a collections of case digests and laws that can help aspiring law students to become a lawyer.
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FACTS:
Petitioner, Gemma Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a check amounting to Pho 10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam. However, instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she deposited it to her bank account. The check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and CA ruled that the petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari to SC. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft. RULING: NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
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FACTS: In March of 2007 in Nueva Ecija, Rolly Adriano, with his three others, overtook a policecar and a maroon Honda CRV. With intent to kill, treachery, and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot Danilo Cabiedes, the driver of CRV, resulting from his instant death. The shooting incident caused a bystander, Ofelia Bulanan, to be hit by a stray bullet and eventually die. Two policemen was able to trace the car used in the incident and ended up arresting Adriano. RTC found accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo Cabiedes, and also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan. CA affrimed the decision of RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not Adriano is responsible for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, a bystander. RULING: YES. Evidently, Adriano’s original intent was to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not have been Adriano’s intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan’s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequences of Adriano’s felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes. ISSUE: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET?
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn. DECISION: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is created as non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET. Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause of termination. ISSUE: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the tribunal
FACTS: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the statutes in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette
FACTS: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: . Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process ISSUE: Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable. DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has authority to punish recalcitrant witness
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The question raised by the petitioner was the legality of his detention by order of the Senate for his refusal to answer questions put to him by one of its investigating committees. The Supreme Court refused to order his release and deferred to the discretionary authority of the legislative body to punish contumacious witnesses for contempt. The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations. ISSUE: Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal FACTS: LAMP filed an action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement. ISSUE: Whether or not the DAP, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP, violated Sec 25(5) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution FACTS: Maria Carolina Araullo filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the validity of DAP (Disbursement Accellaration Program). That, it is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. DBM Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on GAA (General Appropriations Act) (Savings and augmentation provisions) DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, it violated Sec 25 (5) of Article VI of the Costitution. The augmentation is, according to the ponencia, and defined in Art. VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the 1987 Constitution, and authorized within each year’s General Appropriations Act (GAA), is the use of clearly-identified savings in the expenditures of government departments and offices to augment clearly-identified, actual deficiencies within those respective government departments and offices. What augmentation is not, however, is to allocate what was not authorized as an expenditure in the GAA. It is not a transfer of executive department savings to legislative lump sum allocations (cross-border augmentation) – by virtue of the latter’s unconstitutionality, or at the very least, because such itself violates Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati
FACTS: Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
FACTS: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation. The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress DECISION: Partly Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries
FACTS: Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before the SC after senators ordered him detained in Senate premises for being uncooperative in the probe into the death of the UST Law Student Horacio "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate inquiry, Balag repeatedly invoked his right against self-incrimination when asked if he headed the fraternity DECISION: Denied for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court declared the case as moot and academic but the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be resolved and capable of repetition. This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition,” it said, adding that “the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Senate has no power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries. FACTS: The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court found the Senate to have gravely abused its discretion in citing the petitioner for contempt for his refusal to answer questions propounded to him in the course of legislative inquiry. The Court declared that “there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of contempt order suffers from constitutional infirmity.” Executive privilege: 2 kinds: presidential communications (between president and executive official) and deliberative process (between executive officials only) FACTS: Petitioners Locsin and Andal are bot directors and corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the government to the board of directors of both POTC and PHILCOMSAT filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks to enjoin the implementation of and nullify Committee Report No. 312 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and on Public Services (respondents Senate Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee Resolution No. 312 DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides that the Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. The respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Arnault to relieve him from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited any way long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session DECISION: Denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry that is sought by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee should be granted DECISION: Granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look in to a possible violation of Sec.5 of RA No.3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress. ISSUE: Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers under the Constitution
FACTS: Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law. RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy. DECISION: Partially granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional?
FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. DECISION: Partly granted. RATIO DECIDENDI: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The petition was partly granted, Sections 17(a), 18(b), 19(c), 20(d) are declared void for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC. Pursuant to Section 30 of RA No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect. FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. Gordon filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Gordon takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Gordon avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute? Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution DECISION: No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation. The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. It does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution
FACTS: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10 shares. DECISION: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. The Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. FACTS: Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the governor. Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom, claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province simultaneously. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of Sanggunian or barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied. FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general. DECISION: Denied. RATIO DECIDENDI: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to such retirement benefit
FACTS: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the unapproved amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. ISSUE: Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional?
FACTS: RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President, Speaker of the House and members of the Senate and House of Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966. However record show that the increase was implemented on 1964.Philippine Constitution Association assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14 Article 6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase. Thus the petition for writ of prohibition. RATIO DECIDENDI: Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and must be held null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech
FACTS: In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following remarks: x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago. RATIO DECIDENDI: o, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied admission. Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir. Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good." |
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