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MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 71905 August 13, 1986
On October 1, 1984, a judgment was rendered by the Insurance Commission in favor of complaintappellee, Sisenando Villareal, and against herein petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation. Petitioner received a copy of the decision on October 5, 1984 and it filed a motion for reconsideration of said judgment on October 17, 1984. This motion was denied in an Order dated October 26, 1984.
On November 7, 1984, petitioner filed with the Insurance Commission its notice of appeal from the
subject decision to respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
Petitioner's appeal was initially accepted by the IAC as can be gleaned from the letter-advice dated
February 8, 1985, notifying petitioner's counsel to file appellant's brief. However, a Motion to Dismiss
appeal dated March 1, 1985 was filed by the complainant-appellee on the ground that the petitioner
herein, as the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period. Despite the
opposition thereto interposed by petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation, the Respondent IAC, on
August 14, 1985 granted the stated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by said court's computation
of the elapsed period from the date of receipt by herein petitioner of the decision of the Insurance
Commission to the time the notice of appeal was filed before said Commission and notice of appeal
and manifestation submitted to the IAC on December 5, 1984, it would appear that petitioner's appeal
was belatedly made.
Whether or not the petitioner filed its motion with the period prescribed by law.
Petitioner herein is correct in maintaining that its appeal was timely filed. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Insurance Commission and advice of such denial was received by
petitioner on October 30, 1984. As petitioner would then have ten (10) days from October 30, 1984 or
until November 9, 1984, its appeal was well within the ten day period within which an appeal can be
made to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
Respondent IAC fell into error because it failed to consider and apply the pivotal Section 2 of R.A.
5434, which recites that "in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period of fifteen (15)
days, then within ten (10) days from Notice or publication, when required by law, of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration ." Respondent's court's failure to do so led to its erroneous
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules, fixes a uniform fifteen (15) day period for appeal from notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision of any court Section 22(c) of the Interim Rules, however, applies in particular to appeals to the
Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies. Said Section 22(c) explicitly refers to the
provisions of R.A. 5434, of which Section 2 thereof, had already been above cited. There is no
inconsistency between said section and B.P. 129 or its implementing guidelines. B.P. 129 may not be
said to have repealed said provision of R.A. 5434 for the Interim Rules even expressly refer to said
Section 2 of R.A. 5434. Said Section 2 should, therefore, be applied.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 5434 which allows an additional ten (10) days from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration does not extend the period for appeal but merely furnishes an automatic
ten-day allowance in the event that a motion for reconsideration is interposed within the appeal period.
In other words, this particular provision becomes operative only if a motion for reconsideration is filed
during the fifteen-day period. The period for appeal remains untouched by Section 2 of R.A. 5434.
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