a collections of case digests and laws that can help aspiring law students to become a lawyer.
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De Villa v. Belmonte, GR 83988, 24 May 1990
FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people. They aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. They further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the National Capital Region District Command a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme Court's decision dated 29 September 1989, Valmonte’s and ULAP’s petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials for warrantless search and seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution. RULING: Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision of May 24, 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either military or police forces. Although no one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and economic policies or performance; one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. By the same token, a warrantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity.
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People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)
FACTS: Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup d’état in December 1989 against the Government. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR Defense Command, together with his team, conducted a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC .Such surveillance was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report that the said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as communication command post. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowds watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo when a group of five men disengaged themselves and walked towards their surveillance car. Major Soria ordered the driver to start the car and leave the area. However, as they passed the area, the five men drew their guns and fired at them, which resulted in the wounding of the driver. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated for they were afraid that civilians might be caught in the crossfire. Thereafter, the search team raided the Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6 cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and molotov. Obenia, who first entered the establishment, found De Gracia holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through the door in the office of a certain Colonel Matillano, ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. RULING: Yes, It is a valid search and seizure. The instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. Salvador vs. People, GR 146706, 15 July 2005
FACTS: Petitioner, Tomas Salvador was an aircraft mechanic employed by Philippine Airlines. One midnight, petitioner and his two other co-workers were nabbed within the airport vicinity by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), a special mission group that conducted surveillance operation to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. They were caught for possessing assorted watches and jewelries. Petitioner contended that the warrantless search and seizure was illegal and that the items seized should not have been admitted as evidence. Office of Solicitor’s General counters there was sufficient probable cause for the PAF surveillance team to stop and search petitioner and his companions. Trial court found them guilty for violating Tariff and Customs Code, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure was illegal. RULING: No. The Constitutional provisions do not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable. Bill of Rights prohibits intrusions by the law enforcers to a person’s body, personal effects or residence, unless the same are conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. Here, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on the petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law. People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1980)
FACTS: The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, they stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City. A light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Respondents told that they were bringing the boxes to the Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad "called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo. An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted is lawful. RULING: Yes. What ASAC agents did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs Code directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been possessed, issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct interest. The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search and seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to the applicability of the classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision must be upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional guarantee has not been violated and the respondent court gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as inadmissible evidence the items or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any search warrant, as well as the pictures of said items attempted to be presented as evidence against the accused. Asuncion vs. CA, GR 125959, 1 February 1999
FACTS: On 6 December 1993, in compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal Mayor to intensify campaign against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Tañong, the Chief of the Malabon Police AntiNarcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol on the area with specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. Pursuant thereto, SPO1 Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil and a police aide were dispatched at around 11:45 p.m.. The team proceeded to Barangay Tañong where they were joined by their confidential informant and the latter informed them that a gray Nissan car is always parked therein for the purpose of selling shabu. While patrolling along Leoño Street, the confidential informant pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them that the occupant thereof has shabu in his possession. The policemen immediately flagged down the said car along First Street and approached the driver, who turned out to be Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor using the screen name Vic Vargas and who is also known as Binggoy. Advincula then asked Asuncion if they can inspect the vehicle. As Asuncion acceded thereto, Advincula conducted a search on the vehicle and he found a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride beneath the driver's seat. Asuncion told the policemen that he just borrowed the said car and he is not the owner thereof. Asuncion was thereafter taken at the police headquarters for the purpose of taking his identification. However, when he was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped something protruding from his underwear, which when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride. A press conference was conducted the following day presided by Northern Police District Director Pureza during which Asuncion admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride were for his personal use in his shooting. On the other hand, Asuncion denied the charges against him. He claimed that on that day, "between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., he was abducted at gun point in front of the house where his son lives by men who turned out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen who took over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said hospital; that he was thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he is not aware of what happened at 11:45 p.m. as he was then sleeping at the said office." On 14 June 1994, a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Asuncion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 1 year 8 months and 20 days as minimum, to 3 years 6 months and 20 days, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000.00. On 29 June 1994, a Notice of Appeal was filed and the records of the case were transmitted by the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On 30 April 1996 a decision was rendered by the appellate court, modifying the penalty imposed (reducing the sentence to 6 months of arresto mayor in its maximum period as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum and deleting the fine of P3,000.00 imposed on Asuncion). On 6 August 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Asuncion. Asuncion filed a petition for review on certiorari Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the search upon Asuncion’s vehicle is valid. RULING: YES. Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the land ordains it. However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle — Asuncion's vehicle was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching Asuncion's automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and Asuncion himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
FACTS: - Martin Alagao, the petitioner herein and the head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information regarding a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. - Accordingly, he conducted surveillance at gate no. 1 of the customs zone upon orders of the petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. - The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. - However, Remedios Mago, the herein respondent, filed with the CIF petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction claiming that she was the owner of the goods seized and hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa. - Particularly, she contended that o she purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; o she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; o the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a competent court; o Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; o then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine goods because the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; o the goods, even assuming them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally. - Respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the petitioners from opening the nine bales in question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966 - However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago ISSUE: Whether or not the Customs bureau has the jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings against them RULING: Yes. The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs. It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
FACTS: Four (4) police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo due to bomb threats that had been occurring in the area for the last seven (7) days. They found two groups of Muslim-looking men standing on opposite sides of the Quezon Boulevard corner who were acting suspiciously and their eyes were moving very fast. After thirty minutes of observing the two groups, they decided to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the policemen, the groups fled in all directions. Fortunately, one of the men later identified as Malacat, was apprehended. Without a warrant, the police officer searched him and found a grenade tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was arrested and charged with illegal possession of explosives. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid. RULING: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk. The trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. Probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. Posadas vs. CA, 266 Phil 306 (1990)
FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the (INP) Integrated National Police of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunition for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunition found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were endorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense ISSUE: Whether or not the search without warrant is valid. RULING: Yes, it is valid. There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints. Thus, as between a warrant less search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the "buri" bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late. People vs. Solayao, 262 SCRA255 (1996)
FACTS: On June 09, 1992, CAFGU members, headed by SPO3 Nino, were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. In Baragay Onion, they met the 5-man group of accused Nilo Solayao, who was also wearing a camouflage uniform. His companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. SPO3 Niño told Salayao not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he asked Salayao who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. Salayao did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves, which they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. Salayao’s claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano. On 15 August 1994, the RTC of Naval Biliran (Branch 16) found Salayao guilty of illegal possession of firearm under Section 1 of PD 1866 and imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. Salayao appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE/S: Whether the search upon Solayao, yielding the firearm wrapped in coconut leaves, is valid. RULING: Nilo Solayao and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Niño's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and that upon espying the peace officers, his companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. The circumstances are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant." As with Posadas, the case herein constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as evidence. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968)
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure were validly done in accordance with the 4th amendment. RULING: Yes. The search is valid. Under the Fourth Amendment, it provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." The Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it is the duty of an officer to investigate suspicious behavior and prevent crime. The Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches were undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation. Moreover, this case does not provide blanket authority to intrude on an individual’s right to be left alone, nor does it allow such intrusion based on a police offers inarticulate hunch that a crime is about to occur or is in progress. However, it does radically expand police authority to investigate crimes where there is a reasonable basis for suspicion. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and set a precedent that allows police officers to interrogate and frisk suspicious individuals without probable cause for an arrest, providing that the officer can articulate a reasonable basis for the stop and frisk. Saluday vs. People, GR 215305, 3 April 2018
FACTS: · 2009- Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint · A member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals. · He checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He asked who is the owner of the bag and he requested such owner who was Marcelo G. Saluday to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. · SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights · The Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866. ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal. RULING: No. · Section 2, Article III of the Constitution s not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. · The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. · In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, The Court held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.” · Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition of security .measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is. diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public. · Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. People v. Suzuki, GR 120670, 23 October 2003
FACTS: Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a directive to all Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic airport terminals within their respective areas of responsibility, following reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to coordinate with local airport authorities and the PASCOM. In the morning of 12 April 1994, Hedishi Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Suzuki was bound for Manila via Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s piaya.” At the pre-departure area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian personnel of the PASCOM, Suzuki proceeded to the “walk-through metal detector,” a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or object. Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying. This prompted PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao of the Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed it through the machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered Suzuki to go to the hand-carried luggage inspection counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were present. SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. requested Suzuki to open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant and started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented, saying in faltering English, “open, open.” SPO1 Casugod opened the box and found therein 18 small packs, 17 of which were wrapped in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this, Suzuki ran outside the pre-departure area but he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM. They apprehended Suzuki near the entrance of the terminal and brought him to the PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki in drug trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived, the police apprised Suzuki of his constitutional rights. Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried the same. The total weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a “confiscation receipt” which Suzuki, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned over Suzuki to SPO1 Linda for investigation. Subsequently, Suzuki and his companions were brought to the prosecutor’s office for inquest and placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM office. The box with its contents was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted three tests on the specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana. Suzuki was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. Suzuki entered a plea of not guilty, and trial followed thereafter. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal Case 94-16100 convicted Hedishi Suzuki of illegal possession of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 8, Article II of RA 6425, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00. Hence, the automatic review. ISSUE: Whether the PASCOM has the authority to inspect luggage or hand-carried bags RULING: YES. PASCOM has authority and the warrantless search is valid. The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) 399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18 February 1978, a Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of Justice, the Director General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of Finance was signed. Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the following functions and responsibilities: (1) Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation; (2) Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations; (3) Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport security operations; (4) Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and provide other pertinent public safety services within the airports; xxx. Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages hand-carried bags. This is not the first time that the Court recognizes a search conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedure as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In People vs. Canton, and People vs. Johnson, the Court validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons. Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items to enter the pre-departure area is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the detriment of society. It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or seizure. Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM agents. People vs. Johnson, GR 138881, 18 December 2000
FACTS: Respondent is a former Filipino citizen who visited his son’s family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. At around 7:30 p.m. at that day, Olivia Ramirez, on-duty lady frisker, frisked Johnson and felt something hard on the latter’s abdomen. Upon inquiry, Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez, accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal, took Johnson to the nearest women’s room for inspection. Ramirez asked again what is the hard object that is on her stomach and Johnson answered the same reason she had given previously. Ramirez asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Johnson brought out three plastic packs which Ramirez turned over including Johnson’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle, and other personal effects to SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, Ramirez’s superior. Pictures of the seized items were also taken. ISSUE: Whether or not Johnson’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, girdle, and other personal effects are inadmissible as evidence RULING: Yes, they are inadmissible as evidence. There is no justification for the confiscation of Johnson’s passport, airline ticket, luggage, and other personal effects. The pictures taken during that time are also inadmissible, as are the girdle taken from her, and her signature thereon. Rule 126, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the search and seizure only of the following: Personal property to be seized.—A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property: (1)Subject of the offense; (2)Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (3)Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. Accordingly, the above items seized from Johnson should be returned to her. People vs. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785 (1997)
FACTS: On 30 August 1994, U Aung Win, a Passenger of TG Flight 620 of the Thai Airways which had just arrived from Bangkok, Thailand, presented his luggage, a travelling bag for examination to Customs Examiner Busran Tawano, who was assigned at the Arrival Area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City. U Aung Win also handed to Tawano his Customs Declaration 128417 stating that he had no articles to declare. When Tawano was about to inspect his luggage, U Aung Win suddenly left, proceeding towards the direction of Carousel 1, the conveyor for the pieces of luggage of the passengers of Flight 620, as if to retrieve another baggage from it. After having inspected the luggages of the other incoming passengers, Tawano became alarmed by the failure of U Aung Win to return and suspected that the bag of U Aung Win contained illegal articles. The Customs Examiner reported the matter to his superiors. Upon their instructions, the bag was turned over to the office of the Customs Police in the NAIA for x-ray examination where it was detected that it contained some powdery substance. When opened, the bag revealed two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in between its partitions. Representative samples of the substance were examined by Elizabeth Ayonon, a chemist of the Crime Laboratory Service of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at the Arrival Area of the NAIA, and by Tita Advincula, another chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, and found to be positive for heroin. The two chemists concluded that the entire substance, with a total weight of 5,579.80 grams, contained in the two packages found in the bag of U Aung Win, is heroin. A manhunt was conducted to locate U Aung Win. At about 7:45 p.m. of the same date, Rey Espinosa, an employee of the Lufthansa Airlines, notified the commander of the NAIA Customs Police District Command that a certain Burmese national by the name of U Aung Win appeared at the check-in counter of the airline as a departing passenger. Immediately, a team of law enforcers proceeded to the Departure Area and apprehended the accused after he had been identified through his signatures in his Customs Declaration and in his Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Arrival Card. Customs Examiner Tawano also positively identified U Aung Win as the person who left his bag with him at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. During the investigation of U Aung Win, the agents of the Customs Police and the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information that U Aung Win had a contact in Bangkok and that there were other drug couriers in the Philippines. Following the lead, a team of lawmen, together with U Aung Win, was dispatched to the City Garden Hotel in Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, to enable U Aung Win to communicate with his contact in Bangkok for further instructions. While the police officers were standing by, they noticed two persons, a Caucasian and an oriental, alight from a car and enter the hotel. U Aung Win whispered to Customs Police Special Agent Edgar Quiñones that he recognized the two as drug couriers whom he saw talking with his contact in Bangkok named Mau Mau. The members of the team were able to establish the identity of the two persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing, a Thailander, from the driver of the hotel service car used by the two when they arrived in the hotel. It was gathered by the law enforcers that Gatward and Zaw Win Naing were scheduled to leave for Bangkok on board a KLM flight. On 31 August 1994, operatives of the NAIA Customs Police mounted a surveillance operation at the Departure Area for Gatward and Zaw Win Naing who might be leaving the country. At about 7:45 p.m., Special Agent Gino Minguillan of the Customs Police made a verification on the passenger manifest of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Flight 806, bound for Amsterdam via Bangkok, which was scheduled to depart at about 7:55 p.m. He found the name "GATWARD/NRMR" listed therein as a passenger for Amsterdam and accordingly informed his teammates who responded immediately Customs Police Captain Juanito Algenio requested Victorio Erece, manager of the KLM airline at the NAIA, to let passenger Gatward disembark from the aircraft and to have his checked-in luggage, if any, unloaded. The manager acceded to the request to off-load Gatward but not to the unloading of his check-in bag as the plane was about to depart and to do so would unduly delay the flight. However, Erece made an assurance that the bag would be returned immediately to the Philippines on the first available flight from Bangkok. Upon his disembarkment. Gatward was invited by the police officers for investigation. At about 3:00 p.m. of 1 September 1994, Gatward's luggage, was brought back to the NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai airways, pursuant to the request of Erece. Upon its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the presence of Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery substance. Inside the bag were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each containing the powdery substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were hidden inside the bag, one at the side in between a double-wall, the other inside a partition in the middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and Advincula pursuant to the request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the powdery substance contained in the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of 5,237.70 grams, was found to be heroin. Nigel Richard Gatward was charged with violating Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (transporting); while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge when arraigned, while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon his arraignment. On 3 March 1995, the trial court found both guilty of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s suitcases may be searched without warrant. RULING: While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His culpability was not based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of the prosecution, the presentation of which was required by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this country the heroin found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was authorized by law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 320 (1975)
Facts: Respondent company filed with the CFI against petitioner for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. Respondent company prayed for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with respondent court, but said prayer was, however, denied. The CFI set aside its order and granted respondent company’s motion for reconsideration praying for preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI from herein petitioners by virtue of the above said writ. The vessel, Tony Lex VI or Srta. Winnie however, remained in the possession of respondent company. The Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. The two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels. The Fisheries Commissioner requested the Palawan Provincial Fiscal to file criminal charges against the crew members of the fishing vessels. There were filed in the court a couple of informations, one against the crew members of Tony Lex III, and another against the crew members of Tony Lex VI for illegal fishing with the use of dynamite. On the same day, the Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the vessels. Respondent company filed a complaint with application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against herein petitioners. it was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. October 18, 1965, the respondent Judge issued the challenged order granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ upon the filing by private respondent of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two vessels. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Issue: Whether the enforcement of fishing and customs law is exempted in applying for a warrant before the search and seizure. Held: Yes, Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircraft for violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (1) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (2) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or (3) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest. People v Huang Zhen Hua, GR 139301, 9 September 2004
FACTS: Police operatives received word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned that Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro, Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They were able to secure search warrants, one for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and two for violation of R.A No. 6425, as amended otherwise known as the Dangerous Drug Act. The implementation of the first Search Warrant, no persons were found in the are, however the policemen found two kilos shabu, paraphernalia for its production, and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit cards. Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be delivering shabu. The policemen rushed to the area and saw Chan and Lao on board the latter’s car. Thereafter, the shoot-out resulted to death of the two suspect during the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car. The policemen then proceeded to the area where to enforce the other search warrant. The policemen coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the building. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door.9 until Lee peeped through the window beside the front door. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The Lee then opened the door and allowed the team into the condominium unit. The policemen conducted the search in all the rooms within the unit. The team proceeded with the search and found other articles not described on the the search warrant. Huang Zhen Hua was found sleeping in one of the rooms during the search and was surprised to see police officers. Anciro, Jr. found two transparent plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and assorted paraphernalia. Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr. told Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC headquarters. Lee did as she was told and took some clothes from the cabinet in the master’s bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu. ISSUES: Whether or not the articles not specified in the search warrant, are inadmissible evidence. RULING: No, Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao which were not described in the search warrants. However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence. Such articles were in plain view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the said articles because of their close connection to the crime charged. An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character. An object that comes into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally, the ‘plain view’ doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and papers seen by the policemen have an intimate connection with the crime charged. The passport of the appellant would show when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would indicate how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or earned the same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show her relationship to Lao and Chan. The Supreme Court ruled that Huang Zhen Hua should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of Lee should be affirmed. People v. Valdez, GR 129296, 25 September 2000
FACTS: · Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. · The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. · Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued. · The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. · Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. · They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. · The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. · Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor. · The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. · He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. · Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. · When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. · Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. · At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. · Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. · The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible. (2) Whether or not the seized plants are admissible in evidence against the accused. (3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct. RULING: In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions. With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant. In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted. In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. WHEREFORE, the decision promulgate on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause. SO ORDERED. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
FACTS:
ISSUES: 1. Whether warrantless arrest against petitioner were valid. 2. Whether the warrantless search and seizure of Padilla’s firearms and ammunition were valid. RULING: 1. Yes. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner’s vehicle figured in a hit and run—an offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. Manarang heard the screeching of fires, saw the sideswiped victim, reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. Although the policemen were not at the scene of the hit and run, still, Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen in effecting petitioner’s arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. The policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. 2. Yes. (See Doctrine Part on Warrantless Search and Seizure) Authorities stumbled upon petitioner’s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of revolver and rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain view” of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner’s waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen when they saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver’s seat. In United v. Rem, it was held that “(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti.” The other items were voluntarily surrendered by petitioner which indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. People vs Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
FACTS: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence. RULING: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object. Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. People v. Estrella, GR 138539-40, 21 January 2003
FACTS: According to the accused, the policemen asked him as to where his house is located and accused told them that his house is located across the road. The police did not believe him and insisted that accused’s house (according to their asset) is that house located about 5-8 meters away from them. Accused told the policemen to inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to the accused. Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana and likewise having any firearm. ISSUE: Whether the search and seizure undertaken in the hut where the subject marijuana was seized was valid. RULING: No. With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken — during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered – it is held that the search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible. “SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: “(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; “(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and “(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. “In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 Rule 112.” People vs Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 (2000)
FACTS: Mabel Cheung Mei Po, a suspected drug courier, was apprehended by the Special Operation Unit, Narcotics Command, after she delivered a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance to an informant, in full view of NARCOM agents. When questioned, about the source, she pinpointed Che Chun Ting as the source of the drugs. Thus the NARCOM deployed a team of agents for the entrapment and arrest of Che Chun Ting. The team was composed of Major Marcelo Garbo, a certain Captain Campos, 5 P/Insp. Raymond Santiago, SPO3 Renato Campanilla, and a civilian interpreter. At around 7 o'clock in the morning they proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden in Pasay City where Che Chun Ting was and had the place under surveillance. Mabel then called Che Chun Ting through her cellular phone and spoke to him in Chinese. According to the interpreter, who translated to the NARCOM agents the conversation between Mabel and Che Chun Ting, Mabel ordered 1kg of shabu. At around 10:30 AM, Mabel received a call from the Che Chun Ting that he was ready to deliver the stuff. She immediately relayed the message to the NARCOM agents. After receiving the go-signal from Major Garbo, P/Insp. Santiago, SPO3 Campanilla and Mabel proceeded to the Roxas Seafront Garden Upon arriving at the Roxas Seafront Garden, Mabel went to Unit 122. While 2 NARCOM agents were waiting, Che Chun Ting opened the door to his unit and handed to Mabel a transparent plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. The NARCOM agents immediately arrested Che Chun Ting, thereafter they radioed their superiors and coordinated with the security guard on duty to make a search of Unit 122. During the search SPO3 Campanilla seized a black bag with several plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance in an open cabinet at the second floor. The bag was examined in the presence of Major Garbo, the accused himself, and his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz. The accused together with the evidence was then brought to Camp Crame where Forensic Chemist P/Sr. Inspector Julita T. de Villa after conducting laboratory tests found the white crystalline substance to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The defense rebuffed all allegations presented by the Prosecution. Nimfa Ortiz narrated that she sent her brother Noli Ortiz to meet Mabel Cheung Mei Po to help the latter find a lawyer and at the same time get the laser disc she lent to Mabel. Noli testified that when he go inside the car of Mabel a policeman sitting at the back of the car suddenly hit him on the head. Noli Ortiz, Major Garbo, Captain Lukban and Palma went to the Roxas Seafront Garden, thereafter he rang the doorbell of the unit. When Nimfa opened the door, two (2) NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way inside and searched the premises. Noli denied having seen any black bag seized by SPO3 Campanilla; instead, what he saw was his sister's video camera being carted away by the NARCOM agents. He further testified that when his sister was made to sign a certification on the conduct of the search on Unit 122 she was frightened and crying. He claimed that accused Che Chun Ting was then asleep at the second floor of the unit. The Pasay City RTC promulgated a decision on August 22, 1997 which found Che Chun Ting guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of delivering, distributing and dispatching in transit 999.43 grams of shabu; and, having in his custody, possession and control 5,578.68 grams of the same regulated drug. The court sentenced him to suffer the death penalty, one for violation of Sec. 15 and the other for violation of Sec. 16, both of Art. III, of RA 6425. He was likewise ordered to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00 in the first case, and P12,000,000.00 in the second. ISSUE: Whether or Not the Warrantless Search conducted in Unit 122 is valid. RULING: NO, the Warrantless Search conducted in Unit 122 is INVALID. The right is not absolute and admits of certain well-recognized exceptions. For instance, a person lawfully arrested searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense, without a search warrant. The search may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the permissible area or surroundings within his immediate control. The accused was admittedly outside unit 22 and in the act of delivering to Mabel Cheung Mei Po a bag of shabu when he was arrested by the NARCOM operatives. Moreover, it is borne by the records that Unit 122 was not even his residence but that of his girlfriend Nimfa Ortiz, and that he was merely a sojourner therein. Hence, it can hardly be said that the inner portion of the house constituted a permissible area within his reach or immediate control to justify a warrantless search therein. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same must be limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or ''anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. It must be stressed that the purposes of the exception are only to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and also to prevent the person arrested from destroying the evidence within his reach. The search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal; Consequently the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.—We therefore hold that the search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of some 5,578.68 grams of shabu do not fall within the exception, hence, were illegal for being violative of one’s basic constitutional right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the “fruit of a poisonous tree.” However, objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law. People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990)
FACTS: In the late evening of 2 March 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga. The surveillance mission was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. Around 9:30 p.m., said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him. The person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag where marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less. The person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves. The accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, found Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs. Tangliben appealed. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search incident led to a lawful arrest, even in light of the Court’s ruling in People vs. Aminnudin. RULING: One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin herein. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated. Espano v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
FACTS: The accused was caught in flagrante by herein police officers selling Marijuana near Zamora and Pandacan Streets, where they are conducting an investigation in the area reported being rampant of drug pushing. The agents frisked the accused after he completed his transaction to a buyer and there found with him 2 tea bags of Marijuana. Accused was asked by the police officers whether he has some more of the marijuana and told them he got more at his house. They went to the accused house and found 10 more teabags of Marijuana. During the trial, accused denied all the allegations against him and made an alibi that he was in his house sleeping when the police officer went to his house looking for his brother in law and instead handcuffed him to take his part for allegedly having in his possession 10 teabags of Marijuana. Rhe trial court did not believe his alibi and found him guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Accused appealed and said that the arrest was illegally done and the search of his house is deemed a violation of his constitutional right. ISSUE: Whether or notthe warrantless arrest is valid. RULING: Yes. Petitioner’s arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule (Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court ). He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two pieces of cellophane of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioners residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioners house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. Petition denied with a modification that the 10 bags of marijuana seized from his house is inadmissible in evidence since no search warrant was served to him. FACTS: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the 3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days. On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist. Suspecting the bulge on Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for Malmstedt's passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling bags from the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also bulges inside the teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing. Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established the objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt entered a plea of "not guilty." After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt sought reversal of the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without an issued warrant. RULING: Yes. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Section 5 provides that “a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when he was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645 (1991)
FACTS: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in Dumaguete City, by Narcotics Command (NARCOM) elements. His arrest was the result of a "buybust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo acted as the buyer while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal. Quindo approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked P5.00 bill. Quindo then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later in a jeep, where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of marijuana were marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results. Kalubiran contended however that one Quindo approached and frisk him on the same night, and found nothing on him. However, he was called back by one Villamor, who told him at gun point to board the jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was released the following day with the help of a lawyer. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City found Kalubiran guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed. ISSUE: Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana found in his possession during his arrest. RULING: No. Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless searches and seizures under the conditions established in the case. However, Kalubiran was accused only of selling the two sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also have been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. It is unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the second offense because he has not been impleaded in a separate information for violation of Section 8 of the said law. |
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