Facts:
 Adolfo Carloto, President- Manager of Rural Bank of Labason was instructed to go to Central Bank Main’s office in Manila for the the rediscounting obligations of the Rural Bank of Labason. He purchased a round-trip plane ticket to Manila and he asked his sister to send him the rediscounting papers he needed and a pocket money worth 1,000 pesos thru LBC office at Dipolog City. Unfortunately, the documents arrived but he did not receive the pocket money he expected. He made follow-ups regarding the money and even went to the LBC office at Dipolog City. However, the money returned to him only after few days and he wasn’t able to go to Manila for the time to settle the rediscounting obligations and consequently a penalty of 32,000 pesos was charged for the delay of settling the rediscounting obligations. According to Carloto he suffered embarrasment and humiliatio of what happened he filed a suit against LBC for moral damages and the reimbursement of 32,000 pesos. Later, Rural Bank of Labason impleaded in the complaint as co-plaintiff and claim for the same relief. LBC, on the other hand, contend that LBC, as a corporation and artificial being can’t recover moral damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Rural Bank of Labason Inc. should be awarded moral damages.
​
Held:
No. Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life — all of which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.

Facts:
​Petitioner Anita Mangila, a resident of Pampanga, is a single proprietor exporting sea foods and doing business under the name and style of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Loreta Guina is single proprietor providing freight forwarding service doing business as Air Swift International, with office address in Pasay.
Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of sea food products to Guam where Mangila maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay Guina cash on delivery. On the first shipment, Mangila requested for seven days within which to pay Guina. However, for the next three shipments, Mangila failed to pay Guina the shipping charges. Despite several demands, Mangila never paid Guina. Thus, Guina filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City a case for collection of sum of money.
Mangila filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Guina’s invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates that if court litigation becomes necessary to enforce collection, the agreed venue for such action is Makati. Guina filed an Opposition asserting that although Makati appears as the stipulated venue, the same was merely an inadvertence by the printing press. Moreover, Guina claimed that Mangila knew that Guina was holding office in Pasay City and not in Makati.

The trial court, finding credence in private respondents assertion, denied the Motion to Dismiss and allowed the case to proceed.
The trial court thereafter ruled in favor of Guina, ordering Mangila to pay her outstanding balance.
 
ISSUE:
W/N there was improper venue.
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RULING:
Yes.
The case should be dismissed for improper venue, but not for the reason stated by Mangila.
Mangila raised the issue of improper venue due to the stipulation in the invoice that any litigation’s agreed venue is Makati. However,  the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati.
Nevertheless, Pasay is not the proper venue for this case.
Under the Rules of Court, venue in personal actions is where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. The exception to this rule is when the parties agree on an exclusive venue other than the places mentioned in the rules. But, as discussed, this exception is not applicable in this case. Hence, following the general rule, the case may be brought in the place of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the instant case, the residence of Guina was not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was alleged was the postal address of her sole proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only during trial that she mentioned her residence to be in Paranaque City. 
In the instant case, it was established in the lower court that petitioner resides in San Fernando, Pampanga while private respondent resides in Paranaque City. However, this case was brought in Pasay City, where the business of Guina is found. This would have been permissible had Guina’s business been a corporation. However, as Guina admitted in her Complaint in the trial court, her business is a sole proprietorship, and as such, does not have a separate juridical personality that could enable it to file a suit in court. In fact, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships to file a suit in court.
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.
 
Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file this case, Air Swift International is not the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta Guina in her personal capacity.

FACTS:
This case involves a dispute between Mauricio Agad and Severino Mabato regarding their partnership in a fishpond business. Alleging that he(Agad) and defendant Severino Mabato are partners in a fishpond business,  the capital of which Agad contributed P1,000, with the right to receive 50% of the profits; that from 1952 up to and including 1956, Mabato had yearly rendered accounts of the operations of the partnership; and that, despite repeated demands, Mabato had failed to render accounts for the years 1957 to 1963,
 
Agad prayed in his complaint against Mabato and Mabato & Agad Company that judgment be rendered sentencing Mabato to pay him (Agad) the sum of P14,000, as his share in the profits of the partnership for the period from 1957 to 1963, in addition to P1,000 as attorney’s fees, and ordering the dissolution of the partnership, as well as the winding up of its affairs by a receiver to be appointed therefor.
 
In his answer, Mabato admitted the formal allegations of the complaint and denied the existence of said partnership, upon the ground that the contract therefor had not been perfected, despite the execution of Annex "A", because Agad had allegedly failed to give his P1,000 contribution to the partnership capital.
Mabato prayed, therefore, that the complaint be dismissed; that Annex "A" be declared void ab initio
 
Subsequently, Mabato filed a motion to dismiss, upon the ground that the complaint states no cause of action and that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because it involves principally the determination of rights over public lands.
 
After due hearing, the court issued the order appealed from, granting the motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. This conclusion was predicated upon the theory that the contract of partnership, Annex "A", is null and void, pursuant to Art. 1773 of our Civil Code, because an inventory of the fishpond referred in said instrument had not been attached thereto. A reconsideration of this order having been denied, Agad brought the matter for review by record on appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 1773 is applicable, where“immovable property or real rights” have been contributed to the partnership under consideration.
 
RULING:
it should be noted, that, as stated in Annex “A” the partnership was established “to operate a fishpond”, not to “engage in a fishpond business”. Moreover, none of the partners contributed either a fishpond or a real right to any fishpond. Their contributions were limited to the sum of P1,000 each.
WHEREFORE, said Article 1773 of the Civil Code is not in point and that, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with the costs against defendant-appellee, Severino Mabato.