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Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001 367 SCRA 175 Facts: Petitioner, Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titleswere exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution voiding the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural land. Issue: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657. Held: In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs (DAR) Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court held that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries. However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area. Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. Hence, the Court remanded the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
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CREBA vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 183409, Jun 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 295 (2010) Facts: Petitioner, CREBA is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorship and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing. On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. Issue: Whether or not DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988. Held: No. Section 65 of RA 6657 provides that “After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.” Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands. Hacienda Luisita v. PARC
G.R. No. 171101, Jul 05, 2011, 653 SCRA 154 (2011) Facts: In 1957, the Spanish owners of the Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold to Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO) Hacienda Luisita and their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda. The Philippine Government, through the Central Bank of the Philippines, aided the buyer to obtain a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS Board of Trustees extended loan in favour of TADECO with a condition that said lots shall be divided at cost to the tenants, should there be any, under Land Tenure Act. In 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was enacted, abolishing share tenancy and converting it to leasehold tenancy. Subsequently, Congress passed the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) declaring the entire country a land reform area. A month after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, President Marcos allowed tenant-farmers to purchase the land they tilled or to change from shared-tenancy to fixed-rent leasehold tenancy. In 1980, the Martial Law Administration filed a suit before the RTC of Manila against TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now the DAR) for its distribution to farmers. The RTC ordered TADECO to surrender the hacienda to the MAR.Then during the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, after Marcos was ousted, she instituted Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and created the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) as its policy-making body, thru RA 6657 (CARP Law of 1988) ushering a new process of land classification, acquisition, and distribution. Consequently, the CA dismissed the case the Marcos administration initially instituted and won against TADECO, et al. However, the dismissal was conditioned that there be an approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) to be submitted, approved by PARC, and implemented as an alternative mode of land distribution, and failure to comply will cause the revival of previous decision. Thereafter, the Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) was formed as a spin-off corporation to facilitate the SDP. In 1989, about 93% of the Farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) accepted and signed the proposed SDOP. Then, Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) was entered into by TADECO/HLI and 5,848 qualified FWBs. A referendum conducted by DAR showed that 5,177 FWBs out of 5,315 participants opted to receive shares in the HLI. A petition (Petisyon) was then filed for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands. The Petisyon was filed by the AMBALA (composing about 80% of the 5,339 FWBs of Hacienda Luisita). DAR constituted a Special Task Force toattend to the issues relating to the SDP of HLI and the latter found that HLI failed to comply with their undertakings. On December 22, 2005, PARC affirmed the recommendation of DAR to recall/revoke the SDOP of TADECO/HLI and the land be placed under compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition. Issue: Whether or not PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP. Held: Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan. Gelos v. CA
G.R. No. 86186, May 08, 1992, 208 SCRA 608 (1992) Facts: The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao, Laguna, and belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with petitioner Gelos employing him as their laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. The contract of employment dated July 5, 1970, written in Tagalog and entitled "Kasunduan ng Upahang Araw," provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and that"Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second Party makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of work on the said farm.) On September 4, 1973, after Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform him of the termination of his services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working on the land. On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which granted his petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the assistance of the Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On appeal to the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared proper for trial and so reinstated. RTC found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain thereon as such. CA reversed RTC decision. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws and not only a hired laborer whose right to occupy the subject land ended with the termination of their contract of employment Held: No. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention of the parties that determines the relationship between them. The indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1. the selection and engagement of the employee; 2. the payment of wages; 3. the power of dismissal; and 4. the power to control the employee's conduct –– although the latter is the most important element. Tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor be receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest." Here, the private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon. Gabriel v. Pangilinan G.R. No. L-27797, Aug. 26 1987, 58 SCRA 590 (1974) Facts: The plaintiff seeks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the complaint which is under lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of leasehold tenancy. After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case. It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is registered in her name. It contains an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a yearly basis. It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan. who is residing near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professions; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the fishpond. Court of First Instance of Pampanga concluded that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to the CA.CA certified appeal from CFI decision to the SC for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved. Issue: Whether or not the relationship between the appellee and appellant is a leasehold tenancy and not a civil law lease. Held: No. There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. [Six requisites of tenancy relationship enumerated] The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one. Caballes vs DAR
G.R. No. 78214, Dec. 5, 1988, 168 SCRA 254 (1988) Facts: The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor of the petitioner. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During thosefour years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes. Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon. Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification dated January 24, 1983, stating that said Criminal Case was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings:That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which is devoted to bananas; That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which act is prohibited by law; and That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations. Issue: Whether or not private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner. Held: No. Private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous. Section 2 of said law provides: It is the policy of the State: 1. To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development; xxx xxx xxx RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas,and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs. The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: 1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2. The subject is agricultural land; 3. There is consent; 4. The purpose is agricultural production; 5. There is personal cultivation; and 6. There is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner. Case Digest: Estate of Vda. De Panlilio vs Dizon G.R. No. 148777, Oct. 18, 2007, 536 SCRA 565 (2007)7/24/2020 Estate of Vda. De Panlilio vs Dizon
G.R. No. 148777, Oct. 18, 2007, 536 SCRA 565 (2007) Facts: Encarnacion Vda. De Panlilio is the owner of the disputed landholdings over a vast tract of land, with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares called Hacienda Masamat located in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga. On April 19, 1961, Panlilio entered into a contract of lease over the said landholdings with Paulina Mercado, wife of Panlilio’s nephew, covering agricultural years from 1961 to 1979. Sometime in 1973, pursuant to the OLT under PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued thirty eight (38) Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to Panlilio’s tenants. On November 26, 1973, lessee Paulina Mercado filed a letter-complaint with the DAR questioning the issuance of CLTs to Panlilio’s tenants, alleging, among others, that the DAR should not have issued the CLTs since the land involved was principally being planted with sugar and was outside the coverage of PD 27. She claimed thatrespondents surreptitiously planted palay (rice plant) instead of sugar in order to bring the land within the purview of the law. After proper investigation, the DAR concluded that the CLTs were "properly and regularly issued." Paulina Mercado likewise filed a similar complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at San Fernando, Pampanga. On December 4, 1976, the tenants of the portion of the land planted with sugar cane petitioned the DAR to cause the reversion of their sugarland to riceland so that it may be covered by the Agrarian Reform Law. The petition was with the conformity of Panlilio. On January 12, 1977, Panlilio executed an Affidavit, partly quoted as follows: “That it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda Masamat be placed under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter the same be sold to tenant-petitioners.” On January 20, 1977, by virtue of the said Affidavit, the DAR Secretary ordered the distribution of all land transfer certificates. On March 17, 1978, CAR dismissed complaint of Paulina Mercado (lessee) on the basis of the action of the DAR Secretary.On December 29, 1986, Panlilio died. In 1993, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the tenants of Panlilio. In June 1994, Bacolod City RTC, Branch 49 appointed petitioner George Lizares as executor of the estate of Panlilio. On February 28, 1994, petitioner Lizares filed complaint with PARAD, Region III, for annulment of coverage of landholdings under PD 27. On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for cancellation of EPs. Upon petitioner’s motion, all the cases were consolidated. On November 14, 1995, PARAD dismissed Lizares’ complaint on the strength of the January 12, 1977 Affidavit of Panlilio. In addition, the PARAD relied on the report of the DAR and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the subject landholding is devoted to palay. And, finally, PARAD applied the equitable remedy of laches, in that Panlilio failed during her lifetime to bring to the attention of the DAR and CAR her February 3, 1977 Affidavit31 ostensibly revoking her previous January 12, 1977 Affidavit. The DARAB likewise disregarded petitioner Lizares’ Motion for Reconsideration.On April 11, 2000, CA sustained petitioner’s position, but reversed its decision on November 29, 2000. Issues: 1. Whether or not there is valid waiver through the January 12, 1977 Affidavit 2. Whether or not Court of Appeal acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the transfer made by the private respondents to third persons valid Held: YES, the subject land was properly covered by Presidential Decree 27 since Panlilio surrendered said lot to the DAR for coverage under Presidential Decree 27 pursuant to her January 12, 1977 Affidavit. While PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not, it does not preclude nor prohibit the disposition of landholdings planted with other crops to the tenants by express will of the landowner under PD 27. YES. Thus, Presidential Decree 27 is clear that after full payment and title to the land is acquired, the land shall not be transferred except to the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government. If the amortizations for the land have not yet been paid, then there can be no transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned by the Government. The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production. Thus, it is plain to see that Sec. 6 of EO 228, part of which reads “Ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment of amortizations,” principallydeals with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under Presidential Decree No 27. Estribillo v. DAR
G.R. No. 159674, Jun 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 218 (2006) Facts: The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur. The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of Emancipation Patents. The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). In 1956, HMI acquired such forested area through Sales Patent No. 2683. On 21 October 1972 PD 27 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under OLT and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. HMI requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of OLT. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under PD 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. HMI also sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners. On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB, which affirmed the RARAD Decision ruling that theEP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title." Petitioners proceeded to CA with Petition for Review on Certiorari, which was denied. Issue: Whether or not the Emancipation Patents are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration Held: YES. Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings. After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an Emancipation Patent to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person. The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings. Case Digest: Pasco v Pison-Arceo Agri. Dev. Corp. G.R. No. 165501Mar 28, 2006 485 SCRA 5147/23/2020 Pasco v. Pison-Arceo Agri. Dev. Corp.
G.R. No. 165501 Mar 28, 2006 485 SCRA 514 Facts: Respondent, Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Negros Occidental containing more than 100 hectares. Constructed on respondent’s parcel of land are houses which are occupied by its workers. Petitioners, ceased to be employed by respondent by 1987, petitioners were asked to vacate the house they were occupying but they refused, hence, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them before the MTCC in Talisay City. On June 30, 2000, the MTCC of Talisay rendered judgment in favor of respondent. On August 23, 2000, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Talisay City sent a Notice of Coverage advising respondent that its parcel of land is now covered under Republic Act 6657. On August 24, 2000 petitioners appealed the MTCC decision in the Unlawful Detainer Case to the RTC, raising for the first time that, respondent’s hacienda is covered by the CARL and they are qualified beneficiaries thereunder; whether they are qualified beneficiaries is material to the determination of whether they are planters or builders or sowers in bad faith; "upon knowledge that the land subject of the unlawful detainer case is an hacienda, it is within the sound discretion of the judge to clarify from the parties whether or not the subject land is covered by [CARL] and whether or not the defendants are qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries"; "it is mandatory on the part of the courts to take judicial notice of agrarian laws"; and the unlawful detainer case, at all events, was prematurely filed as respondent’s right to eject them would arise only after they are reimbursed of their expenses in repairing the house and, therefore, the MTCC has no jurisdiction yet to order their ejectment. On December 5, 2000, the RTC of Bacolod City affirmed the decision of MTCC Talisay, with modification. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but were denied. Hence, they elevated the case to the CA. On August 27, 2003, the appellate court denied petitioners’ petition. In the meantime, the MARO of Talisay City issued on August 24, 2004 a Certification that herein petitioner Jesus Pasco is registered as potential Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) beneficiary in the land owned by respondent. Held: Yes. The issuance of a Notice of Coverage is merely a preliminary step for the State’s acquisition of the land for agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership of the land to the government. A Notice of Coverage does not ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land reform area, since during a field investigation the DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines would make a determination as to whether, among other things, "the land will be placed under agrarian reform, the land’s suitability to agriculture." The owner retains its right to eject unlawful possessors of his land. As for the registration of petitioners as potential CARP beneficiaries, the same does not help their cause. As "potential" CARP beneficiaries, they are included in the list of those who may be awarded land under the CARP. Nothing in the records of the case shows that the DAR has made an award in favor of petitioners, hence, no rights over the land they occupy can be considered to have vested in their favor in accordance with Section 24 of the CARL which reads: “The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him…” Padua vs CA
G.R. No. 153456 Mar 02, 2007 517 SCRA 232 (2007) Facts: Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. (Dela Cruz, et al.) were tenants of Lot Nos. 68 and 90 of the Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac. In 1966, Dela Cruz, et al. agreed to donate said properties to the municipality on the condition that these be used as school sites. The project did not materialize Dela Cruz, et al. asked that the properties be returned to them. However, they found out that Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No. 90 to Edwin Cruz (Cruz) who were each issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). Cruz executed an Affidavit of Waiver over his interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of which DAR Regional Office III issued an Order dated December 7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring Lot No. 90 open for disposition. On November 7, 1989, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago issued an Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein petitioner Roberto Padua (Padua) who had been occupying said property and paying the amortization thereon to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).On July 2, 1995 DAR Secretary Garilao issued Order cancelling the Order of Award dated November 7, 1989 issued in favor of Roberto Padua and directing the Regional Director to cause the restoration of possession of said lot in favor of Dela Cruz, et al. All payments made by Roberto Padua on account of said lot as rentals for the use thereof are forfeited in favor of the government. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s status in relation to Lot No. 90 was no longer that of a mere potential agrarian reform farmer-beneficiary but a civil law vendor dealing directly with the LBP in the payment of amortizations on the property. Held: No. That view is incorrect. The statutory mechanism for the acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires full payment of amortization before a farmer-beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name of an original or a transfer certificate of title. As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains that of a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00, DAR has authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but not yet registered with the Register of Deeds. Mango v. Barbin
G.R. No. 173923 Oct. 12, 2009 603 SCRA 232 (2009) Facts: On 11 November 1994, respondent Juana Z. Barbin filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Norte an action for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant-Beneficiary, Repossession and Damages. Respondent alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of an irrigated riceland located in Barangay Guinacutan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.7823 hectares, and that Augusto Mago, Crispin Mago, Ernesto Mago, and Pedro Mago were tenants of the subject landholding. Respondent further alleged that petitioners violated the terms of their leasehold contracts when they failed to pay lease rentals for more than two years, which is a ground for their dispossession of the landholding. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer program of the government pursuant to PD 27. Respondent’s original title was then cancelled and the subject landholding was transferred to petitioners who were issued Emancipation Patents by the DAR. The Transfer Certificates of Title issued to petitioners emanating from the Emancipation Patents were registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioners averred that prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, they already delivered their lease rentals to respondent.They further alleged that after the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, the subject landholding ceased to be covered by any leasehold contract. In the Decision dated 30 January 1997, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB): 1. ordered the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte to cancel EP Nos. 745, 747, and 749 issued in the name of Augusto Mago, Ernesto Mago, and Pedro Mago respectively, and 2. directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, to reallocate the subject lands to qualified beneficiaries. DARAB held that when the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties ceased and the tenant-beneficiaries were no longer required to pay lease rentals to the landowner. However, when petitioners entered into an agreement with respondent for a direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of Transfer, petitioners obligated themselves to pay their amortizations to respondent who is the landowner. CA held that the mere issuance of an Emancipation Patent to a qualified farmer-beneficiary is not absolute and can be attacked anytime upon showing of any irregularity in its issuance or non-compliance with the conditions attached to it. The Emancipation Patent is subject to thecondition that amortization payments be remitted promptly to the landowner and that failure to comply with this condition is a ground for cancellation. Issue: Whether or not the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to petitioners which were already registered with the Register of Deeds have already become indefeasible and can no longer be cancelled. Held: N0. Emancipation patents issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994, which was issued in March 1994, enumerates the grounds for cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents or Certificates of Landownership Award: Grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs [Emancipation Patents] or CLOAs [Certificates of Landownership Award] may include but not be limited to the following: 1. Misuse or diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB [Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries]; (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657) 2. Misuse of the land; (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657) 3. Material misrepresentation of the ARB’s basic qualifications as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws; 4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf. Section 73, Paragraphs C and E of R.A. No. 6657) 5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian laws. However, if the land has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after full payment of amortization by the beneficiary; (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228)6. Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations in case of voluntary land transfer/direct payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; (Emphasis supplied) 7. Failure of the ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657) 8. Neglect or abandonment of the awarded land continuously for a period of two (2) calendar years as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; (Section 22 of RA 6657) 9. The land is found to be exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage or to be part of the landowner’s retained area as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; and 10. Other grounds that will circumvent laws related to the implementation of agrarian reform program. In this case, petitioners entered into an agreement with respondent for a direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of Transfer. However, petitioners failed to pay the amortizations to respondent landowner in accordance with their agreed direct payment scheme. In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer Certificates of Title should not have been issued to petitioners without full payment of the just compensation. Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266, the DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only after the tenant-farmers have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, it is understood that full payment of the just compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to them. Thus, Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under PD 27 may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the amortizations. Land Bank v. CA and Pascual
G.R. No. 128557 Dec. 29, 1999 321 SCRA 629 (1999) Facts: Respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in Gattaran,Cagayan. Pursuant to PD 27 and EO 228, the DAR placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). On 11 June 1992 the PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioner LBP to pay private respondent a total amount of P1,961,950.00. Private respondent accepted the valuation. Petitioner LBP having refused to comply with its obligation despite the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD. CA ruled in respondent’s favor. The appellate court also required petitioner LBP to pay a compounded interest of 6% per annum in compliance with DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994. As to its coverage, the Order states: These rules and regulations shall apply to landowners: (1) whose lands are actually tenanted as of 21 October 1972 or thereafter and covered by OLT; (2) who opted for government financing through Land Bank of the Philippines as mode of compensation; and, (3) who have not yet been paid for the value of their land. Issue: Whether or not CA cannot enforce PARAD's valuation since it cannot make such determination for want of jurisdiction hence void. Whether or not CA erred in ruling that private respondent can avail of the 6% compounded interest prescribed for unpaid landowners by Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. Held: No. Petitioner's contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946, which provides that the valuation of lands covered by PD 27 isunder the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, is still in effect cannot be sustained. It seems that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in issuing Memorandum Circular No. I, Series of 1995, directing the DARAB to refrain from hearing valuation cases involving PD 27 lands. For on the contrary, it is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform although such valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. YES. At first glance it would seem that private respondent’s lands are indeed covered by AO No. 13. However, Part IV shows that AO No. 13 provides a fixed formula for determining the Land Value (LV) and the additional interests it would have earned. In the decision of PARAD, however, the Land Value (LV) of private respondent’s property was computed by using the GSP for 1992, which is P300.00 per cavan of palay and P250.00 per cavan of corn. The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned interests. 53 Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposited in a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35 or P31) could be multiplied by (1.06)n to determine the value of the land plus the additional 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972. However, since the PARAD already increased the GSP from P35.00 to P300.00/cavan of palay and from P31.00 to P250.00/cavan of corn, there is no more need to add any interest thereon, muchless compound it. To the extent that it granted 6% compounded interest to private respondent Jose Pascual, the Court of Appeals erred. Santos v. Land Bank
G.R. No. 137431 Sep 07, 2000 340 SCRA 59 (2000) Facts: Petitioner, Edgardo Santos was owner of properties which were taken by DAR under P.D. No. 27 in 1972. On August 12, 1997, RTC rendered judgment: (1) fixing the amount of P49,241,876.00 to be the just compensation and (2) ordering LBP to pay plaintiff the amount of P45,698,805.34 Philippine currency, in the manner provided by R.A. 6657, by way of full payment of the said just compensation.A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond On December 24, 1997 LBP released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash and Land Bank Bond No. AR-0002206 in the amount of P41,128,024.81 to the petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court, praying that the payment of the compensation be in proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,745 in cash, alleging that the cash portion should include the amounts in the Decision representing the interest payments. The Regional Trial Court issued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the balance of P41,128,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration. Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge, resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998 Order of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not a trial court decision directing the payment of such compensation "P45,698,805.34 PESOS, Philippine currency, in the manner provided by R.A. 6657" was illegally amended by an order, issued during the execution proceedings, that such amount shall be paid in cash and bonds. Held: No. The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment. However, it is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgment that the compensation was to be paid "in the manner provided by RA 6657."10 Pursuant to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds, as indicated below: "Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. -- The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may beagreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. "The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner: (1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions (a) For lands above fifty(50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned. Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time (b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at anytime." Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgment. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner set forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the final judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner demands, is not compatible with such judgment. Case Digest: Land Bank v. CA and Pascual G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999,321 SCRA 629 (1999)7/20/2020 Land Bank v. CA and Pascual
G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 629 (1999) Facts: Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in Gattaran, Cagayan. Pursuant to PD 27 and EO 228, the DAR placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). On 11 June 1992 the PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioner LBP to pay private respondent a total amount of P1,961,950.00. Private respondent accepted the valuation. Petitioner LBP having refused to comply with its obligation despite the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD. CA ruled in respondent’s favor. Petitioner LBP contends that CA cannot issue the Writ of Mandamus because it cannot be compelled to perform an act which is beyond its legal duty. Petitioner cites Sec. 2 of PD 251, which amended Sec. 75 of RA 3844, 34 which provides that it is the duty of petitioner bank" (t)o finance and/or guarantee the acquisition, under Presidential Decree No. 85 dated December 25, 1972, of farm lands transferred to the tenant farmers pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. 27) dated October 21, 1972." Petitioner further argues that for a financing or guarantee agreement to exist there must be at least three (3) parties: the creditor, the debtor and the financier or the guarantor. Since petitioner merely guarantees or finances the payment of the value of the land, the farmer-beneficiary’s consent, being the principal debtor, is indispensable and that the only time petitioner becomes legally bound to finance the transaction is when the farmer-beneficiary approves the appraised land value. Petitioner fears that if it is forced to pay the value as determined by the DARAB, the government will suffer losses as the farmer-beneficiary, who does not agree to the appraised land value, will surely refuse to reimburse the amounts that petitioner had disbursed. Issue: Whether or not the landowner, the DAR, the Land Bank and the farmer-beneficiary must all agree to the value of the land as determined by Land Bank Held: No. A perusal of the law however shows that the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not required in establishing the vinculum juris for the proper compensation of the landowner. Section 18 of RA 6657 states -- Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land (emphasis supplied). As may be gleaned from the aforementioned section, the landowner, the DAR and the Land Bank are the only parties involved. The law does not mention the participation of the farmer-beneficiary. Padua v. CA
G.R. No. 153456 Mar 02, 2007 517 SCRA 232 (2007) Facts: Pepito Dela Cruz, et al. (Dela Cruz, et al.) were tenants of Lot Nos. 68 and 90 of the Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac. In 1966, Dela Cruz, et al. agreed to donate said properties to the municipality on the condition that these be used as school sites. The project did not materialize Dela Cruz, et al. asked that the properties be returned to them. However, they found out that Mayor Cruz had distributed Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No. 90 to Edwin Cruz (Cruz) who were each issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). Cruz executed an Affidavit of Waiver over his interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of which DAR Regional Office III issued an Order dated December 7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declaring Lot No. 90 open for disposition. On November 7, 1989, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago issued an Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein petitioner Roberto Padua (Padua) who had been occupying said property and paying the amortization thereon to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).On July 2, 1995 DAR Secretary Garilao issued Order cancelling the Order of Award dated November 7, 1989 issued in favor of Roberto Padua and directing the Regional Director to cause the restoration of possession of said lot in favor of Dela Cruz, et al. All payments made by Roberto Padua on account of said lot as rentals for the use thereof are forfeited in favor of the government. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s status in relation to Lot No. 90 was no longer that of a mere potential agrarian reform farmer-beneficiary but a civil law vendor dealing directly with the LBP in the payment of amortizations on the property. Held: No. That view is incorrect. The statutory mechanism for the acquisition of land through agrarian reform requires full payment of amortization before a farmer-beneficiary may be issued a CLOA or EP, which, in turn, can become the basis for issuance in his name of an original or a transfer certificate of title. As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization on Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains that of a mere potential farmer-beneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or reject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00, DAR has authority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential farmer-beneficiaries but not yet registered with the Register of Deeds. Case Digest: Land Bank vs CA, Yap, et al G.R. No. 118712, Oct. 6, 1995,249 SCRA 149 (1995)7/19/2020 Land Bank vs CA, Yap, et al
G.R. No. 118712, Oct. 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 149 (1995) Facts: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the CARL. Petitioners assail decision of CA which ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED: a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds; b) Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit — not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" — with an accessible bank designated by DAR in the names of the following [private respondents] the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments — within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657: P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR; c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the [private respondents] to withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties Held: YES. The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 79310, Jul 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343 (1989) Facts: In G.R. No. 79777, the subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. Petitioners are questioning constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value. However, in an amended petition, petitioners contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows: SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner: (1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions: (a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. (b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. (c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time. (2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC; (3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability; (4) LBP bonds Issue: Whether or not Sec. 18 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. Held: No. It cannot be denied from these case that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation. Lubrica vs Land Bank
G.R. No. 170220, Nov. 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415 (2006) Facts: Petitioners own parcels of agricultural lands in Mindoro Occidental which were placed under land reform pursuant to PD 27. The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. Petitioners rejected Land Bank’s valuation of their properties: P5,056,833.54 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P1,512,575.05 for the 128.7161 hectares. On January 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares. LBP filed for judicial determination of just compensation before RTC. RTC ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation. Court of Appeals initially upheld Regional Trial Court decision. However, CA, in its Amended Decision, held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed. Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines, it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October 21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972. Issue: Whether or not the court a quo has decided the case in a way not in accord with the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eli G.C. Natividad, et al., G.R. No. 127198, prom. May 16, 2005 Held: YES. The Natividad case reiterated the Court’s ruling in Office of the President v. Court of Appeals that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined. Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation. In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. Land Bank v. Natividad
G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441 (2005) Facts: On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by thegovernment pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27) After trial, RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents, ordering DAR and petitioner LBP to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation. In petition for review, Land Bank contends that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents’ evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank’s evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972. Held: No. Land Bank’s contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, weruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect. Land Bank vs Celada
G.R. No. 164876, Jan. 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 495 Facts: Respondent, Celada owns agricultural in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol identified in 1998 by the DAR as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the CARP. LBP valued respondent's land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61. The DAR offered the same amount, but it was rejected. The matter was referred to DARAB Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation. While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. SAC set aside petitioner's valuation of respondent's land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. The SAC based its valuation of P354,847.50 solely on the observation that there was a 'patent disparity between the price given to respondent and the other landowners. Issue: Whether or not the SAC a quo erred in fixing the just compensation of the land based not on its actual land use but on the valuation of neighboring lands. Held: YES. The SAC erred in setting aside petitioner’s valuation of respondent’s land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. We note that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657 that "should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter". The SAC further held that said Section 17 "cannot be superseded by any administrative order of a government agency", thereby implying that the valuation formula under DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998 (DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998), is invalid and of no effect. While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR’s duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision. Land Bank
vs Colarina G.R. No. 176410, Sep. 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 614 (2010) Facts: Respondent Colarina manifested his voluntary offer to his sell three (3) parcels of agricultural land to the DAR for coverage under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Disappointed with the low valuation by petitioner and the DAR, respondent filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi, Albay, for the judicial determination of just compensation. During pre-trial, LBP manifested that the subject properties may be reassessed and revaluated based on the new guidelines set forth in DAR A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994. The respondent, to support his valuation of the subject properties, presented in evidence his own testimony and that of Oliva), then Assistant Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur and President of the Camarines Chapter of the National Real Estate Association. Thereafter, the SAC rendered a decision reconciling the conflicting evidence of the parties. The SAC followed the formula of the LBP and its land use classification of the subject properties; the appraisal report on the valuation thereof. Both parties appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the SAC Issue: Whether or not the lower courts’ computation of just compensation for the subject properties is correct. Held: No. The factors for the determination of just compensation in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, and consequently converted into a formula in A.O. No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994, is mandatory. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, as affirmed by our subsequent rulings, did not equivocate. We note that A.O. No. 6, Series of 1992 (as amended by A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994) has been superseded by A.O. No. 5, Series of 1998. However, A.O. No. 5, Series of 1998, is not applicable to the present case as the subject properties were assessed and valued prior to its effectivity. However, the RTC, as well as the CA, was gravely mistaken in using respondent’s valuation of the properties contained in Oliva’s appraisal report. Oliva’s appraisal report did not attach pertinent documents thereto, considering that, as he had testified, he used the productivity approach. Thus, replacing the valuation of the subject properties pursuant to the determination of petitioner where the LV was pegged using the formula {CNI x 90%} + {MV x 2}, we arrive at a different amount. Land Bank
vs Barrido G.R. No. 183688, Aug. 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 454 (2010) Facts: Respondents, Barrido are registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Apologista, Sara, Iloilo.On April 30, 2003, the government expropriated a portion of the property under the Land Reform Program. Petitioner offered respondents a total amount of ₱60,385.49 as just compensation, but respondents rejected the offer. Respondents instituted an original action before the Regional Trial Court for the judicial determination of just compensation. RTC adopted a different formula in determining land valuation by considering the average between the findings of the DAR using the formula laid down in E.O. 228 and the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration. Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law when it affirmed the said decision and order of the trial court that fixed the just compensation which is not in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 as translated into a basic formula under DAR Administrative Order NO. 5, Series of 1998. Held: YES. While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation. Land Bank
vs Dumlao G.R No. 167809 Nov. 27, 2008 572 SCRA 108 (2008) Facts: Respondents, heirs of the deceased Dumlao, were the co-owners of several parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 32.2379 hectares situated at Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The properties were placed under Operation Land Transfer by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). However, the definite time of actual taking was not stated. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order (EO) No. 228, a preliminary valuation was made by the DAR on the landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 41504 and T-1180 with a total area of 16.3939 hectares. Finding the valuation to be correct, petitioner bank informed respondents of the said valuation. Payments were then deposited in the name of the landowners. Issues: 1. Whether or not since the properties were acquired pursuant to PD No. 27, the formula for computing just compensation provided by said decree and Executive Order No. 228 should apply. 2. Whether or not October 21, 1972 (when PD 27 was issued) should be deemed as the date of taking of the subject properties. Held: 1. The Court has repeatedly held that if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although the property was acquired under PD No. 27. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Estanislao, the Court ruled that taking into account the passage of RA No. 6657 in 1988 pending the settlement of just compensation, it is that law which applies to landholdings seized under PD No. 27, with said decree and EO No. 288 having only suppletory effect. Guided by this precept, just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform under PD 27 should adhere to Section 17 of RA 6657. Section 17 was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by AO No. 11, Series of 1994,72 the pertinent portions of which provide: A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by [Voluntary Offer to Sell] or [Compulsory Acquisition] regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim: LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) Where: LV = Land Value CNI = Capitalized Net Income CS = Comparable Sales MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable. A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be: LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1) A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be: LV = MV x 2 In no case shall the value of the land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of claimfolder. 2. No. The "taking" of the properties for the purpose of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the date of issuance of emancipation patents, and not on October 21, 1972, as petitioner insists. The nature of the land at that time determines the just compensation to be paid. It is undisputed that emancipation patents were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the trial court should determine the date of issuance of these emancipation patents in order to ascertainthe date of taking and proceed to compute the just compensation due to respondents, in accordance with RA No. 6657. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI)
vs PARC G.R. No. 171101 April 24, 2012 670 SCRA 392 (2012) Facts: Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents. Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain obligations under the SDP. January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock Distribution Plan(DSP). Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA) contends that if HLI or Tadeco is, at all, entitled to just compensation, the "taking" should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989, the date when the SDP was approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000 per hectare as this was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure that the FWBs will not control the majority stockholdings in HLI. Issue: Whether or not in determining the just compensation, the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP [stock distribution plan] "in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBS were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita" Held: We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that "the ‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic." It should be noted, however, that "taking" does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). "Taking" also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of "taking" as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands. Case Digest: Province of Camarines Sur vs CA G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993,222 SCRA 173 (1993)7/12/2020 Province of Camarines Sur
vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 173 (1993) Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province, through its Governor, Hon. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of Php5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an order dated January18, 1990. The Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program Held: No. It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides: A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads: Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation. The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241). To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. |
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