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ISSUE: Whether or not public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
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Lagman vs Medialdea
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privelege of writ of habeas corpus FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists. ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of the privelege of Habeas Corpus in 2009 in Central Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days is constitutional
FACTS: On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao. Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao. DECISION: Moot and Academic; Political Issue; Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly... since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is... automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or... suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy ISSUE: Wheter or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindano, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG). DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of President?
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and statutes
FACTS: Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime. In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, the Court established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.69cralawlawlibrary. Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) was created on 31 March 1977 by Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1112 in order to supervise and regulate, on behalf of the government, the collection of toll fees and the operation of toll facilities by the private sector. On the same date, P.D. 1113 was issued granting to the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now Philippine National Construction Corporation or PNCC) the right, privilege, and authority to construct, operate, and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways for a period of 30 years starting 1 May 1977. TRB and PNCC later entered into a Toll Operation Agreement, which prescribed the operating conditions of the right granted to PNCC under P.D. 1113. On 27 November 1995, the Republic of the Philippines through the TRB as Grantor, CMMTC as Investor, and PNCC as Operator executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) covering Stage 1, Phases 1 and 2; and Stage 2, Phase 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Under the STOA, the design and construction of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of CMMTC. The operation and maintenance of the project roads became the primary and exclusive privilege and responsibility of the PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of PNCC, which undertook and performed the latter's obligations under the STOA. On 18 July 2007, the Republic of the Philippines, through the TRB, CMMTC, and PNCC executed the assailed Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA). Under the ASTOA, Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) replaced PSC in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the South Metro Manila Skyway. Petitioners argue that the franchise for toll operations was exclusively vested by P.D. 1113 in PNCC, which exercised the powers under its franchise through PSC in accordance with the STOA. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: TRB has the power to grant authority to operate a toll facility. In Francisco v. TRB, the court held: It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. First, there is nothing in P.D. 1113 or P.D. 1894 that states that the franchise granted to PNCC is to the exclusion of all others. Second, if we were to go by the theory of petitioners, it is only the operation and maintenance of the toll facilities that is vested with PNCC. This interpretation is contrary to the wording of P.D. 1113 and P.D. 1894 granting PNCC the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain the North Luzon, South Luzon and Metro Manila Expressways and their toll facilities. Third, aside from having been granted the power to grant administrative franchises for toll facility projects, TRB is also empowered to modify, amend, and impose additional conditions on the franchise of PNCC in an appropriate contract, particularly when public interest calls for it. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the President were valid even without the confirmation of Commission on Appointments
FACTS: Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990. On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the fifteen (15) respondent police officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The appointments of respondent police officers were in a permanent capacity. Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Appointments are valid. PNP, herein respondents, do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by Commission on Appointments. Section 116 Article VII provide for four groups of government to be appointed by President: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
FACTS: The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil, who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General, as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza, who was appointed Prosecutor IV of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva , who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of the Cooperative Development Authority, and Francisca B. Rosquita, who was appointed Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples, as petitioners; and G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong, who was appointed member of the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, as petitioner. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments. DECISION: the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203372, 206290, and 212030 are DENIED, and the petition in G.R. No. 209138 is DISMISSED. The appointments of petitioners Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-Garafil (G.R. No. 203372), Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (G.R. No. 206290), Irma A. Villanueva, and Francisca B. Rosquita (G.R. No. 209138), and Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (G.R. No. 212030) are declared VOID. RATIO DECIDENDI: The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion. (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance. (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice
FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that Hon. Alberto C. Agra was appointed by the president to be the Acting Secretary of Justice and that Agra was also subsequently appointed as Acting Solicitor General in concurrent capacity. Respondent has a different story, he alleged that he was assigned to be the Acting Solicitor General first then was subsequently assigned to be the Acting Secretary of Justice. Agra also alleged that he relinquished his position as Acting Solicitor General but kept performing his duties until his successor was appointed. Nothwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises herein. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: According to the Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice Presided to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as ewquires by the primary functions of the officials’ offices. The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both, an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices f
FACTS: On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006. On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Sec. 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Thus, the Court ruled these sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. ISSUE: Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
FACTS: EDCA or Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an agreement between the Philippines and America wherein it authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. After eight rounds of negotiations for two years, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Senators file Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105.91. The resolution expresses the "strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law”. It is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests (commander-in-chief powers). EDCA is considered an executive agreement, therefore may be bound through the President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of executive power, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed. ISSUE: Whether or not Joseph Estrada is disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections according to the phrase in the Constitution which states that "the President shall not be eligible for any re-election.
FACTS: Atty. Pormento filed a petition for disqualification against former President Joseph Estrada for being a presidential candidate in the May 2010 elections. The petition was denied by COMELEC second division and subsequently by COMELEC en banc. Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: No. There is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The respondent did not win the second time he ran. The issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any re- election" will be premised on a person second election as President. Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "re-election" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position, petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Estrada permanently unable to act as President.
FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, Section 11 of Article VII provides that “Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions.” Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour of the Republic, on the basis of the Marcoses’s lawful income.
FACTS: Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. Moreover, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under their conditions contained therein. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities." Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution. ISSUE: WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude
FACTS: Philip Arreza Pichay was convicted by final judgment for four counts of libel. On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner filed a petition for disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. She argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. HRET held that Pichay did not participated the writing of the libelous articles but his conviction was in line with his duty as the president of the publishing company. Based on the circumstances, the HRET concluded that Pichay’s conviction for libel did not involve moral turpitude. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Since Pichay’s ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes. ISSUE: Does HRET have the jurisdiction over BB.
FACTS: COMELEC has cancelled BB’s CoC, acting upon the petition of AA, for alleged misrepresentations in BB’s CoC. While the motion for reconsideration field by BB was pending, the election was held and BB was proclaimed as winner by the Provincial Board of Canvassers. CC filed an Election Protest in the HRET. COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality on its cancellation of BB’s CoC. Despite it, Speaker DD administered the oath of office to BB. BB challenged COMELEC’s action and the Supreme Court upheld that there was no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC. AA filed for an immediate execution of COMELEC’s previous resolution and to declare CC as winner. COMELEC declared the proclamation of BB as null and void. CC filed a petition for the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel Speaker DD to proclaim him as winner, despite notice given to him by COMELEC. DECISION: Granted RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives. BB is not a bona fide member of the House of Representatives for lack of a valid proclamation.. When BB took her oath of office before respondent Speaker DD in open session, BB had no valid COC NOR a valid proclamation. In view of the foregoing, BB has absolutely no legal basis to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives, and therefore, she has no legal personality to be recognized as a party-respondent at a proceeding before the HRET. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.
FACTS: Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration. Carlos Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later on rejected by the Commision of Appointment prompting the President to replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent. Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations. However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s proclamation was valid.
FACTS: Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent moved for the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order, petitioner’s proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner. Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared respondent’s proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won. DECISION: Petition for mandamus is granted RATIO DECIDENDI: The respondent’s proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorate’s choice. Since the validity of respondent’s proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since respondent’s eligibility was not the issue. Serrano vs. People
G.R. No.175023, July 05, 2010 FACTS: A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the victim, by the herein petitioner, Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Anthony Galang claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate. The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the nature or gravity of the wound”. Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide. Held: Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. The court considered the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors. Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide. FACTS:
On April 25,1996, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan, the accused who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. As seen by Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter. ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty of consummated statutory rape. RULING: No. Accused is guilty of attempted rape and be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years 4 months and 10 days of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it. |
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