a collections of case digests and laws that can help aspiring law students to become a lawyer.
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BANGAYAN, JR. VS. BANGAYAN
Facts: Sally Go-Bangayan filed a complaint for bigamy against Benjamin Bangayan and Resally Delfin. Later, Sally learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married under the false name, “Benjamin Z. Sojayco.” Furthermore, Sally discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. After pleading not guilty, Benjamin and Resally both filed their motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt. His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show that he and the “Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.,” who married Resally, were one and the same person. RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship. CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge. Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed the RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them. Held: Yes, Double Jeopardy had already set-in. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy had already set in. A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy. The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. Valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy. An acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.
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Macapagal vs. People
Facts: On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00 for unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time. Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the Supreme Court in this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the RTC of Manila gravely erred in denying their notice of appeal, in convicting petitioner for estafa and in denying their motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. Issue: Whether or not the regional trial court of manila, branch 9, gravely erred in denying the notice of appeal filed by the herein petitioner-appellant. Held: No. The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities. First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit: SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows: (b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x. Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal. Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons which are not present in this case. Third, the petitioner failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration which she also assails in addition to the denial of her notice of appeal. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Payumo v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident that occurred on February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing one and wounding several others. The accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan. After four years of trial, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision dated October 5, 1984, convicting the accused as co-principals in the crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On January 11, 1985, the accused filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied. The accused elevated the case to the Supreme Court, which set aside the October 5, 1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding the case for a new trial. Thus, Criminal Case No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First Division. Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the evidence of the parties, both testimonial and documentary. Later, with the creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions, Criminal Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth Division. On February 23, 1999, the Fifth Division promulgated judgment, convicting the accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth Division could not reach unanimity in resolving the aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. On September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2, issued the subject Resolution promulgated on October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27, 1998 Decision and granting a second new trial of the case. The Special Fifth Division pronounced among others that a second new trial would enable it to allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence including the records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), Armed Forces of the Philippines, to shed light on the "serious allegations" Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial of Criminal Case Held: Yes. The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction. The Court finds the issue to be devoid of any legal and factual basis. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial. The records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that prevented the accused from using these records during the trial to substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a military operation. Accordingly, the assailed Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside. Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information. Issue: Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would warrant an new preliminary investigation. Held: No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. That accused may be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary. . Briones vs. People Facts: An Information was filed against Briones for the crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached group where the former is involve in a mauling. S/G Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty of the crime of simple theft after giving weight to prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi. On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293 in relation to par. of Article 294 of RPC and not of theft. Issue: Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Held: No. For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial. Under the circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent to the place of the incident. Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the location of the subject firearm, but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below. In petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding where a certain evidence was not presented, the defendant, in order to secure a new trial, must satisfy the court that he has a good defense, and that the acquittal would in all probability follow the introduction of the omitted evidence. The Court find that Briones’ change of defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or in defense of a relative will not change the outcome for Briones considering that he failed to show unlawful aggression on the part of S/G Molina and/or S/G Gual – the essential element of these justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Code. The records show that prior to the taking of the firearm, S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached Briones and his companions to stop the fight between Briones’ group and another person. To be sure, there was nothing unlawful in preventing a fight from further escalating and in using reasonable and necessary means to stop it. This conclusion is strengthened by evidence showing that at the time of the incident, Briones was drunk and was with three companions; they all participated in the mauling. For these reasons, the Court find that the CA did not commit any reversible error when it denied Briones' motion for new trial. Likewise, we find no error in the RTC and CA conclusion that he is criminally liable under the criminal information. Estino v. People
Facts: For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera. In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their conviction of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of malversation of public funds under Article 217 Of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30. In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal. Issue: Whether a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-payment of RATA in violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019. Held: Yes. Petitioner’s defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not sufficiently prove that they did not pay the RATA because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. Morillo vs. People
Facts: In July, 2003, Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil, representing themselves as contractors with business in Pamanga, bought contraction materials from Armilyn, worth P500,054.00. Per their agreement, 20% of the amount should be paid within seven days, while the remaining 80% shall be paid within 35 days, with post-dated checks. After the last delivery, Richard paid P20,000.00 and issued two post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch. Upon maturity, Armilyn deposited the checks in her account with Equitable PCIBank; they were however dishonoured. When Armilyn communicated the fact of dishonour to Richard, the latter replaced the checks with two post-dated Metrobank checks, which again were dishonored. Despite demand, Richard and his partners failed to make good on the checks, hence Armilyn filed a case for BP 22 against Richard and Milo Malong before the MeTC of Makati City. After trial, the MeTC Makati City convicted Richard as charged, hence he appealed to the RTC, arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City. He also assailed the absence of the public prosecutor, as the latter delegated the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. The RTC affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower courts. It ruled that MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, as all the elements of the crime of BP 22 happened in Pampanga. Since all the elements of the crime happened in Pampanga the case should have been filed in Pampanga, not where Armilyn deposited the checks, in Makati City. Armilyn appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the court of the place where the checks were deposited, had jurisdiction to try a case for BP 22. Held: It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Basilonia vs. Villaruz
Facts: On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated against the petitioners, wherein the court finds the GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of murder of Attorney Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines with no aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The petitioners appealed but was denied by the CA. After two decades from the entry of judgement Dixon Roblete the son of the deceased Atty. Roblete filed a motion for execution on May 11, 2009, alleging, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon is request. Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. That the petitioners would like to avail bail however they did not appear before the court which forfeited their manifestation for bail and that the court issued a writ of execution. Issue: Whether or not a trial court has jurisdiction to grant writ of execution which was filed 20 years ago Held: Yes because the prescription of penalty will only commence when they were put in custody or in prison which does not happened in this case for the longest time, despite that they were sentenced by final judgment, thus the prescription will not run in their favor. Therefore the court did not commit any wrong to grant the execution. Moreover, thus every criminally liable is also civilly liable therefore the writ of execution of final judgement does not expired and the court has jurisdiction to issue and take eefect the writ of execution. People vs. Asis, 629 SCRA 250 Facts: On or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Asis and Formento, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one Roy Ching with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body and thereafter robbed the victim against his will. As a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. When arraigned on July 9, 1998, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. After due trial, appellants were found guilty and sentenced to death. On appeal, two things stand out: first, there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery or to the homicide; and second, none of the items allegedly stolen were recovered or presented in evidence. Appellants argued that the pieces of circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution are insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution counters that these pieces of evidence, taken together, necessarily lead to their conviction. Issue: Whether or not the evidences of the Prosecution is sufficient to warrant conviction. Held: The appeal is meritorious. The prosecutions evidence does not prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt; hence, their constitutional right to be presumed innocent remains and must be upheld. Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal. VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (all neophytes) of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. During the 2nd day of initiation, non-resident or alumni fraternity members Villareal, subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain which cause the death of Leonardo Villa. Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. Four of the accused (Tecson, et. al.) were found to be guilty of homicide by the trial court but was reduced to crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor by the Court of Appeals. However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Supreme Court ruled that they should be liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead. In Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, Tecson et. al. clarified the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court to their criminal liability. According to Tecson et. al., they immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Hence, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated by virtue of their granted Applications for Probation for which the terms therein are already been complied with. ISSUE: Whether or not, Tecson can be covered or eligible by the Probation Law despite their appeal of conviction. HELD: Yes. Tecson are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines, without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any. First, the Court in resolving this issue ruled that the RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of Tecson et. al. for the law requires that an application for probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin (Branch 121). Hence, its grant of probation with Tecson et. al. is void. However, the Court abandoning its previous stance on ineligibility of those who have appealed their conviction to probation, citing the then recent case of Colinares vs. People that the Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. Had the RTC done what was right and imposed the correct penalty, he would have had the right to apply for probation. Moreover, the Court was quick to clarify that it remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege. COLINARES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: The accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur. On June 25, 2000, Rufino on their way to the store together with his wife, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone and suffered two lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment. The RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether or not, Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty and may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court. HELD: Yes, the Supreme Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide.With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege. Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation. In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation. TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS 586 SCRA 118
FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by respondent Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other hand, petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasay City for poking a gun and utterring a threatening words. However, the MeTC dismissed both charges for Slight Physical Injuries and the counter-charge of Grave Threats for insufficiency of evidence. Tiu, through his counsel, filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Pasay City and rendered a Decision declaring void the judgment of the MeTC. Postanes moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC, he then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari challenging the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC Decision and affirming the dismissal of Grave Threats. The Court of Appeals held that the RTC "has granted upon the State, through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the right to appeal the decision of acquittal which right the government does not have." The prosecution had not been denied by the MeTC of its right to due process. Hence, it was wrong for the RTC to declare the findings of the MeTC as having been arrived at with grave abuse of discretion, thereby denying Postanes of his Constitutional right against double jeopardy. ISSUE: Whether or not, there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC. HELD: Yes, at the outset, the Supreme Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu,, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Tiu is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition must fail. Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the Constitutional proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." Further, as found by the Court of Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC, which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case. PEOPLE vs. TARUC 579 SCRA 118
FACTS: In November 1998 accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged before the RTC of Bataan with the crime of murder in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog. RTC found Taruc guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of MURDER and with the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The case was brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC. However, the PAO lawyer concerned informed the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant escaped from prison on 23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer claimed that he had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the accusedappellant. Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga, Bataan, to file a certification as to the accused-appellant’s escape. The Court of Appeals granted PAO’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Flores, making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming with modification of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant appealed on questions of law and fact. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not, the accused-appellant has right to appeal his conviction even when he escaped from jail and eluded arrest. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that by escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the RTC, as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would succeed. GUASCH vs. DELA CRUZ 589 SCRA 297
FACTS: In November 2000, respondent Arnaldo dela Cruz filed a Complaint-Affidavit against petitioner Mercedita T. Guasch with the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent alleged that petitioner was his neighbor and kumadre. On several occasions, petitioner transacted business with him by exchanging cash for checks of small amount without interest. In July 1999, petitioner went to his residence requesting him to exchange her check with cash of P3,300,000.00. On the date of maturity and upon presentment, however, the check was dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was already closed. In 2002, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against petitioner. The trial court issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case. The trial court found that respondent's assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check will be fully funded on the maturity date was not supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, her guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted. In the Manifestation, respondent's counsel justified his failure to file the motion within the reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and ruled that the trial court did not anchor the acquittal of petitioner on evidence other than that presented by the prosecution as contended by petitioner and was tainted with grave abuse of discretion on denial of respondent's Motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent's Motion to Amend. HELD: As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. As we ruled in Gayos v. Gayos, "it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation." Given the circumstances in this case, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondent's Motion to Amend PEOPLE vs. OLIVO 594 SCRA 77
FACTS: In November 2000, in Quezon City, the accused Charmen Olivo, Nelson Danda and Joey Zafra where charged and convicted both by Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals for the crime of robbery with homicide. Based from the Information, the three accused conspired to engaged in robbery done in a hardware store. They were able to take P35,000.00, but on the process, they assaulted and killed the store owner. But when the case was appealed before the Supreme Court, it was found out that the accused-appellants was arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation for selling illegal drugs and not for robbery with homicide. Further, during the investigation at Camp Karingal, the accused was made to stand in a police line- up and identified by the eyewitness who failed to identify them three times. On appeal, two accused Charmen Olivo and Nelson Danda only appealed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not, the favorable appeal of Charmen Olivo and Nelson will extend to co-accused Joey Zafra who did not appeal. HELD: Yes, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed. After review, the Supreme Court find that the accused-appellants should be acquitted. They were arrested without a warrant during a buy-bust operation on November 24, 2000, transferred to Camp Karingal under dubious circumstances, and made to stand in a police line-up and identified by an eyewitness who failed to identify them three times. These circumstances were ignored by the trial court who gave too much credence on the positive identification of the accusedappellants by the same eyewitness during direct examination. Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial. We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence
BALABA vs. PEOPLE 593 SCRA 210 FACTS: In October 1993, State Auditors of the Provincial Auditor's Office of Bohol conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Municipality of Guindulman. The State Auditors discovered a cash shortage, unaccounted cash tickets and an unrecorded check payable to Balaba. Three demand letters were sent to Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balaba's explanation, Graft Investigation Officer recommended that an information for Malversation of Public Funds be filed against Balaba with the Sandiganbayan. During his arraignment, Balaba entered a plea of not guilty. Trial soon followed. The trial court found Balaba guilty. Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals, the latter dismissed Balaba's appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court. HELD: No, upon Balaba's conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Under Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of RA 8249, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, which reads: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba's appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal. "An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright." In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba's appeal because of lack of jurisdiction. QUIDET vs. PEOPLE 618 SCRA 1
FACTS: In 1992, petitioner Quidet among others (Taban and Tubo) were charged with homicide before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. On October 19, 1991, petitioner together with coaccused conspiring, confederating, and [sic] helping one another, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, in order to facilitate the commission of the offense with the use of sharp pointed instruments, stab one Jimmy Tagarda thus the victim sustained several wounds in different parts of his body and as a consequence of which the victim died immediately thereafter. The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. The RTC convicted all of them for the said offense. Of the three accused, only Quidet appealed. The CA confirmed the decision of RTC but with modification. The CA convicted them for attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide. ISSUE: Whether or not, the favorable appeal of Quidet will extend to the other two accused who did not appeal. HELD: Yes, Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of the appellate court's judgment is favorable to them. The Supreme Court held that the CA correctly modified the decision. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-threatening. Thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. PEOPLE vs. MORALES 616 SCRA 223
FACTS: On or about January 2, 2003 in Quezon City Appellant Morales, not being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, the latter was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003. The trial court found that from the evidence presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following: (1) the fact of the buy-bust operation conducted at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa which led to the arrest of the appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of the two sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be methylamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"), found in the possession of and sold by the appellant. The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was no instigation that took place. Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by the police officers to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. The appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. ISSUE: Whether or not, the CA erred when it affirmed the trial court’s findings of fact to established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu against the accused. HELD: Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The person whom the police officers gave the drugs for delivery of seized items was not present in court nor did they testify that they properly marked the drugs and failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant. Moreover, they did not also take photographs and had no representative from the media and Department of Justice or public official to sign an inventory of the seized items. In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, the accused must be acquitted. People vs Punzalan 774 SCRA 653
Facts: Accused-appellants Punzalan seek the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals convicting them of violation of Section 11, Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165). That on or about the 3rd day of November 2009, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, the above-named accused, without authority of law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 40.78 grams of shabu a dangerous drug. The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the morning, Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan and her team implemented a search warrant issued on October 28, 2009 by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch of the compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant. Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. All three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that the PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the requirements for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of the PDEA Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court which issued the search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority to issue the search warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be conducted is outside its territorial jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the SEARCH WARRANT was illegally procured and unlawfully implemented. Held: No. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties" provides: SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. - The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress. The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the requirements for the issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court. Esquillo vs People 629 SCRA 370
Facts: Police officer was assigned in Malibay , Pasay to conduct surveillance on a notorious snatcher named Ryan. It was during that time the police officer noticed the petitioner. The police officer saw the petitioner standing three (3) meters away from them. They saw the latter place inside a yellow cigarette case a plastic sachet containing a white substance. They approached the petitioner and introduced themselves as a police officer. Subsequently, they inquired regarding the sachet the petitioner placed inside the case. The petitioner acted suspiciously and even tried to flee. The police officer prevented her from doing so. They apprised the petitioner of her constitutional rights and then confiscated the sachet. They marked the sachet with the initials “SRE” and took the petitioner to the police station. The petitioner contends against the police officer’s statement. The petitioner said that she was resting at home when policeman barged inside and asked her whether or not she knew a certain “Ryan”. She replied in the negative. Afterwards, she was forcibly taken to the police station and was detained there. During her detention, the police officers were claiming that that there was shabu inside the wallet they seized from her. Petitioner was claiming that the evidence was planted. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted by the police against petitioner was valid. Held: Yes. The circumstances before the eventual arrest gave the police officer a reasonable belief that a search on her was warranted. The police officer saw in plain view that the petitioner was placing a plastic sachet containing a white substance inside her cigarette case. Give the training of police officer, they would likely be drawn to curiosity and approach her to inquire regarding such matter. The petitioner reaction of attempting to flee after the police officer introduced his self gave more reason for the officer to check the petitioner. There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are: 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. People vs Tuan 628 SCRA 226
Facts: Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her guilty of illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their lack of... credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy and the manner by which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened. Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants, and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly witnessed the implementation of the Search Warrant, during the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 17619-R and 17620-R before the RTC. Accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. Accused-appellant... specifically pointed out the following defects which made said Search Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search Warrant filed with the MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the informants'... admission that they themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is valid Ruling: Yes. Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and... consciously possesses the said drug. The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-appellant's house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-appellant's possession... thereof could not have been authorized by law in any way. Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even offering the same for sale. The bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellant's residence over which she had complete control. In fact, some of the marijuana were found in accused-appellant's own room. Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant's residence after said judge's personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants. Equally without merit is accused-appellant's assertion that the Search Warrant did not describe with particularity the place to be searched. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place... to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant's residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant's house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accused-appellant. PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS
Facts: Respondent was found guilty of violation of the dangerous drugs act. She was arrested after she was carrying a bag alleged to have prohibited drugs inside. The bag, before it came to her possession was found inside a passenger jeepney with no owner so the policeman looked inside it only to find packs of marijuana. The policeman was acting on a report made about the bag by an agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search conducted was valid. Held: Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time. Thirdly, the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use because the motor vehicle had already left the locality. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. MICLAT vs PEOPLE
FACTS: Police Operatives received an INFOREP memo from Camp Crame regarding the drug trading activities being undertaken in Brgy. Palmera Spring II. Arriving at Palmera Spring II, the officers were led to the house of petitioner Abe Miclat. PO3 Antonio positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing Shabu. PO3 Antonio gained entrance and told to Miclat that he was a police officer, and Miclat voluntarily handed the 4 sachets to PO3 Antonio. PO3 Antonio then made the arrest Petitioner claims that he was watching television with his father and sister when they heard a noise downstairs and saw men in civilian clothes, who introduced themselves as police and arrested him, and the shabu was later planted while travelling in the police station. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating RA 9165. CA affirmed in toto ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was valid HELD: YES. At the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. He actively participated before the trial court. He is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest At any rate, an arrest without warrant is lawful when (1) the person arrested execute an overt act that indicates he has just committed, actually committing, or is attempting a crime; (2) the overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto, and the shabu found falls within the “plain view doctrine” where: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure |
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