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People vs. Sapla, GR No.244045
Facts: On January 10, 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty at the Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text message from an informant (concerned citizen) that an individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not the officer who received the text message) then relayed the information to the deputy commander who coordinated with the PDEA. About 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information via text message was received by the RPSB this time detailing the description of the drug courier, to wit: male, wearing collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack; he will be boarding a passenger jeepney bearing plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Based on this information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP. At around 1:20 o’clock in the afternoon, the jeepney arrived at the checkpoint and was flagged down. The police officers stopped the jeepney and inside they saw the person described in the text message they received. They approached said person and asked him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The person answered yes. The police officers then requested the person to open the blue sack. The person hesitated but he eventually complied. The content of the blue sack was four bricks of marijuana. The person was later identified as Jerry Sapla. In court, Sapla denied the allegations as he claimed that when he boarded the jeep, he did not have any sack with him; that the blue sack was only attributed as belonging to him by the police. Sapla was convicted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and ruled that the informant’s tip was sufficient to engender probable cause upon the minds of the police officers; that it was sufficient to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. ISSUE: Whether or not an informant’s tip is sufficient to engender probable cause and police officer may justify the search as consented search. HELD: No. the Supreme Court has always said that a mere informant’s tip is not sufficient to engender probable cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip must rely on his senses. The police officer must not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police officer, with his/her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act and not merely rely on the information passed on to him/her. Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. The Supreme Court noted that there were two previous decisions (Pp. vs Maspil and Pp. vs Bagista) which ruled that a confidential tip was sufficient to engender probable cause, however, the Supreme Court in this case declared that these two cases are now being abandoned to settle the issue once and for all. The Supreme Court also found the text message to be double hearsay: (1) the person who actually received the text message was not presented, and (2) the person who received the text message merely relayed it to the officers who conducted the warrantless search and seizure without the latter actually seeing/reading the actual text message. Further, the text message was not preserved. It also appeared that the phone which received the text message was not a government issued one – this belies the claim of the officers that the message was received by their hotline. Based on the testimony of the police officers, Sapla hesitated when he was requested to open the blue sack. This only means that he did not give his consent and that his compliance was vitiated by the presence of the police. With all the foregoing, the search and seizure conducted was invalid and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible. Sapla was acquitted. The Supreme Court likewise emphasized the need to adhere to strict standards set by the Constitution otherwise “A battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the people.” The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the rule of men dislodges the rule of law. Accordingly, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted and is ordered immediately released from detention. Dabon v. People, GR 208775
FACTS: Law enforcement agents applied for a search warrant after the surveillance and test-buy operations conducted by the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Bohol, which confirmed that Dabon was engaged in illegal drug activity. Search Warrant No. 15, which armed law enforcement agents to search Dabon's residence for violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, was issued. Upon reaching the two-storey apartment at about 7:30 am, the CIDG operatives requested Barangay Kagawad Ariel Angalot (Brgy. Kagawad Angalot), City Councilor Jose Angalot (Councilor Angalot), Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman Marianne Angalot (SK Chairman Angalot), media representative Charles Responte (Responte) and Department of Justice (DOJ) representative Zacarias Castro (Castro) to witness the search. The group entered the house and the CIDG, together with Brgy. Kagawad Angalot and SK Chairman Angalot went to the second floor where Dabon and his family resided. The second floor had two bedrooms, a kitchen and a living room. They found Eusubio Dumaluan (Dumaluan) in the living room while Dabon was inside one of the bedrooms. After P/Insp. Mallari handed the copy of the search warrant to Dabon, the CIDG operatives searched the kitchen where PO2 Datoy and PO2 Enterina found, in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, drug paraphernalia. The police officers then frisked Dumaluan and recovered from his pocket, a coin purse, a lighter, a metal clip, three empty decks of suspected shabu, two pieces of blade and crumpled tin foil. The police officers proceeded to search one of the bedrooms where PO2 Datoy and PO2 Enterina, in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, found three plastic sachets containing suspected shabu, which were hidden in the folded of clothes inside a drawer. They also recovered the following drug paraphernalia: empty cellophane wrapper, rolled tinfoil containing. suspected shabu residue, twisted tissues, plastic straw refiller, three pieces of bamboo clip, improvised metal clip, and blade. The three plastic sachets and the drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom of Dabon and the drug paraphernalia recovered from Dumaluan were turned over to SPO1 Triste who inventoried and placed them in evidence bags in the presence of Councilor Angalot, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, SK Chairman Angalot, media representative Responte and DOJ representative Castro. Two Information were filed against Dabon for violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. For his defense, Dabon argued that he was surprised when he was. awakened by alleged members of the CIDG, who entered his room, pointing guns at him and telling them that they will conduct a raid. Dabon and Dumaluan claimed that they were not allowed to witness the search conducted by the CIDG. Instead, they were ordered to stay and sit in the living room while other members of the household were locked inside the room of their house helper. Issue: Is the evidence obtained against Dabon admissible? Held: No. Here, the hierarchy among the witnesses as explicitly provided under the law was not complied with. For one, the lawful occupants of the premises were not absent when the police authorities implemented the search warrant. Even so, the two-witness rule was not complied with as only one witness, Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, was present when the search was conducted. As told, based on the testimonies of PO2 Datoy and Brgy. Kagawad Angalot, it is clear that the mandatory rule under Section 8 was violated. Clearly, the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that SK Chairman Angalot was there was belied by the statement of PO2 Datoy and Brgy. Kagawad Angalot. Failure to comply with the safeguards provided by law in implementing the search warrant makes the search unreasonable. Thus, the exclusionary rule applies, i.e., any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutional mandate is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. We emphasize that the exclusionary rule ensures that the fundamental rights to one's person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld. People v. Que, GR 212994
FACTS: On July 26, 2003, an informant reported that a person identified as “Joshua,” later identified as Que, was selling shabu. Acting on this report, P/C Insp. Nickson Babul Muksan (P/C Insp. Muksan) organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. PO3 Lim and the informant then left for the area of Fort Pilar. There, the informant introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he intended to purchase P100.00 worth of shabu. Que then handed him shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the marked P100.00 bill and gave the prearranged signal to have Que arrested. After the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from Que. Que was then brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned over to the investigator, SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), who then marked these items with his initials. He also prepared the letter requesting for laboratory examination of the sachets’ contents. Arresting officer SPO1 Jacinto also testified to the same circumstances recounted by PO3 Lim. ISSUE: Whether or not the corpus delicti’s integrity was maintained as required under Section 21 of R.A. 10640 RULING: No, the integrity of the corpus delicti was not preserved. Compliance with Section 21’s chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized items. Noncompliance with them tanishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed. Fidelity to the chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics may easily be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through methods that exceed human sensory perception, such as specially trained canine units and screening devices, are often needed to ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs. The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects facilitates their adulteration and substitution. It also makes planting of evidence conducive. People v. Sipin, GR 224290
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not Sipin is guilty of violation of possession of illegal drugs. RULING: No. Sipin was acquitted and ordered to be released immediately. Invocation of the disputable presumptions that the police officers regularly performed their official duty and that the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, will not suffice to uphold appellant’s conviction. The burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.37 When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, irrespective of the reputation of the accused who enjoys the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is shown.38 For failure of the prosecution to establish beyond reasonable doubt the unbroken chain of custody of the drugs seized from appellant, and to prove as a fact any justifiable reason for noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR, appellant must be acquitted of the crimes charged. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, irrespective of the reputation of the accused who enjoys the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is shown. People v. Dumagoy, GR 216753
FACTS: PO3 Jimenea testified that a confidential informant (CI) informed him that a certain “Buboy,” later identified as appellant, was selling morphine. He relayed the information to PCI Lacerna, who instructed him to confirm the report. On the same day, the CI called up appellant to buy morphine; that appellant agreed to meet them near the gasoline station. Appellant arrived on-board a red motorcycle at the side of the gasoline station. The appellant talked with the CI and asked if he was the buyer of the morphine. The appellant showed him one vial of morphine and asked how much he intends to buy. He told him that he intends to purchase P3,000.00 worth of morphine, and the appellant informed him that the said amount was good for 20 vials of morphine. They then exchanged cell phone numbers and agreed to meet at noon the next day near Western Mindanao Command (WESMINCOM). They returned to their office to inform PCI Lacerna about the agreement with the appellant. Briefing of the operation was held. During the briefing, he was given the buy-bust money, which was placed inside a white envelope, it was also agreed that the prearranged signal would be a “thumbs up” sign. Then they meet the appellant in the agreed place. When the appellant asked for the money, he gave him the white envelope containing the marked money. Appellant in turn, took from his pocket the morphine placed inside a plastic bag. After checking if the 20 vials were indeed morphine, he immediately made a “thumbs up” sign. The police team immediately ran towards them to arrest the appellant. Appellant contends that there was no valid buy-bust operation as he was allegedly instigated or induced to commit the crime by the CI. ISSUE: Whether or not the buy-bust operation was valid. RULING: Yes, There was a valid buy-bust operation. There is instigation when “the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him.” On the other hand, “there is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime.” A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment used to apprehend drug peddlers. It is considered valid as long as it passes the “objective test,” which demands that “the details of the purported transaction during the buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.” In the instant case, there was a valid buy-bust operation as the prosecution was able to establish details of the transaction from the initial contact of the poseur-buyer and the appellant up to the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the morphine. The identities of the poseur-buyer and the appellant as the seller of the morphine, and the details of the procedure employed by the police operatives in conducting the buy-bust were clearly established by the prosecution. The fact that the poseur-buyer, through the CI, solicited morphine from appellant is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy-bust operation invalid as, under prevailing jurisprudence, “a police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a ‘decoy solicitation,’ is not prohibited by law and does not render the buy-bust operation invalid.” Lucas v. Lucas, GR 190710
FACTS:
ISSUE/S: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. RULING: Yes. Jesse failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with Jesus, and Jesse’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the birth cert was not signed by Jesus; and (c) although Jesse used the surname of Jesus, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of Jesus by the latter or his family. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four (4) significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case since such is still at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof deserves the Court’s attention which said that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence and address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order. People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988)
FACTS: Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. Later on, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen and both were charged for Illegal Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The fiscal absolved Ali after a thorough investigation. Then trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. His defense,Aminnudin, disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. · He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. · At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. · He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid. RULING: No. Aminuddin was arrested illegally. The mandate of the Constitution is clear that a valid search or arrest warrant shall be served first before the authorities can check his personal properties or deprived him of his liberty. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after a personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. As to the Court’s exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must, therefore, be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent. Hence, accused-appellant is acquitted. People v. Pasudag, GR 128822, 4 May 2001
FACTS: While the team of SPO2 Pepito Calip was conducting their anti-jueteng operations in Sison, Pangasinan, he urinated at a bushy bamboo fence where he saw marijuana plants growing in between the corn plants and camote tops in a 70 square-meter garden. He reported the same to his chief and dispatched his team to conduct an investigation. He went straight to the owner of the garden, Alberto Pasudag, and asked him to bring them to his backyard garden. They took pictures of Pasudag standing beside one of the marijuana plants. The police then brought Pasudag and the confiscated marijuana plants to the police station. There, he admitted that he owned the marijuana plants. He was charged and found guilty by the trial court of illegal cultivation of marijuana. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding Pasudag guilty of illegal cultivation of marijuana. RULING: Yes. The arrest of the accused was tainted with constitutional infirmity. The procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. The police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a search warrant. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. Moreover, it was revealed that the accused was not informed of his constitutional rights. The court did not agree with the Solicitor General that the accused was not under custodial investigation when he signed the confiscation receipt. It has been held repeatedly that custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the accused was acquitted from the crime charged. People vs. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 (1993)
FACTS: At about 6:30 p.m. of 25 October 1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer. On that occasion the policemen saw Polines hand over to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and returned 10 minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops weighing 22 grams. Upon prodding, Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera Street, also in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal. At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession. Enrile refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer. Antonio Enrile y Villaroman and Rogelio Abugatal y Marquez were charged for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The RTC, after trial and on 14 February 1986, found Enrile and Abugatal guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to life imprisonment and a fine of P30,000.00. Both appealed. Abugatal, however, was killed in an attempted jailbreak and thus the appeal is dismissed as to him. ISSUE: Whether the mark money found in Enrile’s possession, pursuant to a warrantless arrest, search and seizure, provide for his criminal culpability. RULING: No. It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead the policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search. Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source of the marijuana. According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately arrested him. What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information supplied by Abugatal and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he had been caught in flagrante delicto. The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure. People vs. Calimlim, GR 123980, 30 August 2001
FACTS: Limin had been living with the family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for the past 3 years. On the night of 2 April 1995, she was left alone in one of the two houses of the Ferrers since her usual companions, the sons of Manny and Cresencia, were out for the night (disco). The Ferrers were in the other house about 15 meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened when she heard somebody, later identified as Manuel Calimlim y Muyano, enter her room. Calimlim immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said "Accompany me because I killed my wife." She was then dragged to the pig pen, about 8-9 meters away from the place where she slept. Afterwards, she was again forcibly taken back to her room, then to her cousin's room and to the kitchen. In each of these places, Calimlim forcibly had sexual intercourse with her while he poked a knife against her neck. According to Limin, she first recognized Calimlim while they were in the kitchen when she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. She stated that she knew Calimlim because she had seen him always following her whenever she went to school. Limin claimed that she did not struggle nor shout nor resist because she was afraid that appellant might kill her. After the fourth intercourse, Calimlim threatened that he would kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who then reported the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto who lived nearby. The rapes were reported to the station of SPO1 Mario Suratos by Kagawad Ferrer. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer conducted the physical examination on Lanie, and found that there was minimal vaginal bleeding and there were lacerations in the hymen, the positions of which were at 9:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 3:00 o'clock, all fresh, indicating that there were insertions within the past 24 hours. There was also a whitish vaginal discharge which was found positive for spermatozoa. Manuel Calimlim denied the accusations. Calimlim was charged in 4 informations for rape in Criminal Cases U-8525, 8638 to 8640. On 17 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 46, Urdaneta, Pangasinan found Calimlim guilty of 4 counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay the offended party the amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay the costs, in each of the cases. Hence, the automatic review. ISSUE: Whether Calimlim may raise the illegality of the warrantless arrest conducted against him, especially as the arrest was made a day after the crime was committed. RULING: No. Calimlim avers that his arrest violated Section 5 of Rule 113, 40 since his arrest was made one day after the crime was committed, but without any judicial warrant, although the police had ample time to get one. This he claims is also in violation of Article III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. But here it will be noted that Calimlim entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his liberty. This is clear from a reading of Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of this Rule." Given the circumstances of his case, the exceptions do not apply here and the Court is constrained to rule that Calimlim is estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The defense's claim of warrantless arrest which is illegal cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to the conviction of Calimlim, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability. People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791 (1992)
FACTS: The police officers of Ibalon, Legaspi City, received a confidential information regarding an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. The police officer (Taduran) acted as a poseur-buyer. He was told by the informant to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don. After agreeing on the price (P200.00) for 100 grams of marijuana, Don left Taduran and Segovia and when he came back, he’s already bringing with him a plastic containing Marijuana. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. Based on that information, they apprehended the accused without a warrant of arrest. Thereafter, NARCOM agents raided without a search warrant the house of the father, Jovencio Rodrigueza. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The next 2 days, the father was released and Don and co-accused remained. The three accused (Don, Segovia, Lonceras) presented different versions of their alleged participation. RTC found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) while the two co-accused were acquitted. ISSUE: Whether or not the right against unreasonable search and seizures warrantless arrest was violated. RULING: Yes. As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. From the records of the case, Taduran bought 100 grams of marijuana from Don but the evidence presented were the prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. As clearly shown by the evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case, appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against him. Reyes vs. People, GR 229380, 6 June 2018
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the petitioner is lawful. RULING: No. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully affected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Here in this case, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act. In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and in no uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof established by clear and positive proof, which were not shown in this case. In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability. FACTS:
A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus, appellant was about to board a tricycle when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him to the police station. As he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest was violated and the evidence was admissible in court. RULING: No. “Reliable information” alone is not sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.This is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence. The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
People vs. Martinez, GR 191366
FACTS: On September 2, 2006 at around 12:45 PM, PO1 Azarden was on duty at the Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported that a pot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL. On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit. The CA supported the findings of the lower court. ISSUE: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt. RULING: No. The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches and seizures without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain view” search of evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs search, (6) stop and frisk, (7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of RRCP warrantless arrest can only be done in in flagrante cases, hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants were based solely on the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance of the place was conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive case does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit case may apply only upon probable cause, which means actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground of suspicion when suspicion of a person to be arrested is probably guilty of the offense based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In case at bar, this is not the case since the entire arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of a concerned citizen. People vs. Go, GR 116001, 14 March 2001
FACTS: SPO1 Piamonte and SPO3 Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, received an intelligence report from a police civilian that he saw Luisito Go also known as “King Louie” with a gun tucked in his waist, entered the Flamingo Disco House. Together, the three policemen proceeded to the said disco house. When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were conducting an “Operation Bakal,” whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. The police officers saw Go and his lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked Go to stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun, but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go brought the driver’s license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the gun, and invited Go to the police precinct for questioning. On the way out of the disco, Go asked permission to bring his car, which was parked outside. The police officers Go to his car. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked Go why he had these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, Go suggested that they talk the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at the police headquarters. Go took out an attache case from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Go opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash. The police officers brought Go to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct, they turned over the attache case together with the two black clutch bags to the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attache case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.1 Consequently, two Informations were filed against Go before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The other Information, charged Go with violation of P.D. 1866, ISSUE: Whether or not Go was lawfully arrested. RULING: Yes. The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. In this case, the police saw the gun tucked in Go’s waist when he stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Go could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules. People vs. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388
FACTS: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. In front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. Sucro appealed. ISSUE: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible. RULING: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence. Umil vs. Ramos, GR 81567, 9 July 1990
Facts: On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car. As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. Issue: Whether an arrest and search warrant is required for the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State. Held: No. The claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error. People v. Cogaed, GR 200334, 30 July 2014
FACTS: At about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana" from Barangay LunOy, San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag. The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches when "without any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, he voluntarily opened his bag." ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant RULING: No. Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld. Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed. Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect. Dela Cruz v. People, GR 209387, 11 January 2016
FACTS: · Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, coming back and forth taking a vessel. · While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. · Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. · The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. · Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law and was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms. · Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure, thus warranting his conviction. · The firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without warrant, is valid. RULING: Yes. The Court finds the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against the accused. The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs search. Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when "persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the enforcement of customs laws." The Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al.: The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People, in that the state’s policy to combat smuggling must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on whether the state has the duty to accord constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which duty has not been paid, as with a person’s papers and/or effects. Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws. The Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. People vs. Mariacos, GR 188611, 16 June 2010
FACTS: PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret agent who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with an “O.K.” marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black backpack with an “O.K.” marking and peeked inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got away. PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered. Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and arrest were lawful. RULING: Yes, search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination. Also, the arrest is lawful as there is a probable cause. The night before appellant’s arrest, the police received information that marijuana was to be transported and had set up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects Dela Cruz vs. People, GR 200748, 23 July 2014
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. RULING: Yes. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak of his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation. In the present case, though, the petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs. In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Law enforcement agents, must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force People vs. Vinecario, GR 141137, 20 January 2004
FACTS: On the night of April 10, 1995, at around 10:45 p.m as police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a Honda TMX motorcycle with three men namely Victor Vinecario, Arnold Roble and Gerlyn Wates on board sped past them. One of the police officers blew his whistle and ordered them to return to the checkpoint. When the three men were asked by the police officer why they sped away to which appellant Victor retorted that he is a member of the army but when he was asked by the law enforcers to produce an identification card, he could not, however, offer any. The police officers then noticed that a big military backpack was slung over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed, as were his co-appellants, to be afraid and acting suspiciously. Suspecting that the backpack contained a bomb, SPO1 Goc-ong instructed his men to disperse, following which he ordered Vinecario to open the bag. SPO1 Goc-ong then touched the stuff wrapped in paper upon which Vinecario grabbed it, resulting to the tearing-off of the paper wrapper. Soon the smell of marijuana wafted in the air. Vinecario, Roble and Wates were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of RA 6425 as amended by Rep. Act 7659, Sec. 20, par. 5 thereof, are jointly sentenced (sic) to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection by the RTC of Davao. But in a resolution, Vinecario argues that the prosecution failed to show that the search conducted by the police officers was incident to a lawful arrest; that he could not have been deemed to have consented to the search as any such consent was given under intimidating or coercive circumstances; and that there existed no probable cause to justify the search and seizure of the backpack, hence, the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence, it being a product of illegal search. ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted in checkpoints upon the person of accused-appellant and the seizure of the alleged of marijuana is valid. RULING: Yes, search conducted in checkpoints upon the person of accused-appellant and the seizure of the alleged of marijuana is valid. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of the existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. Aniag v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424 (1994)
FACTS: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, COMELEC issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban. Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote to Rep. Francisco Aniang (Bulacan’s 1st District) requesting the return of the 2 firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request by his staff on January 13, Rep. Aniang immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his home at Valle Verde and return it to Congress. At around 5pm the same day, the PNP headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20 meters away from its entrance. About 30 minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by Rep. Aniang to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, Arellano's case went to the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office for inquest. The referral did not include Rep. Aniang as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the QCPO ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. On January 18, the City Prosecutor invited Rep. Aniang to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Rep. Aniangs appeared at the preliminary investigation and confirmed Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. The Quezon City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed. On April 6, 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of R.A. 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. Rep. Aniang moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court. On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied Rep. Aniang’s motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the Warrantless Search conducted by the PNP on the Car of Rep. Aniang is valid. RULING: NO, the Warrantless Search conducted by the PNP on the car of Rep. Aniang is not valid. The checkpoint was set up 20 meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as advertised to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case. Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. |
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