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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge engaged in electioneering while still an MTC judge.
FACTS: Complainant Leonila Vistan alleged that as early as 10 Feb 1987, prior to the start of the campaign period, and while still an MTC judge, respondent Ruben Nicolas started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constitutents in the second district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the statude of his office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct, a clear violation of Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent being a presidential appointee and a holder of a non-career service position could be removed from service at the pleasure of the President.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman’s Special Prosecution Officer filed an information against Nita Buenaobra, chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang Pilipino, with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for allegedly causing undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable negligence in connection with the unauthorized reprinting of the Diksyunaryo ng Wikang Pilipino. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation while the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) conducted a parallel administrative investigation against respondent charging her with the same acts and ommissions subject of the Sandiganbayan case. On 11 Apr 2003, petitioner adopted PAGC’s recommendation and dismissed respondent from office. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Non-career service personnel enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without just cause and observance of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not de Jesus’ appointment may be properly changed from temporary status to permanent despite non-compliance with the eligibility requirement for the position of Graft Investigation Officer III.
FACTS: On 31 Jul 2002, Melchor Arthur Carandang, Paul Elmer Clemente, and Jose Tereso de Jesus, Jr. were appointed Graft Investigation Officers III of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Civil Service Commission approved such appointments on the condition that appointees must obtain CES or CSE eligibility to acquire security of tenure. Carandang and Clemente had been conferred with CSE eligibility on 06 Jun 2003. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: Under P.D.No. 807, Section 9(h) which authorizes the CSC to approve appointments to positions in the civil service, except those specified therein, its authority is limited only to whether or not the appointee possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. Third level eligibility is not required for third level officials appointed by the Ombudsman in light of the provisions of the Constitution vis a vis the Administrative Code of 1987. ISSUE: Whether or not Salas is a confidential employee.
FACTS: On 07 Oct 1989, respondent Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR chairman as internal security staff member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. His employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on 03 Dec 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close relationship with the occupant. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. ISSUE: Whether or not a CES eligibility is sufficient to acquire security of tenure.
FACTS: Respondent Ramon S. Roco was appointed by then President Fidel V. Ramos on 26 Aug 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office in Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank Level V. He was re-appointed to the same position by then President Joseph Estrada. From his appointment in 1996, respondent was not a CES eligible and was only conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Board on 13 Aug 1999. On 07 Sep 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who was not a CES eligible, was appointed by then President Estrada as Regional Director of LTO-V. Pursuant thereto, DOTC Undersecretary Herminio B. Coloma, Jr., as officer-in-charge of the department, issued a memorandum directing petitioner General to assume the said office immediately and for respondent Roco to report to the Office of the Secretary. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Two requisites must concur in order for an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure: CES eligibility and appointment ot the appropriate CES rank. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may conduct “unofficial” tabulation of presidential election results based on a copy of the election returns.
FACTS: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of national and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the precint election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the quickcount as being preemptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitutuion. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election results, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions of the COMELEC.
FACTS: On 04 Jun 1998, respondent Jose Ramirez filed an election protest with the COMELEC challenging the result of the 11 May 1998 elections where petitioner Ruperto Ambil, Jr. was proclaimed the duly-elected governor of Eastern Samar. On 24 Feb 2000, Commissioner Japal Guidani retired from the service prior to the finalization of his proposed resolution in the Ramirez protest. In said resolution, Commissioner Julio Desamito had dissented while Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco did not indicate her vote. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-A, Section 7 provides that any decision, order or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. The Court interpreted the provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The decision must be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, not a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections en banc may hear and decide pre-proclamation cases classified as special cases.
FACTS: Petitioners impugned the challenged resolutions of the Commission on Elections in pre-proclamation cases classified as special cases. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a division of the commission. The commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. FACTS: Then president GMA issued EO 864 which allows tge chairman of the CSC to be in the board of trustees/directors of certain GOCCs. Funa asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due to the significance of its government functions. He further asserts that such independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the Executive Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government. In this situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are attached to the Executive Department. Funa claims that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional commissions from holding any other office or employment. A conflict of interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations. Respondents submit that the prohibition against holding any other office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional compensation in ex officio capacities. ISSUE: W/N the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple office or employment. DECISION: Yes. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. RATIO DECIDENDI: While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. .Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch, hence when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman ISSUE: W/N DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” is constitutional FACTS: CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. General Appropriation Act of 2002 (GAA) appropriated total funds to the CSC but they claimed that there is an unreleased balance. To CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its no report, no release policy. DBM proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of CSC budget was not on account of any failure on CSC part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. Moreover, DBM contends that CSC did not exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBM Secretary regarding the extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to Court. Second, even assuming that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with Supreme Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: DBM’s policy of “No Report, No Release” may not be validly enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which states: The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. It is under such situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. ISSUE: W/N the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman.
FACTS: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.” They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President. ISSUE: W/N the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
FACTS: The President appointed petitioner Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. The Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998, opined that petitioner's term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon; wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disallowance but the Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129. DECISION: Her appointment expired on February 02, 1999, but is entitled to received her salary and other emoluments RATIO DECIDENDI: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure." "The term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent." We thus see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner, and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term Commissioner. Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman; February 02, 1999, for Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñeta, Jr.|| ISSUE: W/N the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). In the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. ISSUE: Whether or not the legislature can exempt the GSIS from legal fees imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government units
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the ROC. The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997) Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Court’s order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The GSIS is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. More importantly, the Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal independence. The 1987 Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus. FACTS: Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Development Assistance Fund. The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these cases show a threat to judicial independence. Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power "in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court. With regard to his prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, petitioner avers that Congress should not act as "wreckers of the law" by threatening "to clip the powers of the High Tribunal[.]" Congress committed a "blunder of monumental proportions" when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget. Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to "REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people." DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. The court held that there is no actual case or controversy and that the petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. ISSUE: Whether or not the said provision is applicable to members of the judiciary
FACTS: Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 states that: Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC),Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of presidential appointees, from the Office of the President. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof. The requirement of seeking a Clearance of Pendency/NonPendency of Administrative Case from the Civil Service Commission embodied in Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10154 is declared INAPPLICABLE to retiring employees of the Judiciary ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s interference, in this case, violates the judiciary’s autonomy. FACTS: Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA) found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc in A.M. No. 03- 12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4. Atty. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, recommended that the Court advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices, the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The COA’s authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court’s fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs. ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of Judicial Bar Council requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional
FACTS: Petitioner applied for a position as a judge in a second level court but JBC did not include his name in the list of applicants since he failed to qualify. This is because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least five years and petitioner here only served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the authority of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because thesaid qualification was already prescribed DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The said added 5-year-qualification being assailed by the petitioner is constitutional since as stated in the Sect. 8 (5), Art.VIII, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary. Consequently, it was also stated in the said provision thatonly the persons nominated by the JBC is transmitted to the president that will choose whom to nominate as judge in the judiciary. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application is raised.
FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed. However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question. During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist. Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process. ISSUE: whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was valid.
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private respondent's allegations. FACTS: In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been met. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders. FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding. ISSUE: Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) unconstitutional
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.” DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. ISSUE: Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.) constitutional
FACTS: petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET - ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation. petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7] Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops, and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties. Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision. Principles: On verba legis interpretation... verba legis Petitioners' own interpretation and application of the verba legis rule will in fact result in an absurdity, which legal construction strictly abhors. The settled rule is that the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed as such and should not be given a construction that changes its meaning With due respect, the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's theory of "initial entry" mentioned above ventured into a construction of the provisions of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is patently contrary to the plain language and meaning of the said constitutional provision. ISSUE: Whether or not former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
FACTS: On Sep 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On Oct 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon to Estrada thereby restoring his civil and political right upon which Estrada received and accepted. On Nov 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the COMELEC. In 2012 Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal, petitioner, filed a petition for disqualification against Estrada. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights”as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. |
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