BANAT v COMELEC
 
Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party list petitioned in Court for the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondent COMELEC from implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352. Petitioner also assailed the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of the said Republic Act and alleged that they were of questionable application and their validity was doubtful. Petitioner raised the issue whether RA 9369, RA 7166 as amended, being a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352, violated Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which states that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." BANAT also questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated Section 17 or Article VI of the Constitution which specifies that the Senate and the House of Representatives should each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and qualification contests relating to its Members. Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to the subject matter of RA 9369.

 Issue:
Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI.
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Held:
No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear an unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative, or argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Section 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertained only to the adoption and application of the procedures on the pre-proclamation controversies. It did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "en banc" may entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
“Ang Ladlad” is an organization of people who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals or trans- genders. The Comelec dismissed the petition on moral grounds as “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that it tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.”

Issue:
Whether or not “Ang Ladlad” party-list application should be denied as the organization allegedly tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
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Held:
No. The denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion; including its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. “Ang Ladlad” has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Hence, its application as a party-list should be granted.
 

Roque v COMELEC

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award. They contend the mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.

Issue:
Is the Poll Automation Law unconstitutional for infringing the constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the ballot.
 
Held:
No. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a “three feet” long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded preserving the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known.

Penera v COMELEC

Facts:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.
Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11 September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
 
Issue:
Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning. May premature campaigning be committed by a person who is not a candidate.
 
Held:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:
x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.