a collections of case digests and laws that can help aspiring law students to become a lawyer.
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Chavez v. PCGG, GR 130716, 9 December 1998 FACTS:
Whether or not the General and Supplemental Agreements which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned. RULING: Yes for the following reasons: The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. Again, this ill-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets. The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties. The government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other court. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost. People v. Isinain, 85 Phil 648 (1950)
FACTS: Cruz, the encargado of the coconut grove of Eustaquio in City of Zamboanga, was informed by one of the guards that there were three persons stealing coconuts in the said plantation. Cruz called Fargas, the truck driver of Eustaquio, and accompanied by some laborers, both proceeded to the plantation. There the group saw three persons, chopping coconuts. When they approached, the trespassers started to run away, but Cruz fired a shot into the air, and one stopped and was apprehended. He turned out to be Moro Isnain, who, upon investigation by the precinct commander of the corresponding police station acknowledged his culpability, asked for pardon and identified his confederates as Moros Addi and Akik (who are still at large). Before the justice of the peace he pleaded guilty to the charge. However, in the court of first instance he changed his mind. He admitted he had been arrested during the raid, but submitted the flimsy excuse that he had merely gone to the place because he was thirsty. Anyway, he confessed that he joined the other two thieves in order to drink—and did drink—coconut water. This naturally constitutes theft of the coconuts. Therefore there is no question that the appellant, with the other two runaways unlawfully picked coconuts from the plantation of Eustaquio, fruits which, according to the evidence, were valued at more than thirty-three pesos. ISSUE/S: Whether or not Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code classifying as qualified theft, stealing of coconuts is unconstitutional, because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than the taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby denies him the equal protection of the laws. RULING: No, the provision is constitutional. In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3 Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves. There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied. People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil 515 (1956)
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not Hernandez is entitled to right to bail RULING: - YES It was held that the murders, arsons and robberies committed are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed as means necessary for the perpetration of the said offense of rebellion and that the crime charged is simple rebellion and in conformity with the policy of the court in dealing with accused person amenable to a similar punishment, Hernandez should then be allowed bail. Although such may risk the security of the State given the crime involved, it was also held in Montano v. Ocampo that, “ * to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong; it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant's criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this Court has been made.” It must be noted that Hernandez was sentenced not to the extreme penalty but to life imprisonment. Individual freedom is too basic , too transcendental and vital in a Republican State, like ours, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed , the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with the guarantee of enjoyment in the very first paragraph of the Bill of Rights the framers of our constitution devoted other parts of which to the protection of several aspects of freedom. It should be noted that Hernandez has already been detained for more than 5 years and it would still take some time to dispose of the case. The decision appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State. Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
FACTS:
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, GR 158693, 17 November 2004, En Banc, Ynares-Santiago [J] FACTS: Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. (RHI Inc.) is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed Virgilio and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Virgilio and Jenny then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on December 28, 1999 declaring the dismissals illegal and it ordered RHI Inc. to pay the monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. The NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Agabon’s thus they filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but it ordered the payment of money claims. ISSUE/S: Whether or Not the Riviera Home Improvements Inc. should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process? RULING: YES, Rivera Home Improvements Inc. should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from failure to comply with constitutional due process. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. As enunciated by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions, an employer is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Non v. Dames, GR 89317, 30 May 1990
FACTS: Petitioners are seeking for the annulment of the decision of the trial court for them to readmit / re-enroll in Mabini Colleges Inc. Petitioners were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The respondents, Mabini College, claimed that they reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. ISSUE/S: WON the trial court erred in ruling the case based on Alcuaz et al vs PSBA. WON the respondent is allowed to deny the petitioner for the readmission without procedural process regarding their violation RULING: It does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards. Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988)
FACTS: Petitioner bonafide students of PSBA QC staged demonstrations in the premises of the school. An agreement between the school and the students was entered into about the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners, committed tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, with the cooperation of the intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions upon them in view of their participation in the demonstration which caused the admission denial of the students for the second semester and the dismissal of the intervening professors. ISSUE: W/N there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors-teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents RULING: No. There is no denial of due process. PSBA-Q.C. no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. When a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the school’s administrative process, both students and professors were given three (3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction against them. With respect to the academic activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers, while the investigation is on-going, the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening professors. The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of administrative due process were met by the school and the students were given the opportunity to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute especially when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract. Petition is dismissed but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time. Meralco v. PSC, 11 SCRA 317 (1986)
FACTS:
b. for revision and reduction of its residential meter rate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the informal hearing serves the purpose of “proper notice and hearing” in administrative cases. RULING: No. The record shows that no hearing was held. On 22 June 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L. Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the parties could come to some kind of understanding." Meralco has not been given its day in court. The decision of 27 December 1957 was not promulgated "upon proper notice and hearing", as required by law, and that therefore it can not serve as a legal basis for requiring the Meralco to put in effect the reductions ordered in the decision. It is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented considered by the tribunal. Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of law, which binds not only the government of the Republic, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. WHEREFORE, We set aside the decision of the respondent Public Service Commission of December 27, 1957 and the order of March 3, 1958, and remand the records of the above entitled cases to the Commission for further proceedings, and to render judgment accordingly. No costs. Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not Montemayor was absolutely denied of due process in the proceedings relating to his dismissal from AUF RULING: No. In procedural due process, there must be a hearing before condemnation, with the investigation to proceed in an orderly manner, and judgment to be rendered only after such inquiry. Academic due process, a term coined, is a system of procedure designed to yield the best possible judgment when an adverse decision against a professor may be the consequence with stress on the clear, orderly, and fair way of reaching a conclusion. Every university or college teacher should be entitled before dismissal or demotion, to have the charges against him stated in writing, in specific terms and to have a fair trial on these charges before a special or permanent judicial committee of the faculty or by the faculty at large. At such trial the teacher accused should have full opportunity to present evidence. Herein, the procedure followed in the first investigation of Montemayor (June 1974) satisfied the procedure due process requisite. The second investigation (November 1974), however, did not. The motion for postponement therein was denied, the hearing proceeded as scheduled in the absence of Montemayor, and the committee lost no time in submitting its report finding the charges against Montemayor to have been sufficiently established and recommending his removal. The deficiency, however, was remedied, as Montemayor was able to present his case before the Labor Commission. Denial of due process happened only in the proceeding he had before the investigating committees and not in the proceedings before the NLRC wherein he was given the fullest opportunity to present his case, the latter being the subject matter of the petition for certiorari. Montemayor was afforded his day in court. Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940)
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union Inc, was deprived of due process RULING: YES. The SC concluded that the Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). The SC had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) Further the SC enumerated the requisites of administrative due process embodied as primary rights: 1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. 2. the tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. The decision must have something to support itself 4. the evidence must be "substantial" 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected 6. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. 7. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The Court held that the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth here in above. Abra Valley College vs Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)
FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether the lot and building and questionnaire used exclusively for educational purposes. RULING: No. The exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is not limited to property “actually indispensable” but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution. The phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The second floor being used for residential purposes of the director and his family may be justified but the list of the first floor thereof to Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education However, since only a portion is used for purposes of hammers it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved YMCA v. CIR, 33 Phil 217 (1916)
FACTS:
YES, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation. The Young Men's Christian Association of Manila cannot be said to be an institution used exclusively for religious purposes, or an institution used exclusively for charitable purposes, or an institution devoted exclusively to educational purposes and there is no doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institution must devote itself exclusively to one or the other of the purposes mentioned in the statute before it can be exempt from taxation; but the statute does not say that it must be devoted exclusively to any one of the purposes therein mentioned. It may be a combination of two or three or more of those purposes and still be entitled to exempt. Physical Therapy Org. v. Municipal Board, GR L-10448, 30 August 1959
FACTS:
ISSUE/S: Whether the City of Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the operation. of massage clinics within its jurisdiction RULING: No. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. We do not believe that the Municipal Board of the City of Manila and the Mayor wanted or intended to regulate the practice of massage in general or restrict the same to hygienic and aesthetic only. Section 18 of the New Charter of the City of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the City and its inhabitants. This is generally referred to as the General Welfare Clause, a delegation in statutory form of the police power, under which municipal corporations are authorized to enact ordinances to provide for the health and safety, and promote the morality, peace and general welfare of its inhabitants. NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 196 (1992)
FACTS: On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 2248 and Civil Case No. 2277, respectively. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. After a series of hearings were held, on 15 June 1979, a consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by NAPOCOR, and ordering the latter to pay the landowners certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully paid. Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the consolidated decision were filed by NAPOCOR. The same were denied by the court. NAPOCOR did not appeal on the consolidated decision, which became final and executory. Thus, on 16 May 1980, one of the landowners (Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated 15 June 1979. NAPOCOR complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On 10 February 1981, another landowner (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol) filed with the trial court an ex-parte motion praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum." On 11 February 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. Subsequently, the other landowners filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on 10 March 1981 and 28 August 1981 orders bearing similar import. NAPOCOR moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated 28 August 1981, which the court denied on 25 January 1982. NAPOCOR filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the rate applicable as legal interest is 6% (Article 2209 of the Civil Code) or 12% (Central Bank Circular 416) RULING: Article 2209 of the Civil Code, which provides that "If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per annum," and not Central Bank Circular 416, is the law applicable. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree 116, which amended Act 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Article 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. Herein, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Article 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)
FACTS: October 29, 1974 – A complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against 42 defendants with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila alleging that petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters to construct a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal. Petitioner offered to pay compensation but the parties failed to reach an agreement. Respondent judge, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners, arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, merely basing the amount from competent evidence. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of the petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that the respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. RULING: The judge flagrantly violated the petitioner’s right to due process when it disregarded the assistance of the Board of Commissioners in the determination of just compensation and subsequently ordering of payment thereof. In an expropriation case such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive A trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Secretary of Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334
FACTS: In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated December 15, 1994,respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras (Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the payment of compensation at the current fair market value. Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with damages filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum. ISSUES:
RULING:
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation. Republic v. De Knecht, GR 87351, 12 February 1990
FACTS: On February 20, 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation proceeding proceedings against the owners of the houses, which includes Cristina De Knecht, standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. On March 19, 1979, de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal, prematureness of the complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the property. In June 1979, the republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on the grounds that it already made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint in which the lower court granted. On July 1979, de Knecht filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the lower court. On October 30, 1980, the Supreme Court rendered granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition. On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. ISSUE: Whether or not an expropriation proceeding that was determined by final judgement may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation RULING: Yes, the property may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation even if there is already a final judgement dismissing the same. While it is true that said final judgment on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take private properties for public use upon the payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action and by legislation. Municipality of Meycauyan v. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)
FACTS: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985. ISSUE: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMC’s property for the purpose of a connecting road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose. RULING: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to require into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority V CA
FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport. In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name.Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT. Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT. In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu, alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot 941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled “Republic of the Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al.” It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian, on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written agreement]. Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of the Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued in its name. However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No. 941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff. MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition. ISSUE/S: Petioner questions whether or not: 1. THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT THAT THERE WAS A REPURCHASE AGREEMENT AND IGNORING PETITIONER’S PROTESTATIONS THAT ADMISSION OF RESPONDENT’S ORAL EVIDENCE IS NOT ALLOWED UNDER THE STATUE OF FRAUDS. 2. THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MODIFIED JUDGMENT SHOULD INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF CHIONGBIAN EVEN IF SHE WAS NOT A PARTY IN SAID APPEALED CASE, and in RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF CHIONGBIAN TO REPURCHASE SHOULD BE UNDER THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS AS THE OTHER LANDOWNERS 3.Whether the abandonment of the public use for which Lot No. 941 was expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it. RULING: The Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of Chiongbian against the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority for reconveyance of Lot No. 941 is DISMISSED. 1. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. CA wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale. More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private respondents introduced evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. This pronouncement is not applicable to the present case since the parol evidence rule which provides that “when the terms of a written agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement” applies to written agreements and has no application to a judgment of a court. To permit CHIONGBIAN to prove the existence of a compromise settlement which she claims to have entered into with the Republic of the Philippines prior to the rendition of judgment in the expropriation case would result in a modification of the judgment of a court which has long become final and executory. And even assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN could prove the existence of the alleged written agreement acknowledging her right to repurchase Lot No. 941 through parol evidence, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the evidence presented by CHIONGBIAN was admissible. Under 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale of real property shall be unenforceable unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or a secondary evidence of its contents. Contrary to the finding of the CA, the records reveal that MCIAA objected to the purpose for which the testimonies of CHIONGBIAN and Bercede (BERCEDE) were offered, i.e. to prove the existence of the alleged written agreement evincing a right to repurchase Lot No. 941 in favor of CHIONGBIAN, for being in violation of the Statute of Frauds. MCIAA also objected to the purpose for which the testimony of Attorney (PASTRANA) was offered, i.e. to prove the existence of the alleged written agreement and an alleged deed of sale, on the same ground. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses are inadmissible under the Statute of Frauds to prove the existence of the alleged sale. Moreover, CHIONGBIAN’s testimony shows that she had no personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would be returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport was closed. She stated that she only learned of the alleged assurance of the Republic of the Philippines through her lawyer, Attorney Calderon, who was not presented as a witness. 2. CHIONGBIAN cannot invoke the modified judgment of the Court of Appeals in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Escaño, et. al. where her co-defendants entered into separate and distinct compromise agreements with the Republic of the Philippines wherein they agreed to sell their land subject of the expropriation proceedings to the latter subject to the resolutory condition that in the event the Republic of the Philippines no longer uses said property as an airport, title and ownership of said property shall revert to its respective owners upon reimbursement of the price paid therefor without interest. MCIAA correctly points out that since CHIONGBIAN did not appeal the judgment of expropriation and was not a party to the appeal of her co-defendants, the judgment therein cannot redound to her benefit. And even assuming that CHIONGBIAN was a party to the appeal, she was not a party to the compromise agreements entered into by her co-defendants. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. A judicial compromise has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties and it is not valid and binding on a party who did not sign the same. Since CHIONGBIAN was not a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot legally invoke the same. 3. “The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator… which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.” REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON
FACTS: In 1993, NAPOCOR, a GOCC entered a property located in Batangas City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. On 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC in Batangas City seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property, alleging that it had negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of the easement but they had failed to reach any agreement. The respondents maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property and that the entry was done without their consent. They tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project; and that their property was classified as industrial land. The RTC ordered NAPOCOR to pay the respondent just compensation for the whole area, NAPOCOR appealed to CA, wherein the CA affirmed the order and decision of the RTC with modification that plaintiff-appellant shall pay only for the occupied portion. Hence, this appeal. On 2012, during the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property;that because the public purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now duty bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. RULING: Yes. The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4,36 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the court deems just and equitable. The SC remind the parties about the nature of the power of eminent domain that the public use is fundamental basis for the action of expropriation, hence, NAPOCOR motion should be granted. The SC held that the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. With regards to the NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or her property for public use.Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of the property. In light of these premises, the SC expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual justification. This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, with instruction to the court of origin to enable the parties to fully litigate the action for damages by giving them the opportunity to re-define the factual and legal issues by the submission of the proper pleadings on the extent of the taking, the value of the compensation to be paid to the respondents by NAPOCOR, and other relevant matters as they deem fit. Trial shall be limited to matters the evidence upon which had not been heretofore heard or adduced. The assessment and payment of the correct amount of filing fees due from the respondents shall be made in the judgment, and such amount shall constitute a first lien on the recovery. Subject to these conditions, the court of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for damages. WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the expropriation proceedings due to the intervening cessation of the need for public use. City of Baguio v. NAWASA
FACTS: On April 25, 1956 Plaintiff City of Baguio, a municipal corporation filed a complaint for declaratory relief against defendant NAWASA, a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383. It contend that said Act does not include within its purview the Baguio Waterworks System; that assuming that it does, said Act is unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of the ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system without compensation and without due process of law, and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities, municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated. On May 22, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Republic Act No. 1383 is a proper exercise of the police power of the State; that assuming that said Act contemplates an act of expropriation, it is still a constitutional exercise of the power of eminent domain; that at any rate the Baguio Waterworks System is not a private property but "public works for public service" over which the Legislature has control; and that the provisions of said Act being clear and unambiguous, there is no necessity for construction. On November 5, 1956 the court held that the waterworks system of the City of Baguio falls within the category of ‘private property’, as contemplated by our Constitution and may not be expropriated without just compensation; and that section 8 of Republic Act No. 1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the waterworks system of Baguio is unconstitutional as this is not ‘just compensation. ISSUE/S: Whether or not Republic Act No. 1383 is a valid exercise of police power or power of eminent domain. RULING: Republic Act No. 1383 is not a valid exercise of police power, since the Act does not confiscate, nor destroy, nor appropriate property belonging to appellee. It merely directs that all waterworks belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA for the purpose of placing them under the control and supervision of one agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing it does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with an equal value of the assets of the NAWASA. Furthermore Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public but is rather a property owned by the appellee. Waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city, and being owned by a municipal corporation; it cannot be taken away. Republic v. PLDT
FACTS: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise to operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, 9 using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates. 10 Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former. On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local residents. Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February 1958, under a "provisional" agreement. On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed ISSUE/S: Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff RULING: No. We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines). But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, GR 211356, 29 September 2014
FACTS: On January 7, 2010, Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove. Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance). Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion. PETITIONER’s CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition. RESPONDENT’s CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings. ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the property in question. RULING: The petition was denied. The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. Association of Medical Clinic for Overseas Workers Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Center Association, GR 207132, 6 December 2016
FACTS:
ISSUE/S: Whether the DOH letters prohibiting GAMCA from implementing the referral decking system embodied under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 10022 violates Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution for being an undue taking of property. RULING: No,Police power includes (1) the imposition of restraint on liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. The exercise of police power involves the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." By its very nature, the exercise of the State's police power limits individual rights and liberties, and subjects them to the "far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number."[92] Though vast and plenary, this State power also carries limitations, specifically, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, the advancement of the public good. The government's exercise of police power must satisfy the "valid object and valid means" method of analysis: first, the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires interference; and second, the means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably present in Section 16 of RA No. 10022. The prohibition against the referral decking system is consistent with the State's exercise of the police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the people. Public interest demands State interference on health matters, since the welfare of migrant workers is a legitimate public concern. These rules are part of the larger legal framework to ensure the Overseas Filipino Workers' (OFW) access to quality healthcare services, and to curb existing practices that limit their choices to specific clinics and facilities. |
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