Case Digest: Abakada Group Party list vs. Purisima, GR 166715, August 14, 2008

ISSUE:  Whether the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of separation of powers under the Constitution 

FACTS:  Petitioners, Abakada Guro Party list invoking their right as taxpayers, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law. RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy. 

DECISION:  Partially granted. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation