OKABE v. GUTIERREZ 426 SCRA 685

OKABE v. GUTIERREZ 426 SCRA 685

Facts:
In December 1999, Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint of estafa against Teresita Tanghal
Okabe. Maruyama alleged, that she entrusted P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged
in the business of door-to-door delivery from Japan to the Philippines and failed to deliver the
money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only
US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. After preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City
Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution finding probable cause
for estafa against petitioner and information was filed in the RTC of Pasay City. However, she
left the Philippines for Japan without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the
Philippines. Thereafter, trial court issued an order granting the motion for the issuance of a
hold departure order and ordering the Immigration to hold and prevent any attempt on the
part of the petitioner to depart from the Philippines. On appeal, the CA rendered a
Decision partially granting motion to lift/recall the hold departure order. However, by posting
bail, petitioner waived her right to assail the finding of the existence of probable cause.
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied
retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail before the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect.

Issue:
Whether or not, Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure shall
apply.

Held:
Yes, Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure applies, in People
v. Red, the new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects
and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable.
Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as
a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time
of their effectivity. Before the CA rendered its decision, the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure was already in effect. Moreover, petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to
assail the warrant of arrest issued against her. There must be clear and convincing proof that
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable
cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, her act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally
relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. In this case,
a warrant was issued for the arrest of the petitioner. When the petitioner learned of the
issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest and secure
her provisional liberty. The bail bond was approved and issued an order recalling the warrant
of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her
right to assail her arrest.