSIS and to secure the release of the mortgage covering that portion of the land belonging to herein private respondents and which was mortgaged to the GSIS. 4 This undertaking was not fulfilled.

Upon failure of the mortgagors to comply with the conditions of the mortgage, particularly the payment of the amortizations due, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and caused the mortgaged property to be sold at public auction.

Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner and the Lagasca spouses in the former Court of First Instance of Quezon City, praying that the extrajudicial foreclosure "made on, their property and all other documents executed in relation thereto in favor of the Government Service Insurance System" be declared null and void.
Private respondents alleged that they signed the mortgage contracts not as sureties or guarantors for the Lagasca spouses but they merely gave their common property to the said co-owners who were solely benefited by the loans from the GSIS.

The trial court dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the promissory note and the mortgage deeds are negotiable instruments.

Held:
No, the executed documents are not negotiable.
In submitting their case to this Court, both parties relied on the provisions of Section 29 of Act No. 2031, otherwise known as the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provide that an accommodation party is one who has signed an instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor of indorser without receiving value therefor, but is held liable on the instrument to a holder for value although the latter knew him to be only an accommodation party.
​
This approach of both parties appears to be misdirected and their reliance misplaced. The promissory note hereinbefore quoted, as well as the mortgage deeds subject of this case, are clearly not negotiable instruments. These documents do not comply with the fourth requisite to be considered as such under Section 1 of Act No. 2031 because they are neither payable to order nor to bearer. The note is payable to a specified party, the GSIS. Absent the aforesaid requisite, the provisions of Act No. 2031 would not apply; governance shall be afforded, instead, by the provisions of the Civil Code and special laws on mortgages.
Therefore due to the lack of the essential requisites the promissory note and the deed of mortgage is not negotiable document of title.
​

Velasquez vs. People
G.R. No.195021, March 15, 2017
 
 
FACTS:
On May 24, 2003 in the evening, Velasquez (accused) while armed with stones and wooden poles, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, maul and hit Jesus del Mundo inflicting upon him injuries in the vital parts of his body, the said accused having thus commenced a felony directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which could have produced the crime of Murder but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance to his damage and prejudice. 
​
The accused invoke the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code reiterating that it was Jesus, who was supposedly inebriated, vented his ire upon Nicolas and the other accused, as well as on Mercedes. The accused thus responded and countered Jesus' attacks, leading to his injuries. 
Petitioners Nicolas Velasquez and Victor Velasquez, along with four others -Felix Caballeda, Jojo Del Mundo, Sonny Boy Velasquez, and Ampong Ocumen - were charged with attempted murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code. 

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm inflicted on Jesus Del Mundo.

Held: 
Yes. A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon another person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor. 
The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own merits: 
It is settled that when an accused admits harming the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he harmed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.