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Drugstore Association of the Phils., VS. National Counicl on Disability Affairs
FACTS: A Petition for Review on Certiorari with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution dated November 19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903. The CA dismissed petitioners' Petition for Prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory twenty percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine by persons with disability (PWD). On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, entitled "An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their Integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," was passed into law. The law defines "disabled persons", "impairment" and "disability" On April 23, 2008, the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA) issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2008, prescribing guidelines which should serve as a mechanism for the issuance of a PWD Identification Card (IDC) which shall be the basis for providing privileges and discounts to bona fide PWDs in accordance with R.A. 9442. On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-001118 specifically stating that the grant of 20% discount shall be provided in the purchase of branded medicines and unbranded generic medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs. It also detailed the guidelines for the provision of medical and related discounts and special privileges to PWDs pursuant to R.A. 9442. On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of Appeals to annul and enjoin the implementation of the following laws 1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442; 2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9442; 3) NCDA A.O. No. 1; 4) DOF Revenue Regulation No. 1-2009; 5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011. On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as amended, as well as the assailed administrative issuances. However, the CA suspended the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof of respondent NCDA's compliance with filing of said administrative order with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) and its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The dispositive portion of the Decision states WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The effectivity of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 is hereby SUSPENDED pending Respondent's compliance with the proof of filing of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 with the Office of the National Administrative Register and its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Respondent NCDA filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA to lift the suspension of the implementation of NCDA A.O. No. 1 attaching thereto proof of its publication in the Philippine Star and Daily Tribune on August 12, 2010, as well as a certification from the ONAR showing that the same was filed with the said office on October 22, 2009.22 Likewise, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision. In a Resolution dated November 19, 2010, the CA dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration and lifted the suspension of the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 considering the filing of the same with ONAR and its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. ISSUE/S: I. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED DRUGSTORES; II. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT SECTION 32 OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND THE OTHER IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE; III. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES UNDER SECTION 4(A), SECTION 4(B) AND SECTION 4(C) OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442, RULE 1 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS23 OF RA 7277, SECTION 5.1 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND DOH AO 2009-11 ARE NOT VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL; IV. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. RULING: The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of Carlos Superdrug Corporation et al. v. DSWD, et al wherein We pronouced that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9257 which grants 20% discount on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens is a legitimate exercise of police power Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7227, as amended by R.A. No. 9442, violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it fairly singles out drugstores to bear the burden of the discount, and that it can hardly be said to "rationally" meet a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law. The law allegedly targets only retailers such as petitioners, and that the other enterprises in the drug industry are not imposed with similar burden. This same argument had been raised in the case of Carlos Superdrug Corp., et al. v. DSWD, et al and We reaffirm and apply the ruling therein in the case at bar. Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or things differently situated should be treated differently. In the case of ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. v. Hon. Purisima, et al. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution dated November 19, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903 are AFFIRMED.
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Carlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development
FACTS: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Public respondents, on the other hand, include the (DOH), (DOF), the (DOJ), and the (DILG) which have been specifically tasked to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore establishments. DoH issued Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003, providing “[t]he grant of twenty percent (20%) discount shall be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.” Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act because it infringes Art. III, Sec. 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount. · ISSUE/S: Whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program? RULING: Yes The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nation building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. Thus, the Act provides: (f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.” As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare; Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of property owners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, a questioned provision is invalidated. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act. 31 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza
FACTS: Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack. The ordinance ordered the cease and desist from operation of several businesses 6 months from its effectivity, among which were the so-called Pandacan Terminals of oil companies. However, 6 months later, City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) allowing the oil companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. Petitioner filed this original action for mandamus praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. They averred that Atienza has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. · ISSUE/S: Whether or not Mayor Atienza has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan terminals. RULING: Yes. Mayor Atienza has no other choice but to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan terminals. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, he has the duty top put into effect Ordinance no. 8027 as long as it had not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila and no reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed. Hence, Mayor Atienza was directed by the Court to enforce Ordinance 8027 : Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. DSWD
FACTS: Petitioner Southern Luzon Drug Corporation filed a petition for prohibition against the DSWD, NCWDP (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), DOF and the BIR, which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the “Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,” particularly the granting of a 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction. RA 9257 amended some provisions of RA 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines but removed the annual income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the “Magna Carta for Disabled Persons” was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens and PWDs is a valid exercise of police power RULING: Yes. It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442. In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State." Even then, the State's claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health and safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the point of interfering with personal liberties or property rights in order to advance common good. To warrant such interference, two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the: attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. Moreover, the 20% Discount does not violate equal protection. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. White Light v. City of Manila, 576 SCRA 416 (2009)
FACTS:
Whether or not the assailed Ordinance of the City of Manila is a valid exercise of police power . RULING: No, the Supreme Court reversed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and reinstated the Decision of RTC Manila, Branch 9 upholding that the Ordinance is unconstitutional. Under the Constitution, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Liberty, as guaranteed by the Constitution, was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude”. To consider the exercise of police power as valid, it must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. In this case, although the objective of the Ordinance is to minimize, if not eliminate, the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and other similar activities, which certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State, other legitimate activities would also be impaired. Similarly, the behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could be diminished by simply applying existing laws. Hence, the exercise of police power through the assailed Ordinance is considered an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and is deemed unconstitutional and invalid. MMDA v. Viron Transportation, GR 170656 (2007)
FACTS: On February 10, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 179 "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System". The EO tasked the MMDA to undertake measures to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila. Thereupon, the MMDA recommended a plan to eliminate the bus terminals along major thoroughfares through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate existing transport varied modes. The Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy - making body of the MMDA, issued a Resolution expressing support to the Project citing the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares in Metro Manila. On February 24, 2003 the Viron Transport Co. Inc. filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila., asking the Court to construe the scope, extent, and limitation of the power of MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924 (An Act Creating the MMDA). Viron also asked for a Ruling on whether the planned closure of terminals contravenes the Public Service Act and related Laws. Mencorp Transporttion System Inc. filed a similar petition, asking the Court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal over possessory rights with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain closure proposal. Mencorp petition was incorporated with the Viron and raffled to RTC Manila of June 19, 2003. The prayer for TRO and or Preliminary Injunction was denied. On January 24, 2005 the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the EO pursuant to RA 7924, ruling that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the state as it satisfied the Two Tests of Public Welfare and Lawful Means. On September 8, 2005 the trial court reversed its decision ruling that (1) the EO was an unreasonable exercise of police power, 2. that the authority of the MMDA under section (5) (e) of RA 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of existing bus terminals, and (3) that the E.O is inconsistent with the provisions of Public Service Act. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by a Resolution dated November 23, 2005. Hence the Petition which faults the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 179 was unconstitutional as it constitutes unreasonable exercise of police power by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. RULING: Yes. The designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. Under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC as the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. The validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No. 7924. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services," including transport and traffic management. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to ‘enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare’ of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority.’ It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself. Assuming that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.44 Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. In Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner Inc. two Ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena declaring that no other terminal shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the City of Lucena and declared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein. The Ordinances were challenged for being unconstitutional on the ground that the measures constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. In De la Cruz v. Paras, and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the assailed Ordinances were characterized by over breadth as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the City while they make compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal for fees, rentals, and charges thus unduly oppressive. The EO for the closure of respondents' terminal is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. Paragraph (a) Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now LTFRB) with the jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment, and other properties. The PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act. Ermita- Malate Hotel vs. City of Manila
FACTS: · The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clause. . It was alleged that Sec. 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violate of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels, that Sec. 2, prohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours runs counter to due process guarantee for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character ISSUE/S: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause? RULING: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs. Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute. OKABE v. GUTIERREZ 426 SCRA 685
Facts: In December 1999, Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint of estafa against Teresita Tanghal Okabe. Maruyama alleged, that she entrusted P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines and failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. After preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause for estafa against petitioner and information was filed in the RTC of Pasay City. However, she left the Philippines for Japan without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the Philippines. Thereafter, trial court issued an order granting the motion for the issuance of a hold departure order and ordering the Immigration to hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines. On appeal, the CA rendered a Decision partially granting motion to lift/recall the hold departure order. However, by posting bail, petitioner waived her right to assail the finding of the existence of probable cause. Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect. Issue: Whether or not, Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure shall apply. Held: Yes, Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure applies, in People v. Red, the new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the CA rendered its decision, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. Moreover, petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her. There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, her act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the petitioner. When the petitioner learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty. The bail bond was approved and issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. OLALIA (521 SCRA)
Facts: Juan Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of “accepting an advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the Common Law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ forwarded the request to the NBI, then it was filed with the RTC of Manila where it issued an order of arrest. That same day the NBI agent arrested and detained him. On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and a writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the order of the arrest. The Court of Appeals declared the order of arrest void. Then the DOJ filed with this court petition for review on certiorari praying that the decision of the CA be reversed. The Court granted the petition of the DOJ and sustained the validity of arrest. The decision then became final and executory. Meanwhile, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for extradition of private respondent and petition for bail which was opposed by the petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo issued an order denying the petition for bail holding that there is no Philippine law, granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high “flight risk.” Judge Bernardo inhibited from further hearing and the case was then raffled to Branch 5. Juan Antonio Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration to said order and was granted by Hon. Olalia, thus allowing him to post bail. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the said order but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to post bail. Held: The court dismissed the petition. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil case. In his separate opinion in Purganan, Chief Justice Renato proposed that a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. The potential extradite must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and process of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that he presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence”. PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN (529 SCRA 685) Facts: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. One of the informations was for the crime of plunder and among the respondents was Jose Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy and his co-accused were arrested and placed in the custody of law. He then filed a “Very Urgent Omnibus Motion” alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, alleging that that he was only involved in illegal gambling and not plunder; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. He filed a motion to resolve to fix bail on the ground that the facts charged in the information does not make out a non-bailable offense. The Sandiganbayan set his alternative prayer to post bail for hearing after arraignment of all the accused. Jinggoy moved for reconsideration of the resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceed to arraign him. From the denial of action of the Sandiganbayan, Jinggoy interposed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not fixing bail for him. Pending the resolution of this petition, Jinggoy filed with the Sandiganbayan an “Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons.” Jinggoy prayed for early resolution on his petition for bail on medical considerations. The respondent court denied the motion for bail for lack of factual basis. According to the court, Jinggoy failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that medical condition for the accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose be allowed to post bail. On April 2002, Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan filed before the Sandiganbayn an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the prosecution filed its opposition. Bail hearings were conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda. The resolution of the Sandiganbayan granted the omnibus application for bail. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied hence this present petition. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayn acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting Jinggoy Estrada’s motion for bail. Held: No. The imputation of grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent is untenable. To begin with, Section 13 of Article III of the Constitution mandates: Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by the Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. The likelihood pf escape on the part of the individual is now almost nil, given his election as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice. It must be categorically stated herein that in making resolution to grant bail, the Sandiganbayan is not making any judgment as to the final outcome of plunder case. This Court (Sandiganbayan) is simply called to determine whether, at this stage, the evidence of movant’s guilt is strong to warrant temporary release on bail. Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to pre-empting the Sandiganbayan ongoing determination of facts and merits of the main case. With the view we take on this case, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed resolutions, because the grant of bail therein is predicated only on it preliminary appreciation of the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine whether or not deprivation of the right to bail is warranted. FLORESTA V. UBADIAS (429 SCRA 270)
Facts: The then provincial prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta (complainant) administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC) with “gross ignorance of law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Among other grounds, complainant faults respondent for granting, “without giving notice to the prosecution,” the petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (“Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act”). Respondent avers that in Crim. Case No. 271-99, upon motion filed close to noon time of January 3, 2000, the prosecutor was furnished a copy of the petition for bail by Mangohig, who was then under preliminary investigation. During the hearing set on the following day, or on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m, there was no appearance from the Prosecutor’s Office. Since the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense, respondent granted him bail. Issue: WON the is Judge correct in granting the petition for bail even without the participation of the Prosecution during the bail hearing? Held: No. Whether or not bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca instructs: Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. While in Section 18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a “reasonable notice” of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on shorter notice. Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the prosecution. In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610 which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by relationship which is punishable by death. Under the circumstances, by respondent’s assailed grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. PEOPLE V. VAZQUEZ (714 SCRA)
Facts: The case at bar is an appeal from the Decision dated May 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification the Joint Decision dated August 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. With the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu for ₱250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindy’s Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m. In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindy’s Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She brought five genuine ₱500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play money to make it appear that she had ₱250,000.00 with her. After she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Don’s apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene. When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the genuine ₱500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects’ rights were read to them and they were subsequently booked. On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers. The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court. Issue: Whether or not the appellant may assail the validity of the arrest Held: No. At the outset, the Court ruled that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. The Court reiterated its decision in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction." Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. The SC held in People v. Cabugatan that: This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person ANTIQUERA V. PEOPLE (712 SCRA) Facts: Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board apatrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing RTC rendered a Decision that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision affirming in full the decision of the trial court. Issue: WON CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia? Held: Yes .Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. 1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it. 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was like wise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. LUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (667 SCRA 421)
FACTS: PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3 Alteza invited Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. Luz obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which contained a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the said container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the former spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu. Luz was later charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Luz claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, Luz filed a case to the Supreme Court. Issues:
1. No. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into custody. This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation. 2. Even if one were to work under the assumption that Luz was deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. COMERCIANTE V. PEOPLE (763 SCRA 57)
Facts: Comerciante not having been lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control a dangerous drug known as shabu. The police spotted Comerciante and Dasill standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached them and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets which was later on confirmed contained shabu. Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. Comerciante averred that the police were looking for "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area. They were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. The RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, The RTC opined that there was probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest. Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent that P03 Calag was impelled by any malicious motive, he must be presumed to have properly performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante. Comerciante appealed. The CA affirmed Comerciante's conviction. Issue: WON the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction Held: No. Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusionary rule is not an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows: SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. the Court finds it highly implausible that the police, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. SARAUM V. PEOPLE (781 SCRA)
Facts: Around midnight on 17 Aug 2006, a buy-bust operation was conducted by Cebu PNP in coordination with PDEA against a certain alias “Pata.” During the operation, the target managed to escape and led the police on a chase. In hot pursuit of the suspect who darted into a neighbor’s shanty, the police caught Amado Saraum and Peter Esperanza inside, who were about to engage in a meth session with drug paraphernalia in hand (lighter, tissue paper, aluminum foil). The evidence was bagged and tagged, and the suspects detained. Saraum did not object to the warrantless arrest prior to his arraignment, and his counsel only entered his objection to the admission of the seized paraphernalia as evidence due to an invalid warrantless arrest when the prosecution had already begun presenting their evidence. RTC convicted him of Possession of Paraphernalia of Dangerous Drugs (sec. 12, Art. II of RA 9165 —Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). On appeal, CA sustained conviction, hence this petition. Issue: WON the warrantless arrest of Saraum is valid? Held: Yes, the arrest in flagrante delicto was valid. Under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; Elements of valid arrest in flagrante delicto: 1. Person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. 2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Mere possession of the paraphernalia is an offense. While the items have countless lawful uses by themselves, the prosecution successfully proved their purpose for taking drugs. Since the warrantless arrest was valid, the warrantless seizure incidental to the arrest is also valid, and the seized items are the corpus delicti of the offense itself. DE LIMA V. REYES (779 SCRA)
Facts: Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega) was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr. On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation. On July 7, 2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution dated September 2, 2011. On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. On September 29, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's Resolution dated September 2, 2011. On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel. In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He also argued that the parties were already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither new nor material to the case. On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused,including former Governor Reyes. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest on March 27, 2012. However, the warrants against former Governor Reyes and his brother were ineffective since the two allegedly left the country days before the warrants could be served. On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012. On April 2, 2012, he also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. In his Supplemental Petition, former Governor Reyes argued that the Regional Trial Court could not enforce the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and proceed with the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void. On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five, rendered the Decision declaring Department Order No. 710 null and void and reinstating the First Panel's Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011. According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel. The Court of Appeals also found that the Secretary of Justice's admission that the issuance of Department Order No. 710 did not set aside the First Panel's Resolution dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011 "[compounded] the already anomalous situation." It also stated that Department Order No. 710 did not give the Second Panel the power to reverse, affirm, or modify the Resolutions of the First Panel; therefore, the Second Panel did not have the authority to assess the admissibility and weight of any existing or additional evidence. The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated March 19, 2013. The Motion, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated September 27, 2013. Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals. Issue: First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710, and with regard to this: Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition; and Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another panel of prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. Lastly, whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul. Held: When an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion. In Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn: In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority. Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 because she had reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was... created not to overturn the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility." The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary investigation. The prosecutor's determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an information should be filed in court or whether the complaint should be dismissed. A preliminary investigation is "merely inquisitorial," and is only conducted to aid the prosecutor in preparing the information. It serves a two-fold purpose: first, to protect the innocent against wrongful prosecutions; and second, to spare the state from using its funds and resources in useless prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz-Paño: The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. PCGG VS. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ, 773 SCRA
Facts: An Affidavit-Complaint was filed by the PCGG against former officers/directors of theDevelopment Bank of the Philippines (DBP), namely, Ferry, Tengco, Zosa, Zalamea, Castell, and Sison, as well as former officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation(Galleon), namely, Cuenca, Tinio, and Roque charging them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g)of RA 3019. In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc. Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify various anomalous behest loans entered into by the Philippine Government in the past. Later on, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 619 on November 9, 1992,laying down the criteria which the Ad Hoc Committee may use as a frame of reference in determining whether or not a loan is behest in nature. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of officers and employees of different government financial institutions (GFIs), examined and studied documents relative to loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) -one of which is the loan account grantedby the DBP to Galleo. Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering that: (a) Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan itself was undercoUateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon were known to be cronies of President Marcos; and id) certain documents pertaining to the loan account were found to bear "marginal notes" of President Marcos himself. Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant criminal complaint against individual respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0500-I. Issue: Whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Ruling: The petition is meritorious. In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA VS. OBIAS, 635 SCRA 91
Facts: Engr. Nestor Tria, RD of DPWH Region V was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force Tria, recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Obet Aclan, Totoy Ona, and Atty. Epifania “Fanny” Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of Engr. Tria. During the preliminary investigation, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria, and further asserted that from the totality of evidence gathered by the NBI, it has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria. The Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence as against Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ, assailing the Prosecutor’s order to dismiss the charge against Obias. As such, Justice Secretary Cuevas issued a Resolution directing the Prosecutor to include Obias in the information. The DOJ was convinced that the sequence of events and respondent’s conduct before, during and after the killing of Engr. Tria undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and Ona. Respondent Obias, along with Aclan and Ona, filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ’s resolution, to which the DOJ denied. An Information against Aclan, Ona, and Obias was then filed with the RTC. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987. In a letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondent’s counsel, the DOJ denied respondent’s notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated November 4, 1983, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the OP where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is “reclusion perpetua to death,” shall be taken by petition for review. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. However, the DOJ denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and terminated. OP dismissed the murder charge. CA affirmed OP’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of the murder charge. RULING: NO. In arguing that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the OP’s dismissal of the murder charge against respondent, petitioner invoked SC’s ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court once an information has been filed with it. A prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up its averments, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with the SC. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. However, SC may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions. Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt. Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Prosecutor’s control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse. ABANADO VS. BAYONA, 677 SCRA 595
Facts: Petitioner filed an information to the MTC and raffled to the respondent. Petitioner requested the court to issue a warrant of arrest to the accused in the said information. All documents was submitted the the petitioner except the denied resolution of the Investigating prosecutor. The Respondent ordered the petitioner to produced the said resolution which the petitioner refused as it he is not mandated to produce the said document. The respondent filed a contempt case against the Petitioner which the petitioner retaliated by filing this administrative case. Issue: Whether the MTC has jurisdiction in conducting a preliminary Investigation RULING: No, the conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function.30 Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION VS. REYES, 687 SCRA 524
Facts: Josefa “Jing” Reyes offered her services to petitioner as the latter’s real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed the petitioner that more or less then (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, but to no avail despite her receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City. The respondent admitted that she in fact received the said amount from the petitioner, but she gave the money to a certain Mateo Elejorde whom she filed a criminal case for misappropriating the said funds. That she has no intention to take the said amount for her personal benefit. The prosecutor found probable cause against the respondent and filed information before the RTC. Respondent appealed the said resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice, which was first denied but subsequently granted on reconsideration. DOJ ordered the prosecutor to withdraw the said information. Petitioner asked the CA for review with was denied. Hence this case. Issue: Whether probable cause exist in filing the information against the accused RULING: Yes, that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. That in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims. FENEQUITO VS. VERGARA, JR., 677 SCRA 113
Facts: Respondent filed a case against the petitioner for falsification of public document, the City Prosecutor filed the information to the MeTC. The Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. Respondent appealed to the RTC. RTC granted the appeal and ordered the MeTC to proceed with the trial. Petitioner petitioned to the CA to review the RTC decision. CA affirmed the RTC ruling. Petitioner when to the SC to petition the review of the decision of the CA. Hence this case. Issue: Whether the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned Document Report submitted as evidence by respondent to the prosecutor’s office, showed that the findings therein are not conclusive and, thus, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. RULING: No, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. J.M. DOMINGUEZ VS. LICLICAN, 764 SCRA 338 (7/28/15)
Facts: During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioners the election for its new set of directors was conducted. This event was presided by then company’s officers. Conflict ensued when petitioners were allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that they are not registered stockholders of JMD. Petitioners walked out the meeting, while the election pushed through and elected the Respondents. Petitioners filed a civil case against the Respondent to nullify the said election. While the case was pending, respondents withdrew money out of the JMD account that led the Petitioner filing a qualified theft against the respondents alleging that they are not authorized to withdrew money of of JMD’s account. RTC issued a warrant of arrest against the Respondents. Respondents appealed to the CA to nullify the arrest alleged existence of a prejudicial question. CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner filed a motion stating that the Prejudicial Question was already resolved in their favor which cure the defect of the order of the RTC. CA ruled in negative, hence this case. Issue: Whether the subsequent resolution of the prejudicial question did cure the defect of not recognizing the said question RULING: No, The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, issued its challenged Orders, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly, the RTC Judge should not have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil Case was resolved with finality. To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured either by the Judgment or by Judge’s inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation would create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court trying the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption that the resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit the private complainant in the criminal proceedings. |
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