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Albert Teng Fish Trading v. Pahagac, November 17, 2010
Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishing and, for this purpose, owns boats (basnig), equipment, and other fishing paraphernalia. It customarily enters into joint venture agreements with master fishermen (maestros) who take charge of the management of each fishing venture, including the hiring of the members of its complement.Teng claims that the maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers to determine the volume of the fish caught in every fishing voyage. The respondent workers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading before the NCMB, Region Branch No. IX, Zamboanga City. The respondent workers alleged that Teng hired them, without any written employment contract, to classify the fish caught; where to unload the catch; and to receive to instructions from Teng on procurement of provisions needed by maestros. They also claimed that they received regular monthly salaries, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus, and incentives in the form of shares in the total volume of fish caught. In December 2002, Teng terminated their services. The Volunteer Arbiter (VA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and the respondent workers and dismissed all other claims by respondents. The respondents timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the VA who reasoned out that Section 6, Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the VA’s order or decision The respondent-workers elevated the case to the CA which reversed the VA’s decision after finding sufficient evidence showing the existence of employer-employee relationship and remanded the case to the VA for the computation of petitioner’s backwages, separation pay and other monetary benefits. CA denied Teng’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, Teng filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with Supreme Court. Whether or not the VA’s decision is subject to a motion for reconsideration or appeal? Yes. Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration. On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code. As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states: Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award or decision x x x shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word "unappealable" from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law, and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent. The Court recognized the intent of the change of phraseology in Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang, where we ruled that: It is true that the present rule [Art. 262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period. In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,27 we likewise ruled that the VA’s decision may still be reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 days from receipt thereof. The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision. We further cited the 1989 Procedural Guidelines which implemented Article 262-A, viz: [U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day period. The Court ruled that the respondent workers seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the VA’s judgment, and the VA erred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration is allowed. By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA’s decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies36 as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule. By disallowing reconsideration of the VA’s decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. PHILEC v . CA, December 10, 2014 PHILEC is a domestic corporation “engaged in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage transformers.” Among its rank-and-file employees were Lipio and Ignacio, Sr., former members of the PHILEC Workers’ Union (PWU). While, PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees. Prior to the creation of the new collective bargaining agreement PHILEC selected Lipio for promotion from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII to Foreman I under Pay Grade B and Ignacio, Sr., then DT-Assembler with Pay Grade VII, was likewise selected for training for the position of Foreman I. On September 17, 1997, PHILEC and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), effective retroactively on June 1, 1997 and expiring on May 31, 1999. Under Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective bargaining agreement, a rank-and-file employee promoted shall be entitled to the following step increases in his or her basic salary. However, PWU members claimed that the schedule of training allowance did not conform with their CBA.Hence, PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance machinery. PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. Thus, the parties filed a submission agreement with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. PHILEC disputed PWU’s claim of unfair labor practice. According to PHILEC, it did not violate its collective bargaining agreement with PWU when it implemented the “Modified SGV” scale. Even assuming that it violated the collective bargaining agreement, PHILEC argued that its violation was not “gross” or a “flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. PHILEC, therefore, was not guilty of unfair labor practice. Voluntary Arbitrator held that PHILEC violated its CBA with PWU, therefore ordering them to pay the PWU members allowance based on their CBA. PHILEC then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging that the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely abused its discretion in rendering its decision. However, CA affirmed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. Hence the petition. WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision proper? No, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision is not the proper remedy. Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency, this court concluded that a decision or award rendered by a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of Appeals. Court ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision “shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.” Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal. There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision became final and executory after 10 calendar days from PHILEC’s receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial reconsideration. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision is already “beyond the purview of this Court to act upon.” Baronda v . CA, October 14, 2015 Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. employed the Baronda as a mud press truck driver. He hit HIDECO's transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total factory blackout. Power was eventually restored but the restoration cost HIDECO. Following the incident, HIDECO served a notice of offense requiring him to explain the incident within three days from notice. He complied. Thereafter, the management conducted its investigation, and, finding him guilty of negligence, recommended his dismissal. The resident manager served a termination letter and informed him of the decision to terminate his employment effective at the close of office hours of that day. Hence, HIDECO no longer allowed him to report to work on the next day. The petitioner, along with another employee also dismissed by HIDECO, filed in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in Tacloban City a complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO. Voluntary Arbitrator Antonio C. Lopez, Jr. handled the case and eventually rendered his decision by finding the petitioner's dismissal illegal, and ordering his reinstatement. Voluntary Arbitrator Lopez, Jr. deemed the petitioner's separation from the service as a suspension from work without pay, and commanded him to pay on installment basis the damages sustained by HIDECO incident he had caused. HIDECO filed a motion for reconsideration but the Voluntary Arbitrator denied the motion. Accepting the outcome, HIDECO subsequently reinstated the petitioner. The petitioner filed his manifestation with motion for the issuance of the writ of execution in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator praying for the execution of the decision, and insisting on being entitled to back wages and other benefits. HIDECO opposed the petitioner's motion for execution and simultaneously presented its own motion for execution to enforce the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator directing the petitioner to pay the actual damages. The Voluntary Arbitrator denied the petitioner's motion for execution on the ground that the decision did not award any backwages and granted HIDECO's motion for execution. Whether the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision was executory pending appeal? The timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of such motion for reconsideration or appeal. The immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code. The duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability. We see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence over other dispute settlement devices. Such primacy of voluntary arbitration is mandated by no less than the Philippine Constitution and is ingrained as a policy objective of our labor relations law. The reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force and effect as that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to enforce the constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance social justice. Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals, August 28, 2018 Under Section 5(2)3 of Republic Act No. 6728 (Government Assistance To Students and Teachers In Private Education Act), 70% of the increase in tuition fees shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching personnel. Pursuant to this provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its tuition fees for school year 2006-2007. In order to save the depleting funds of the Guagua National Colleges’ Retirement Plan, its Board of Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the tuition fee increases. GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union challenged the Guagua National Colleges’ unilateral decision by claiming that the increase violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration after failing to settle the controversy by themselves. After hearing the parties, Voluntary Arbitrator rendered his decision dated June 16, 2008 in favor of GNC, holding that retirement benefits fell within the category of "other benefits" that could be charged against the 70% net incremental proceeds pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728. After receiving a copy of the decision on June 16, 2008, the Guagua National Colleges filed an Urgent Motion for Extension praying that the CA grant them an extension of 15 days from July 1, 2008, or until July 16, 2008, within which to file their petition for review. On July 2, 2008, the CA issued a resolution granting the Urgent Motion for Extension. The Guagua National Colleges filed the petition for review on July 16, 2008. Subsequently, the GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union filed its Motion to Dismiss, asserting that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had already become final and executory pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code and in accordance with the ruling in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. Sales Force Union-PTGWO- Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. The CA acted on the Motion to Dismiss on December 15, 2008 through the now assailed resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss. Whether or not the CA gravely abuse its discretion in denying the GNC-Faculty Labor Union and GNC Non-Teaching Maintenance Labor Union’s Motion to Dismiss despite the finality of the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code? No. The petition for review shall be filed within 15 days pursuant to Section 4, Rules 43 of the Rules of Court; the 10-day period under Article 276 of the Labor Code refers to the filing of a motion for reconsideration vis-a-vis the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award. We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has already become final and executory. Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, this court "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court. The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal." By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA's decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule. The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by congressional intent. Coca-cola Femsa Philippines v. Bacolod Sales Force Union, September 21, 2016 Coca-cola Femsa Philippines Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of non-nonalcoholic beverages. Thereafter, Cosmos ceded its sales functions to petitioner which resulted in the integration of a number of Cosmo’s salesmen (Cosmos integrees) into petitioner’s workforce as route salesmen. Subsequently, by adopting a route-to-market system abolished the route salesman position and replaced by account developer position. Through internal selection process, the Cosmos salesmen’s position were designated as ADs. However, petitioner hired new ADs with a higher basic monthly pay and benefits occupying the same position, job description and functions. Aggrieved by the difference in treatment, respondent the recognized CB agent submitted its concerns to the grievance machinery contending the same. In its defense, Cosmo argued that the fixing of hiring rates is a management prerogative. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) ruled that there is a disparity in the wages between the two and directed the petitioner to readjust their salaries. CA denied the petition for review of petitioner on the ground that Voluntary Arbitration decision had attained finality. Whether or not Voluntary Arbitrator’s judgments or final orders which are declared final by law are exempt from judicial review? No. The Voluntary Arbitrator’s judgments or final orders which are declared final by law are not so exempt from judicial review when so warranted. "Any agreement stipulating that 'the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable' and 'that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part of the arbitrator's award may be availed of' cannot be held to preclude in proper cases the power of judicial review which is inherent in courts." The Court sees the prima facie reasonableness of petitioner's asseverations and finds that the merits of its case, based on such argumentation, properly warrant judicial review. As such, the CA should look into the soundness of the VA rulings in relation to the nuances averred, particularly, the impact of the differences in the selection processes applied and relevant qualifications between the Cosmos integrees and the newly-hired ADs. Moreover, the CA ought to determine the proper application of the "equal pay for equal work" principle vis-a-vis the business decision of an employer to adopt a more competitive compensation scheme in light of the demands in human resource. Thus, borrowing the language in Chung Fu Industries (Phils.) Inc. v. CA - which similarly involved a restrictive stipulation on appeal from an arbitral award the Court finds that the CA erred in refusing "to look into the merits of this case, despite prima facie showing of the existence of grounds warranting judicial review," which, thus, "effectively deprived petitioner of the opportunity to prove or substantiate its allegations."
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On 2006, petitioner Honda Cars Philippines, Inc., (company) and respondent Honda Cars Technical Specialists and Supervisory Union, entered into a collective bargaining agreement. Prior to April 1, 2005, the union members were receiving a transportation allowance of 3,300.00 a month. On September 3, 2005, the company and the union entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA) converting the transportation allowance into a monthly gasoline allowance. It was provided, that in the event the amount of gasoline is not fully consumed, the gasoline not used may be converted into cash, subject to whatever tax may be applicable. Since the cash conversion is paid in the monthly payroll as an excess gas allowance, the company considers the amount as part of the managers’ and AVPs’ compensation that is subject to income tax on compensation. The union, on the other hand, argued that the gasoline allowance for its members is a "negotiated item" under their CBA on fringe benefits. The disagreement between the company and the union on the matter resulted in a grievance which they referred to the CBA grievance procedure for resolution. As it remained unsettled there, they submitted the issue to a panel of voluntary arbitrators as required by the CBA. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators declared that the cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance enjoyed by the members of the union is a fringe benefit subject to the fringe benefit tax, not to income tax WON the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction to settle tax matters? No. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax matters, and do not involve labor disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. They do not require the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or company personnel policies. Henry Delada was the Union President of the Manila Pavilion Supervisors Association at the Manila Pavilion Hotel (MPH). He was originally assigned as Head Waiter of Rotisserie, a fine-dining restaurant operated by MPH. Pursuant to a supervisory personnel reorganization program, MPH reassigned him as Head Waiter of Seasons Coffee Shop, another restaurant at MPH. Respondent declined the inter-outlet transfer and instead asked for a grievance meeting on the matter, pursuant to their CBA. He also requested his retention as Head Waiter of Rotisserie while the grievance procedure was ongoing. MPH replied and told Delada to report to his new assignment for the time being, without prejudice to the resolution of the grievance involving the transfer. He adamantly refused to assume his new post at the Seasons Coffee Shop and instead continued to report to his previous assignment. Thus, MPH sent him several memoranda on various dates, requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be penalized for the following offenses: serious misconduct; willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer; gross insubordination; gross and habitual neglect of duties; and willful breach of trust. Meanwhile, the parties failed to reach a settlement. Consequently, Delada lodged a Complaint before the NCMB. While the Complaint concerning the validity of his transfer was pending before the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA), MPH continued with the disciplinary action against him for his refusal to report to his new post at Seasons Coffee Shop. The PVA issued a Decision and ruled that the transfer of Delada was a valid exercise of management prerogative. The PVA thus pronounced that Delada had no valid and justifiable reason to refuse or even to delay compliance with the management's directive. The CA affirmed the Decision of the PVA and denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority. Held: Yes. The Court cited a previously ruled case wherein it ruled that the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority—subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court. In that case, the specific issue presented was “the issue of performance bonus.” The Court then held that the arbitrator had the authority to determine not only the issue of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted, but also the related question of the amount of bonus, were it to be granted. The Court then said that there was no indication at all that the parties to the arbitration agreement had regarded “the issue of performance bonus” as a two-tiered issue, only one aspect of which was being submitted to arbitration; thus, the Court held that the failure of the parties to specifically limit the issues to that which was stated allowed the arbitrator to assume jurisdiction over the related issue. Marbury vs. Madison, 5 US 137
ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus? FACTS: On the last day in office President John Adams names forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Law, to take control of the federal judiciary before the Thomas Jefferson took office.The commission was signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State, John Marshall but they wenot delivered before the expiration of Adam’s term as President. When the new President Thomas Jefferson took office he refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they have not been delivered before the end of Adam’s term as president. William Marbury was one of the intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury directly went tothe supreme court to file his complaint, refusing for a writ of Mandamus to compel Jefferson’s Secretary James Madisonto deliver the commissions. At that time The Judiciary Act 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of Mandamus toany courts appointed or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction. Lambino vs. COMELEC GR 174153 (2006)
FACTS: Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act. They alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.” These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
ISSUE: Whether or Not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing. FACTS: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Facts:
Armelo J. Lamayo began working for Negros Metal Corporation as a machinist. Sometime in May 2002, while Lamayo was at the company's foundry grinding some tools he was using, the company manager, called his attention why he was using the grinder there to which he replied that since the machine there was bigger, he would finish his work faster. Lamayo's explanation was found unsatisfactory, hence, he was, via memorandum, charged of loitering and warned. Taking the warning as a three-day suspension as penalized under company rules, Lamayo reported for work after three days, only to be meted with another 10-day suspension. After serving the second suspension, Lamayo reported for work but was informed that his services had been terminated and that he should draft his resignation letter. Thus, Lamayo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter however it was opposed by Negros Metal contending that the complaint should be dismissed because the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it since, under their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such matters must first be brought before the company's grievance machinery. Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the dispute. Held: Yes. Under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, it is clear that a labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes. On the other hand, under Article 261, a voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company policies. As a general rule then, termination disputes should be brought before a labor arbiter, except when the parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. In the present case, the CBA provision on grievance machinery being invoked by petitioner does not expressly state that termination disputes are included in the ambit of what may be brought before the company's grievance machinery. Thus, the matter of suspension of an employee was under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
Sometime in December 2012, Petitioner Luis Gemudiano (Gemudiano) applied with Naess Shipping for possible employment as seaman upon learning of a job opening in its domestic vessel operations. As advised by Naess Shipping's crewing manager Leah G. Fetero (Fetero), petitioner underwent the mandatory pre-employment medical examination (PEME) where he was declared fit for sea service. On February 18, 2013, Naess Shipping, for and in behalf of its principal Royal Dragon, executed a "Contract of Employment for Marine Crew on Board Domestic Vessels" (contract of employment) engaging the services of petitioner as Second Officer aboard the vessel "M/V Melling 11," an inter-island bulk and cargo carrier, for a period of six months with a gross monthly salary of P30,000.00. It was stipulated that the contract shall take effect on March 12, 2013. Subsequently, petitioner and respondents executed an "Addendum to Contract of Employment for Marine Crew Onboard Domestic Vessels" (Addendum) stating that the employment relationship between them shall commence once the Master of the Vessel issues a boarding confirmation to the petitioner. Petitioner also bound himself to abide by the Code of Discipline as provided for in the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations. On March 8, 2013, petitioner received a call from Fetero informing him that Royal Dragon cancelled his embarkation. Thus, he filed a complaint for breach of contract against respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Petitioner alleged that respondents' unilateral and unreasonable failure to deploy him despite the perfected contract of employment constitutes breach and gives rise to a liability to pay actual damages. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that petitioner's employment did not commence because his deployment was withheld by reason of misrepresentation. They stressed that petitioner did not disclose the fact that he is suffering from diabetes mellitus and asthma which render him unfit for sea service. They claimed that the Labor Arbiter (LA) has no jurisdiction over the petitioner's complaint for breach of contract, invoking the absence of employer-employee relationship. On March 28, 2014, the LA found respondents to have breached their contractual obligation to petitioner and ordered them to pay him P180,000.00 representing his salary for the duration of the contract. The LA applied Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which provides that the labor arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages." NLRC affirmed the decision of LA but with modification as to damages. On appeal, the CA annulled and set aside the decision of NLRC. It declared that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner's complaint because of the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties. It emphasized that the perfected contract of employment did not commence since petitioner's deployment to his vessel of assignment did not materialize. It enunciated that petitioner does not fall within the definition of "migrant worker" or "seafarer" under R.A. No. 8042 because his services were engaged for local employment. Facts:
The present case arose from a labor dispute between petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and respondent Airline Pilots' Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), a duly registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. ALPAP filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike alleging that PAL committed unfair labor practice. The Secretary of DOLE (SOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and thereafter prohibited ALPAP from staging a strike and committing any act that could exacerbate the dispute. Despite the prohibition by the SOLE, ALPAP staged a strike. A return-to-work order was issued by the SOLE but ALPAP defied the same and went on with their strike. The SOLE issued a resolution which declared the illegality of the strike staged by ALPAP and the loss of employment status of the officers who participated in the strike. The SOLE's resolution was upheld by the CA and matter was eventually elevated to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed ALPAP's petition for failure to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion or a reversible error. The resolution attained finality. Almost eight (8) months :from the finality. PAL filed before the LA a complaint for damages against ALPAP, as well as some of its officers and members. The LA dismissed PAL's complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue on damages. It noted that the SOLE did not certify the controversy for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC nor in any occasion did the parties agree to refer the same to voluntary arbitration under Article 263(h) of the Labor Code. Hence, jurisdiction to resolve all issues arising from the labor dispute, including the claim for damages arising from the illegal strike, was left with the SOLE to the exclusion of all other fora. Aggrieved, PAL elevated an appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed with modification the LA’s decision. It ruled that labor tribunals have no jurisdiction over the claims interposed by PAL. It opined that the reliefs prayed for by PAL should have been ventilated before the regular courts considering that they are based on the tortuous acts. It explained that the airline pilots' refusal to fly their assigned aircrafts constitutes breach of contractual obligation which is intrinsically a civil dispute. The CA partially granted PAL's petition. It ruled that while the NLRC correctly sustained the LA's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it declared that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the LA's pronouncement that PAL's cause of action had already prescribed. The appellate court concurred with the NLRC's opinion that exclusive jurisdiction over PAL's claim for damages lies with the regular courts and not with the SOLE. Causes of action based on an obligation or duty not provided under the labor laws are beyond the SOLE's jurisdiction. Only those issues that arise from the assumed labor dispute, which has a direct causal connection to the employer-employee relationship between the parties, will fall under the jurisdiction of the SOLE. It pointed out that the damages caused by the willful acts of the striking pilots in abandoning their aircraft are recoverable under civil law and are thus within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC and the LA have jurisdiction over PAL’s claims against ALPAP for Damages Incurred as a Consequence of the latter’s actions during the illegal strike. Held: Yes. Labor tribunals have jurisdiction over actions for damages arising from a labor strike. Under Article 217 [now Article 224] of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, the LA and the NLRC have jurisdiction to resolve cases involving claims for damages arising from employer-employee relationship. It is settled, however, that not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Intrinsically, civil disputes, although involving the claim of an employer against its employees, are cognizable by regular courts. To determine whether a claim for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 is properly cognizable by the labor arbiter, jurisprudence has evolved the "reasonable connection rule" which essentially states that the claim for damages must have reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. A money claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer relations. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts. PAL's cause of action is not grounded on mere acts of quasi-delict. The claimed damages arose from the illegal strike and acts committed during the same which were in tum closely related and intertwined with the respondents' allegations of unfair labor practices against PAL. Since the loss and injury from which PAL seeks compensation have reasonable causal connection with the alleged acts of unfair labor practice, a claim provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, the question of damages becomes a labor controversy and is therefore an employment relationship dispute. From the foregoing, it is clear that the regular courts do not have jurisdiction over PAL's claim of damages, the same being intertwined with its labor dispute with the respondents over which the SOLE had assumed jurisdiction. Facts:
Alibudbud was employed by Malayan as Senior Vice President (SVP) for its Sales Department. She was issued a 2004 Honda Civic sedan under Malayan's Car Financing Plan conditioned on the following stipulations: (1) she must continuously stay and serve Malayan for at least three full years from the date of the availment of the Car Financing Plan; and (2) that in case of resignation, retirement or termination before the three-year period, she shall pay in full 100% share of Malayan and the outstanding balance of his/her share of the cost of the motor vehicle. Relatively, Alibudbud also executed a Promissory Note and a Deed of Chattel Mortgage in favor of Malayan. Alibudbud was dismissed from Malayan due to redundancy. In view thereof, Malayan demanded that she surrender the possession of the car to the company. Alibudbud sternly refused to do so. Malayan instituted a Complaint for replevin and/or sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Alibudbud filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, she explained that the resolution of the labor case will determine her rights and obligations, as well as that of Malayan. RTC denied the motion, It was opined that: (1) reference shall be made only on the Promissory Note which Alibudbud executed in favor of Malayan in determining the rights and obligations of the parties; (2) the cause of action in the replevin case is rooted from the Promissory Note; and (3) the issue in the labor dispute is in no way connected with the rights and obligations of the parties arising out of the Promissory Note. RTC granted the complaint for replevin. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. It explained that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance over the replevin action because of the employer-employee relations between the parties which Malayan never denied. Issue: Whether or not the action is separate or distinct from the illegal dismissal case. Held: Yes. The present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor and creditor, not their "employer-employee" relationship. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing Plan. Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case. The Court further considers it justified for Malayan to refuse to accept her offer to settle her car obligation for not being in accordance with the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage she executed. Even the illegal dismissal case she heavily relied upon in moving for the suspension of the replevin action was settled in favor of Malayan which was merely found to have validly exercised its management prerogative in order to improve its company sales. Facts:
Petitioner SMSI is a domestic corporation engaged in furnishing its clients with manpower, such as janitors, drivers, messengers, and maintenance personnel. Petitioners Tambunting and Dabu are the President and Vice-President for Administration, respectively, of petitioner SMSI. Respondent was hired as a rank and file employee of petitioner SMSI on March 13, 1994. When respondent's employment was terminated on December 21, 2005, she was holding the position of Accounting Supervisor with a monthly salary of PI 3,000.00. On June 15, 2006, respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners, seeking reinstatement and payment of backwages, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, separation pay, unused leave pay, damages, and attorney's fees. Her complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-05066-06. Issue: Whether breach of trust did not merit the ultimate dismissal penalty of dismissal. Held: For a valid dismissal of an employee, it is fundamental that the employer observe both substantive and procedural due process - the termination of employment must be based on a just or authorized cause and the dismissal can only be effected, after due notice and hearing. Petitioners' compliance with procedural due process in dismissing respondent is no longer being challenged in the present Petition; the issues for review of the Court herein essentially involve substantive due process. Facts:
Respondent Perfecto Balogo filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against petitioner Pentagon Steel Corporation for illegal dismissal. He alleged that his illness prevented him from reporting for work for 10 days to which the petitioner considered him on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL). When the respondent finally reported for work, the petitioner refused to take him back despite the medical certificate he submitted. During the conciliation proceedings, the respondent presented a medical certificate issued by the company physician, as required by the petitioner to determine whether he was fit to return to work. According to the petitioner, the respondent refused to return to work and insisted that he be paid his separation pay which the petitioner refused. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal charge which was reversed by the NLRC. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC. The CA held that the respondent was constructively dismissed. The petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion against the CA. In basing its decision on the proceedings that transpired when the parties were negotiating for a compromise agreement during the preliminary conference of the case. Issue: Whether the respondent is not entitled to reinstatement due to strained relations from the dispute with his employer. Held: NO. As the CA correctly ruled, the NLRC erred when it awarded separation pay instead of reinstatement. The circumstances in this case do not warrant an exception to the rule that reinstatement is the consequence of an illegal dismissal. First, The existence of strained relations between the parties was not clearly established. We have consistently ruled that the doctrine of strained relations cannot be used recklessly or applied loosely to deprive an illegally dismissed employee of his means of livelihood and deny him reinstatement. Since the application of this doctrine will result in the deprivation of employment despite the absence of just cause, the implementation of the doctrine of strained relationship must be supplemented by the rule that the existence of a strained relationship is for the employer to clearly establish and prove in the manner it is called upon to prove the existence of a just cause; the degree of hostility attendant to a litigation is not, by itself, sufficient proof of the existence of strained relations that would rule out the possibility of reinstatement.30 Indeed, labor disputes almost always result in “strained relations,” and the phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation; otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated. In the present case, we find no evidentiary support for the conclusion that strained relations existed between the parties. To be sure, the petitioner did not raise the defense of strained relationship with the respondent before the labor arbiter. Consequently, this issue—factual in nature—was not the subject of evidence on the part of both the petitioner and the respondent. There thus exists no competent evidence on which to base the conclusion that the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent has reached the point where their relationship is now best severed. We agree with the CA’s specific finding that the conflict, if any, occasioned by the respondent’s filing of an illegal dismissal case, does not merit the severance of the employee-employer relationship between the parties. Second. The records disclose that respondent has been in the petitioner’s employ for 23 years and has no previous record of inefficiency or infraction of company rules prior to his illegal dismissal from service. We significantly note that payment of separation pay in lieu of respondent’s reinstatement will work injustice to the latter when considered with his long and devoted years in the petitioner’s service. Separation pay may take into account the respondent’s past years of service, but will deprive the respondent of compensation for the future productive years that his security of tenure protects. We take note, too, that the respondent, after 23 years of service, shall in a few years retire; any separation pay paid at this point cannot equal the retirement pay due the respondent upon retirement. For all these reasons, we uphold the CA ruling that the respondent should be reinstated to his former position or to a substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights. Facts:
Paolo Jesus Padilla was hired on Apr. 1, 2002 as a Marketing Associate by Am-Phil and his regular employment was confirmed on Sept. 29, 2002. In March 2004, Am-Phil officers informed Padilla that a retrenchment program is being implemented because of adverse condition of the business and Padilla is one of the affected employees. Padilla questioned Am-Phil’s choice for they had 6 contractual employees while he was a regular employee. He also pointed out that that the sales have not been lower relative to the previous year. Padilla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. For its defense, Am-Phil claimed that Padilla was not illegally terminated and that it validly exercised management prerogative. On May 9, 2005, the LA officer found that Padilla was illegally dismissed. He noted that Am-Phil failed to substantiate its claim of serious business losses and that it failed to comply with the procedural requirement for a proper retrenchment. In appeal before the NLRC, apart from asserting that Padilla was validly retrenched, Am-Phil claimed that the LA officer was in error in deciding the case despite the pendency of its motion for leave to file supplemental rejoinder. Through the same, Am-Phil supposedly intended to submit its audited financial statements for the years 2001-2004 to prove that it had suffered business losses. Am-Phil claimed that its right to due process was violated by the LA’s refusal to consider the said audited financial statements. NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling. The NLRC noted that a supplemental rejoinder was not a necessary pleading in proceedings before LAs. Issue: Was it proper for the LA to have ruled that Padilla was illegally dismissed despite AmPhil’s pending motion for leave to file supplemental rejoinder? Held: No. Am-Phil’s motion for leave to file supplemental rejoinder, dated May 20, 2005, was filed on May 31, 2005, well after the LA promulgated his May 9, 2005 decision. Common sense dictates that as the motion for leave to file supplemental rejoinder was filed after the rendition of the decision, the decision could not have possibly taken into consideration the motion. Even if the Court were to ignore the fact that the motion was filed after the rendition of the decision, the LA was under no obligation to admit supplemental rejoinder. Rule V of the 2002 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that verified position papers to be submitted shall cover only those claims and causes of action raised in the complaint. The parties shall thereafter not be allowed to allege facts, or present evidence to prove facts, not referred to and any cause or causes of action not included in the complaint or position papers, affidavits, and other documents. It is clear that a supplemental rejoinder, as correctly ruled by the NLRC, is not a pleading which a LA is duty-bound to accept. The requirements of due process in labor cases before the LA is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers. Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing thread for weaving. Petitioner hired respondent Engr. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to maintain its facilities in Lambakin, Marilao, Bulacan. On August 7, 2002, respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. Few days later, he was diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis, and thereafter, with moderate, severe and persistent Allergic Rhinitis. Accordingly, respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as it will transmute into health problems. Distressed, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), San Fernando, Pampanga, for alleged illegal dismissal and for the payment of backwages, separation pay, actual damages and attorney’s fees. Subsequently, respondent filed another Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe, healthy and workable environment. In his Complaint, respondent alleged that as part of his job description, he conducts regular maintenance check on petitioner’s facilities including its dye house area, which is very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate safety measures introduced by petitioner. According to respondent, the air washer dampers and all roof exhaust vests are blown into open air, carrying dust thereto. Concerned, respondent recommended to management to place roof insulation to minimize, if not, eradicate the health hazards attendant in the work place. However, said recommendation was turned down by management due to high cost. In reply, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter (LA) under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent’s complaint praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent. YES. True, the maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases. More, the acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving employee-employer relations since respondent used to be the Civil Engineer of petitioner. However, it should be stressed that respondent’s claim for damages is specifically grounded on petitioner’s gross negligence to provide a safe, healthy and workable environment for its employees −a case of quasi-delict. This is easily ascertained from a plain and cursory reading of the Complaint, which enumerates the acts and/or omissions of petitioner relative to the conditions in the workplace. It is a basic tenet that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein, which is a matter resolved only after and as a result of a trial. In this case, a perusal of the complaint would reveal that the subject matter is one of claim for damages arising from quasi-delict, which is within the ambit of the regular court's jurisdiction. In the case at bar, respondent alleges that due to the continued and prolonged exposure to textile dust seriously inimical to his health, he suffered work-contracted disease which is now irreversible and incurable, and deprived him of job opportunities. Clearly, injury and damages were allegedly suffered by respondent, an element of quasi-delict. Secondly, the previous contract of employment between petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the element of "no pre-existing contractual relation" since petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in maintaining a hazardous work environment cannot be considered a mere breach of such contract of employment, but falls squarely within the elements of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code since the negligence is direct, substantive and independent. Hence, we ruled in Yusen Air and Sea Services Phils., Inc. v. Villamor that: When, as here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort, which has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. Therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondent's complaint praying for moral damages, exemplary damages, compensatory damages, anchored on petitioner's alleged gross negligence in failing to provide a safe and healthy working environment for respondent. Facts:
As Solid Mills’ employees, petitioners and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property owned by Solid Mills. According to Solid Mills, this was “[o]out of liberality and for the convenience of its employees and on the condition that the employees would vacate the premises anytime the Company deems it. Thereafter, petitioners were informed that effective October 10, 2003, Solid Mills would cease its operations due to serious business losses. NAFLU recognized Solid Mills’ closure due to serious business losses in the memorandum of agreement dated September 1, 2003. The memorandum of agreement provided for Solid Mills’ grant of separation pay less accountabilities, accrued sick leave benefits, vacation leave benefits, and 13th month pay to the employees. Employees who signed the memorandum of agreement were considered to have agreed to vacate SMI Village, and to the demolition of the constructed houses inside as condition for the release of their termination benefits and separation pay. Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid their benefits and separation pay. Petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter for alleged non-payment of separation pay, accrued sick and vacation leaves, and 13th month pay. They argued that their accrued benefits and separation pay should not be withheld because their payment is based on company policy and practice. Moreover, the 13th month pay is based on law, specifically, Presidential Decree No. 851. Their possession of Solid Mills property is not an accountability that is subject to clearance procedures. They had already turned over to Solid Mills their uniforms and equipment when Solid Mills ceased operations. Issue: Whether Solid Mills is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the petitioners’ return of its properties. Held: Yes, an employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the employee’s return of its properties. Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a standard procedure among employers, whether public or private. Clearance procedures are instituted to ensure that the properties, real or personal, belonging to the employer but are in the possession of the separated employee, are returned to the employer before the employee’s departure. The Civil Code provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due. “Debt” in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer. It includes any accountability that the employee may have to the employer. There is no reason to limit its scope to uniforms and equipment, as petitioners would argue. “Accountability,” in its ordinary sense, means obligation or debt. The ordinary meaning of the term “accountability” does not limit the definition of accountability to those incurred in the worksite. As long as the debt or obligation was incurred by virtue of the employer-employee relationship, generally, it shall be included in the employee’s accountabilities that are subject to clearance procedures. It may be true that not all employees enjoyed the privilege of staying in respondent Solid Mills’ property. However, this alone does not imply that this privilege when enjoyed was not a result of the employer-employee relationship. Those who did avail of the privilege were employees of respondent Solid Mills. Petitioners’ possession should, therefore, be included in the term “accountability.” Tegimenta Chemical Philippines owned by petitioner Vivian D. Garcia hired respondent Buensalida as an aircon maintenance technician. Respondent injured his left ring finger while repairing the air handling units at the SM Department Store in Davao City. As a result, respondent underwent a surgical debridgement procedure and was confined in the hospital for two days. SM Prime Holdings initially shouldered respondent's hospitalization expenses but it subsequently collected the amount from petitioner who, in turn, informed respondent that the amount would be deducted from his salary. Petitioner also ignored respondent's availment of SSS and PhilHealth benefits. Thereafter, respondent demanded for the restoration of the deducted amounts but was denied by petitioner; hence, he filed a complaint for "constructive dismissal with money claims" against petitioner before the Regional Arbitration Branch of Davao City. Meanwhile, respondent was recalled to the Head Office at Quezon City. Respondent averred that his transfer was purposely done by petitioner to harass him, in view of their estranged relationship brought about by the filing of the Davao case. He was not advanced any travel fare in going back to Manila. He was also instructed to attend seminars conducted by the SSS and Philhealth. Petitioner issued another Memorandum informing respondent that he would be re-assigned to Manila as night shift supervisor. However, respondent refused the new assignment because it would allegedly affect his gross income and other benefits. The night shift had no fixed work schedule in contrast to respondent's previous six-days-a-week schedule. Respondent would then be deprived of a fixed or regular income. Petitioner again issued a Memorandum stating that respondent's re-assignment was "for the good interest of the company." The move was allegedly "aimed to stop the increasing polarization among the personnel in Davao City" and the "result of cost-cutting measures implemented by the company in all SM branches and establishments." Thus, respondent filed another Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal against petitioner before the NLRC-NCR-North Sector in Quezon City. Subsequently, respondent amended his Complaint in the NCR case to include underpayment or non-payment of salaries, service incentive leave, 13th month pay and boarding house rental. He claimed that petitioner failed to pay his boarding expenses arising from his assignment to Davao City, contrary to the promise of petitioner. His ECOLA, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay were also not paid in the manner provided by law. The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent's complaint in the NCR case on the ground that the cause of action therein was embraced in the Davao case. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in a resolution. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC resolution in a Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution. Hence, the instant petition. Facts:
Pioneer International Limited (PIL), an Australian company engaged in the ready-mix concrete business, established herein petitioner PCPI to undertake its business in the Philippines. PIL contacted respondent Todaro and asked if the latter is available to join them in their intention to establish plant operations in the country to which the latter agreed. Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as consultant for 2-3 months, after which he would be employed as manager of concrete operations should PIL decide to invest in the Philippines. PIL started its operation however it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. Respondent thus filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner. Petitioner meanwhile contends that the case should fall with the NLRC as the damages arose from an alleged breach of employment contract. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of respondent. . Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over the dispute. Held: The RTC has jurisdiction. Where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts. In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners’ alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. Facts:
Petitioner Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency ("Jaguar") is a private corporation engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients, one of whom is Delta Milling Industries, Inc. ("Delta"). Respondent security guards instituted the instant labor case before the labor arbiter.The labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondents Sales. Petitioner Jaguar filed a partial appeal questioning the failure of public respondent NLRC to resolve its cross-claim against Delta as the party ultimately liable for payment of the monetary award to the security guards. The NLRC dismissed the appeal, holding that it was not the proper forum to raise the issue. It went on to say that Jaguar, being the direct employer of the security guards, is the one principally liable to the employees. Thus, it directed petitioner to file a separate civil action for recovery of the amount before the regular court having jurisdiction over the subject matter, for the purpose of proving the liability of Delta. Petitioner Jaguar filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Issue: Whether the Labor Arbiter has the jurisdiction to try the case. Held: No, Article 217 of the Labor Code provides that Labor Arbiter will only try the case if there is an employer-employee relationship. This is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite; and there is none in this case. Here, there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Delta Milling. In its cross-claim, petitioner is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement of the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be paid to the guard employees. There is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling. Rather, the cross-claim involves a civil dispute between petitioner and Delta Milling. Petitioner's cross-claim is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts. Diokno v. Cacdac, July 4, 2007
In the union elections of the First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES), a legitimate labor organization, the Committee on Election (COMELEC) rejected several candidates. Private respondents filed a Petition before the Med-Arbitration Unit of DOLE. Petitioners filed a Petition with the COMELEC seeking to disqualify private respondents. COMELEC declared private respondents disqualified to run and/or participate in the elections. Eventually, COMELEC proclaimed Diokno, et. al., as winners in the elections. Private respondents filed with DOLE a Petition to nullify the order of their disqualification, nullify the election proceedings and declare holding of a new election. Another group filed a separate petition questioning the elections. Med-Arbiter decided in favor of private respondents. On appeal, Director of BLR affirmed in toto the decision of the Med-Arbiter. CA found petitioners’ appeal to be bereft of merit. Whether the Bureau of Labor Relations has jurisdiction over the case despite failure of private respondents to exhaust administrative remedies within the union. Yes. Art. 226 of the Labor Code is explicit in declaring that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. The controversy in the case is an intra-union dispute. The dispute is within or inside FLAMES, a labor union. At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private respondents Data, et. al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections. The Petition which was initiated by Daya, et. al., before the BLR was properly within its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute. South Cotabato Communications Corporation v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, June 15, 2016
Facts: On January 19, 2004, the DOLE Region XII conducted a Complaint Inspection of DXCP’s Radio Station, owned by South Cotabato Communications Corp (SCCC). Such inspection found various violations of labor standards i.e. underpayment of wages and 13th month pay; nonpayment of 5-day service incentive leave, rest day premium pay, and holiday premium pay; and non-remittance of SS contributions. DOLE then issued a Notice of Inspection Result to SCCC to correct said violations within 5 days. Due to SCCC’s failure to comply with such a directive, DOLE scheduled a summary investigation on March 3, 2004 which SCCC, unfortunately, failed to appear in without explanation. Another hearing was scheduled on April 1, 2004, but SCCC failed to again appear due to the unavailability of their counsel. A secretary of the counsel requested to move the hearing again on April 1, 2004, but the DOLE denied such request. On May 20, 2004, the Regional Director of DOLE Region XII issued an Order directing SCCC to pay its “employees” Php759,752 due to the violation of labor standards alleged therein. SCCC appealed to the SOLE, raising two grounds: (1) denial of due process and (2) lack of factual and legal basis of the assailed Order. The SOLE affirmed the Regional Director’s findings. This was affirmed by the CA. SCCC comes before the Supreme Court contending that: (1) SCCC was denied due process because they were prevented from presenting evidence to prove that herein respondents are not their employees when the Regional Director submitted the case for resolution, (2) the Regional Director’s Order was wanting of factual and legal basis because there was no categorical finding of the existence of an Employer-Employee Relationship between the parties – an element which is a prerequisite for the DOLE’s exercise of jurisdiction. In its comment, DOLE proffered that the “results of the interviews conducted in the premises of DXCP in the course of its inspection constitute substantial evidence that served as basis for the monetary awards to herein respondents.” Issue: 1) Whether or not there was a denial of procedural due process. No. 2) Whether or not the lack of factual and legal basis that effectively negates the exercise of jurisdiction by the DOLE. Yes. Held: No, there was no denial of procedural due process in this case. Due process in administrative proceedings refers to an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this case, SCCC was notified of the summary investigations conducted on March 3, 2004 and April 1, 2004, both of which they failed to attend. It was incumbent upon SCCC to make time for the summary investigations. Clearly, their own negligence did them in. Yes, there was a lack of factual and legal basis for the DOLE Regional Director’s Order. An employer-employee relationship was not sufficiently established. Such is a prerequisite for the DOLE to establish over the case. Before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128 of the Labor Code, two important questions must first be resolved. (1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of? (2) Are there violations of the Labor Code or of any labor law? The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor, one which the legislative branch is entitled to impose. The rationale underlying this limitation is to eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions of the Secretary of Labor and the NLRC, on a matter fraught with questions of fact and law, which is best resolved by the quasi-judicial body, which is the NRLC, rather than an administrative official of the executive branch of the government. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. Like the NLRC, the DOLE has the authority to rule on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, considering that the existence of an employer-employee relationship is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of its visitorial power. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that without an employer-employee relationship, or if one has already been terminated, the Secretary of Labor is without jurisdiction to determine if violations of labor standards provision had in fact been committed, and to direct employers to comply with their alleged violations of labor standards. The Orders of the Regional Director and the Secretary of Labor do not contain the factual basis necessary to establish the jurisdiction of the DOLE and to justify the monetary awards to the respondents. In promulgating its May 2004 Order, the Regional Director merely noted the discovery of violations of labor standards provisions in the course of inspection of the DXCP premises. No such categorical determination was made on the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In a word, the Regional Director had presumed, not demonstrated, the existence of the relationship. Of particular note is the DOLE'S failure to show that SCCC, thus, exercised control over herein respondents' conduct in the workplace. The Regional Director and SOLE relied solely on the respondents’ allegation of employment to justify the existence of an EER. Mere allegations fall below the quantum of proof necessary to establish an EER since they can easily be concocted and manufactured. In a similar vein, the DOLE’s use of the straight computation method in awarding the sum of P759,752 to respondents, without reference to any other evidence other than the interviews conducted during the inspection, is highly telling that the DOLE acted arbitrarily. It is implausible for all 9 respondents to be entitled to uniform amounts of Service Incentive Leave (SIL) pay, holiday pay premium, and rest day premium pay for three (3) years since entitlement to said benefits would largely depend on the actual rest days and holidays worked and amount of remaining leave credits in a year. SCCC may have failed to refute the allegation that respondents were employees of DXCP. Nevertheless, it was incumbent upon the respondents to prove their allegation that they were, indeed, under SCCC's employ and that the latter violated their labor rights. Without an express finding of EER, the DOLE cannot assume to have jurisdiction to resolve the complaints of herein respondents as jurisdiction in that instance lies with the NLRC. Petition is GRANTED Facts:
The PALCEA-SUPER filed a petition for direct certification election before the Med-Arbiter seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of Namboku. Namboku opposed the petition on the ground of inappropriateness. It claimed that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are project employees. The Med-Arbiter issued an Order holding that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are regular employees. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and affirmed Med-Arbiter’s Order. Namboku filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari. The latter granted the petition of Namboku and reversed the resolution of the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the CA on the ground that she is merely a nominal party to the case and has no personal interest. Issue: Is the Secretary of Labor considered a real party in interest. Held: No. The Secretary of Labor is not a real party in interest vested with personality to file the present petitions. As to the Secretary of Labor, she was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party because one of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. But that does not make her a real party-in-interest or vests her with authority to appeal the decisions of the CA in case it reverses her ruling, Facts:
Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with DOLE Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, among others. The DOLE Regional Director found that private respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims. However, People’s Broadcasting sought reconsideration of the Director’s Order, but failed. The Acting DOLE Secretary also dismissed People’s Broadcasting’s appeal. In the CA, the Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent. It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) was held to be the primary agency in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This was the interpretation of the Court of the clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" in Art. 128(b). Issue: Whether or not DOLE has the power to determine employer-employee relationship exists. Held: Yes, the DOLE must have the power to determine whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The DOLE, in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, has a ready set of guidelines to follow, the same guide the courts themselves use. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The use of this test is not solely limited to the NLRC. The DOLE Secretary, or his or her representatives, can utilize the same test, even in the course of inspection, making use of the same evidence that would have been presented before the NLRC. If the DOLE makes a finding that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, it takes cognizance of the matter, to the exclusion of the NLRC. The DOLE would have no jurisdiction only if the employer-employee relationship has already been terminated, or it appears, upon review, that no employer-employee relationship existed in the first place. However, this is not to say that the determination by the DOLE is beyond question or review.1avvphi1 Suffice it to say, there are judicial remedies such as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may be availed of, should a party wish to dispute the findings of the DOLE. 88 Aces Maritime Services, Inc. (88 Aces) is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino seafarers for and on behalf of its foreign principal Khalifa Algosaibi Diving & Marine Services Co. (Khalifa Algosaibi). Janet A. Jocson (Jocson) is the president/owner/manager of 88 Aces. After passing the required pre-employment medical examination, Apolinario left Manila on February 26, 2010 and embarked MV Algosaibi in Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia. After completing his six-month contract with 88 Aces in August 2010, Apolinario however was not repatriated as he directly entered into a new contract with 88 Aces' foreign principal, Khalifa Algosaibi. His new contract with Khalifa Algosaibi lasted until April 2012. In April 2012, Apolinario was repatriated in Manila. On March 17, 2015, when Apolinario consulted Dr. Rufo Luna, the Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of San Jose, who declared him to be physically unfit to continue work due to his hyperglycemia as a result of his diabetese milletus. Consequently, Apolinario demanded from respondents the payment of his disability benefits, but to no avail. Whether or not the claim of Apolinario already prescribed? Sections 2 and 18 of the Standard term and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, provide for the duration and termination of contract between the employer and a seafarer. It is well-settled that a seafarer's cause of action arises upon his disembarkation from the vessel. As Apolinario's disembarkation from Algosaibi was on April 11, 2012, he had three years from the date, or until April 11, 2015, to make a claim for disability benefits. Records show that Apolinario had requested for a SENA before the NLRC as early as March 25, 2015. To elucidate, SENA is an administrative approach to provide an accessible, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of complaints arising from employer-employee relationship to prevent cases from ripening into full blown disputes. All labor and employment disputes undergo this 30-day mandatory conciliation-mediation process. |
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