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Republic vs. Salvador N. Lopez Agri Business Corp.
G.R. No. 178895, Jan. 10, 2011, 639 SCRA 49 (2011) Facts: Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez AgriBusiness Corporation. Said parcels of land are hereinafter described as follows:Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835 under TCT No. T12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad. 286 of TCT No. T12637 which is already covered under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Scheme and had already been valued by the Land Valuation Office, Land Bank of the Philippines. On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T12635 covering Lots 1454A and 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter affidavit addressed to the respondent Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land. The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved. On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots 1454A and 1296 were taken beyond the operation of the CARP pursuant to its reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District (Heavy Industry) per Resolution No. 39 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional Director denied the Motion. The petitioner appealed the Regional Directors Orders to respondent DAR. On June 10, 1998, the latter issued its assailed Order affirming the Regional Directors ruling on Lots 1454A and 1296 and further declared Lots 1298 and 1293B as covered by the CARP. On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent prompting the former to file the instant petition. The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos. T12637 and T12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the Lopez lands) from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption withrespect to Lots 1454A and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T12635) in Barrio Limot (the Limot lands). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T16356). The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied. Issue: Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Court’s ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR. Held: The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, the Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the CARL. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP.In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs, some of which were covered by several certificates of ownership. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business, structures consisting of two chutes where the livestock were kept during nighttime. The existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of the CARL was positively affirmed by the farm workers and the overseer who were interviewed by the MARO. Considering these factual findings and the fact that the lands were in fact being used for SNLABC’s livestock business even prior to 15 June 1988, the DAR Regional Director ordered the exemption of the Lopez lands from CARP coverage. The Court gives great probative value to the actual, on-site investigation made by the MARO as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director. The Court finds that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising. The tax declarations of the Lopez lands as agricultural lands are not conclusive or final, so as to prevent their exclusion from CARP coverage as lands devoted to livestock-raising. Indeed, the MARO’s on-site inspection and actual investigation showing that the Lopez lands were being used for livestock-grazing are more convincing in the determination of the nature of those lands. In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage. Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABC’s use of the area as a "seasonal extension of the applicant’s ‘grazing lands’ during the summer." Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC’s livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable -- and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used -- for agricultural purposes.
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Buklod ng Magbubukid vs E.M. Ramos & Sons
G.R. No. 131481, Mar 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 401 (2001) Facts: At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas,Cavite. Originally owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club, the property was acquired by the repondent EMRASON in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision known as Traveller's Life Homes. Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as the "Loval Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1, enitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof." In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching to the aplication detailed development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving EMRASON's application. Subsequently, EMRASON paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property development. It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation. On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution. On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmarinas, Cavite addressed a letter to EMRASON. On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from EMRASON. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of land situated at BarangayLangkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite owned by EMRASON. In the meantime, EMRASON filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices. Collectively docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional Director, Region IV, which had jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation lo determine whether or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition. Forthwith, the DAR Regional office conducted an on-site inspection of the subject property. On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP. On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x". On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary o Garilao issued an order affirming the Notices of Acquisition and Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he coverage under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for which subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued. Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied by the DAR Secretary Garilao in his subsequent order of January 6, 1993, EMRASON appealed to the Office of the President.On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona [(Deputy Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x x x, dismissing EMRASON's appeal. On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out with his second challenged issuance denying EMRASON's aforementioned motion for reconsideration x x x. From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP, EMRASON filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), which enjoined then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao and Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona from implementing the OP Decision of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of May 14, 1996 until further orders from the court. On September 17, 1996, the appellate court issued a Resolution granting the prayer of EMRASON for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of Appeals, with the prayer that the writ of preliminary injunction already issued be lifted, recalled and/or dissolved. At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to intervene as an indispensable party in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950; that the writ of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved, having been issued in violation of Section 55 of the CARL; and that the Petition for Review of EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because -the latter's participation was "not being in any way prejudicial to the interest of the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal complexion of the case." The appellate court, however, affirmed the propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON given that under Section 5 ofSupreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16, 1995, appeals from judgments or final orders of the OP or the DAR under the CARL shall be taken to the Court of Appeals, through a verified petition for review; and that under Section 3 of the same Administrative Circular, such a petition for review may raise questions of facts, law, or mixed questions of facts and law. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because the subject property was already converted/classified as residential by the Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.. The Court of Appeals further observed that the subject property has never been devoted to any agricultural activity and is, in fact, more suitable for non-agricultural purposes. Issue: Whether or not subject property could be placed under the CARP. Held: No. Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines the coverage of the CARP, to wit: SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries. More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP: (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain; (b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph; (c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use plan shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands within one (1) year from effectivity of this /Vet. without prejudice to the implementation of the land acquisition and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to said date. The Court reiterates that since July 9, 1972, upon approval of Resolution No. 29-A by the Municipality of Dasmarinas, the subject property had been reclassified from agricultural to residential. The tax declarations covering the subject property, classifying the same as agricultural, cannot prevail over Resolution No. 29-A.Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land by virtue of Resolution No. 29-A dated July 9, 1972, it is no longer agricultural land by the time the CARL took effect on June 15, 1988 and is, therefore, exempt from the CARP. Roxas & Co. v. DAMBA-NFSW
G.R. No. 149548, Dec 04, 2009, 607 SCRA 33 (2009) Facts: Petitioner, Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by Department of Agrarian Reform in accordance with the CARL. On August 6, 1992 petitioner, through its President, sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its voluntary offer to sell of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reads: DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Essentially, Petitioner, filed its application for conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone, reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15, 1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Petitioner filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 19943 which states that all lands already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR. Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non- agricultural use to exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage. Held: No. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. It bears emphasis that a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes. Petitioner, Roxas & Co., can only look to the provisions of the Tourism Act, and not to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, for possible exemption. DAR vs DECS
G.R. No. 158228, Mar 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 217 (2004) Facts: Subject Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS. DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005. June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings. DAR Regional Director Andres, August 7, 1998 approved the recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries. DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. Aggrieved, DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) Held: NO. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz: x x x x x x x x x c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, … , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. x x x x x x x x x Clearly, it shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: a. the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and b. the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes." The importance of the phrase "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Case Digest: Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB G.R. No. 100091, Oct 22, 1992,215 SCRA 86 (1992)7/11/2020 Central Mindanao University
vs. DARAB G.R. No. 100091, Oct 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 86 (1992) Facts: Central Mindanao University(CMU) is an agricultural university. From its beginning, CMU was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. Then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares. It was 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called"Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the school were leased to its faculty and employees. Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the University a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries. When Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the Univertisy in July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. Another project was launched o develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision that there would be no tenant-landlord relationship. The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not. The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint. DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries. Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU. Issue: Whether or not subject land is covered by CARP. Held: NO. The 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because: It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress; It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the Central Mindanao University; and, It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers Petitioner, was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on January 8, 1960. Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and byproducts of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law. On June 10, 1988, a new Agrarian Reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its several properties from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms. On December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CAR coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner redocumented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9. The DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived with a recommendation for the exemption of petitioners 316.0422 hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCECs findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director Dalugdug issued an Order exempting petitioners 316.0422 hectare property from CARP. The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994. Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers filed a letter appeal with the DAR Secretary. Correlatively, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa Baras, Rizal. The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court, Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate portions of the property. In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final and executory. R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881, which was approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL. On October 22, 1996, the fact finding team formed by the DAR Undersecretary for Field Operations and Support Services conducted an actual headcount of the livestock population on the property. The headcount showed that there were 448 heads of cattle and more than 5,000 heads of swine. On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP. Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioners president, prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988. Applying the animalland ratio (1 hectare for grazing for every head of cattle/carabao/horse) and the infrastructureanimal ratio (1.7815 hectares for 21 heads of cattle/carabao/horse, and 0.5126 hectare for 21 heads of hogs) under DAR A.O. No. 9, Secretary Garilao exempted 240.9776 hectares of the property.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however, Secretary Garilao denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Memorandum on Appeal before the Office of the President (OP). On February 4, 2000, the OP rendered a decision reinstating Director Dalugdugs Order dated June 27, 1994 and declared the entire 316.0422 hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP. However, on separate motions for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision filed by farmergroups Samahang AnakPawis ng Lagundi and Pinugay Farmers, and the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of DAR, the OP issued a resolution dated September 16, 2002, setting aside its previous decision and a new one entered REINSTATING the Order dated 21 January 1997 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. April 29, 2005, the CA found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal -and and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP coverage.Meanwhile, six months earlier, or on November 4, 2004, without the knowledge of the CA as the parties did not inform the appellate court then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR Conversion Order granting petitioners application to convert portions of the 316.0422 hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The CAs decision of April 29, 2005, Motions for Reconsideration were filed by farmergroups, namely: the farmers represented by Espinas (Espinas group), the Pinugay Farmers, and the SAPLAG. The farmergroups all claimed that the CA should have accorded respect to the factual findings of the OP. Moreover, the farmergroups unanimously intimated that petitioner already converted and developed a portion of the property into a leisure residential commercial estate known as the Palo Alto Leisure and Sports Complex . With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villas Conversion Order of November 4, 2004, the appellate court had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. In the same token, the Espinas group prayed that this remaining area be covered by the CARP.CA amended its decision and the 162.7373 hectare agricultural portion is declared covered by CARP. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Issue: Whether or not lands devoted to livestock farming within the meaning of Luz farms and Sutton, and which are thereby exempt from CARL coverage, are nevertheless subject to DAR’s continuing verification as to use, and, on the basis of such verification, may be ordered reverted to agricultural classification and compulsory acquisition Held: YES. The Court held that it is established that that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR Secretary’s competence and jurisdiction. It is the DAR Secretary who is vested with such jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. Facts:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. MARO inspected respondents’ land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. DAR ignored their request. DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio. DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied. Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government Issue: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are constitutional. Held: YES. In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as:animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.15 Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR16 reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.17 We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term "agricultural land" does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business. Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands. Issue: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith are constitutional. Held: NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Facts:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal. On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as town site reservation. EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development permits after complying with the requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted. DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. Natalia and EDIC protested to this. Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members. DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision. Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters. Hence, this petition. Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for town site reservation. OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was no valid conversion Issue: Whether or not lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies prior to 15 June 1988, are covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Held: NO. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus -- Republic Act no. 6657 states, Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL. Facts:
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short). On June 18, 1981, private respondents, instituted a complaint against Hon. Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Macarambon as Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands. Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied. On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on January 10, 1983. Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6, 1986. On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment. WON lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27. NO. We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus, The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA 45) In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides: Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading, Section 6. Retention Limits. . On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 330, against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificateof Title (OCT) No. P27140 issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador; that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest; and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.
On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and the parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers together with the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence to support their respective claims. On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the parties’ submission of their respective position papers and other supporting evidence.On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. Respondent sought reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA. the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy relationship. The CA likewise gave no probative value to the affidavits of petitioners’ witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish petitioners’ status as agricultural tenants. If at all, the affidavits merely showed that petitioners occupied the subject land with the consent of the original owners. And since petitioners are occupying the subject land by mere tolerance, they are bound by an implied promise to vacate the same upon demand by the respondent. Failing to do so, petitioners are liable to pay damages. . WON land owner can still exercise their right of retention over subject 4.1685 ha riceland despite the fact that a previous decision denying petition for exemption under PD 27 had long been executory. WON distinction between exemption from agrarian reform coverage and the right of retentionWON distinction between exemption from agrarian reform coverage and the right of retention YES. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland. In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 23 , we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657 24 . We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. 25 Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, viz.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library SECTION 6. Retention Limits — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shallvary according to factors governing a viable family-size, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a lease holder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease holder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention. In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares" 26 . defines the nature and incidents of a landowner’s right of retention. For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner’s choice of the area to be retained, must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, 27 which supplies the details for the exercise of a landowner’s retention rights, likewise-recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. 28 What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. NO. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts. Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality ofjudgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed. P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any retention right 20 . Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term"other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the landowner derives adequate income to support his family.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops. On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands" . Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner’s right of retention, are different. Issue:
Whether or not land owner can still exercise their right of retention over subject 4.1685 hectares rice land despite the fact that a previous decision denying petition for exemption under Presidential Decree 27 had long been executory. Facts: Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Soriente, Macatulad, Mediana and Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the respondents, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers, Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same rice land, this time under R.A. No. 6657. On March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary. DAR Secretary affirmed the decision of the regional director. They appealed to the Office of the President (OP). Office of the President ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectares of land. The application of the children was still denied. Hence the appeal in CA. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President. Held: YES. Petitioner heirs of Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland. In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 23 , we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657 24 . We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. 25 Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, SECTION 6. Retention Limits — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares" . Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. Facts:
Petitioner Roxas & Co., is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Issues: 1. Whether or not acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law 2. Whether or not assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, Supreme Court has the power to rule on this issue Held: 1. No. 2. No. The failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742,
Jul 14, 1989, Facts: On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of rice holding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution Issue: Whether or not CARL violates due process because landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain Held: NO. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land." The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected. Facts: In the Year 1996, Malto and private respondent AAA started to frequently exchange messages and calls. Their conversation always started innocently but he had a way of veering the subject to sex. Soon, they had a "mutual understanding" and became sweethearts. On November 19, 1997, AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner outside the premises of the college. She was surprised when he brought her to Queensland Lodge on Harrison St. in Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse. She resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got angry at him. On November 26, 1997, Malto asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk in private. He again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the room, he took off his shirt, lay down in bed and told her, "halika na, dito na tayo mag-usap." She refused but he dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he overpowered her. He went on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her but she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying, "Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won’t hurt you." She refused and said, "Mike, ayoko." Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she hesitantly replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while commenting "ibibigay mo rin pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed. They had sexual intercourse. In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College and in other colleges where he taught. On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an administrative complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691. Issue: Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law can be applied Held: Yes. The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). Facts: On June 06, 2002, The family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about to sleep at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 1⁄2 years old respectively. The Court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for double murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer reclusion perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.Aggrieved by the trial court's and Court of Appeal’s judgments, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. Hence, this appeal Issue: Whether or not the lower court imposed proper award of damages on the accused-appellant Held: No. The lower court failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties and award of damages imposed on accused-appellant. In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 31⁄2-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives. Facts: That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Arturo Pacificador, then Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with other individuals, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue of a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at that time was P862,150.00 thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits, advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the amount of P777,005.50. Respondent, and his erstwhile co-accused, Marcelo were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the provision of Act No. 3326 on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that R.A. No. 3019 provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. Issue: Whether or not the fifteen-year prescriptive period shall be applied in this case Held: No. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 195, provides that the offenses committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976. Garcia vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No.119063, January 27, 1997 Facts: On 28 August 1991, Garcia filed with an Affidavit of Complaint charging his wife, private respondent Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefore. She contended that by the petitioner's admissions in his testimony given on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty which prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by the petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Hence, this petition Issue: Whether or not the private respondent's many trips abroad suspended the running of the prescriptive period Held: No. The court held that that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period Maruhom vs. People
G.R. No.206513, October 20, 2015 Facts: On September 24, 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct upon the person of one AAA, who was then a sixteen year old minor, by then and there embracing her, touching her breast and private part against her will and without her consent and the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological development of the complainant. After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision which convicted petitioner of the crime charged. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things, that even assuming he committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same were done without the victim’s consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence upon her. The CA rendered a Decision adopting the recommendation of the OSG. Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012. Instead of further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the CA a manifestation with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can avail the benefits of Probation Law Held: No. Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if an appeal from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused. In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction before the CA alleging that it was error on the part of the trial court to have found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. Accused already perfected his appeal and it is late in the day to avail the benefits of probation. Imbo vs. People
G.R. No.197712, April 20, 2015 Facts: While their entire household was asleep and had retired for the night, she was awakened by petitioner, her own father, licking her vagina and mashing her breasts. At the time, AAA was sleeping at the second level of their residence with her younger sister, BBB. AAA immediately and repeatedly shouted for her mother, CCC, who was sleeping outside the room, but to no avail. AAA continued to shout for her mother prompting petitioner to leave and run out of the room. AAA cried herself to sleep, and on the very next day told her mother of what her father, petitioner, had done to her. Adamant on his innocence, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the appellate court maintaining that he did not commit Acts of Lasciviousness against his own daughter, AAA; the charge was only concocted by his wife who, for some reason, wanted to separate from him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction of petitioner for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. Issue: Whether or not the penalty imposed by the lower court failed to properly apply R.A. No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law Held: Yes. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides the imposable penalty for Acts of Lasciviousness when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, albeit the offense is prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, is reclusion temporal in its medium period. The range of the imposable penalty on petitioner of reclusion temporal in its medium period is fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to prison sentence both for an offense punished by the RPC and an offense punished "by any other law." The correct application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law has long been clarified in People v. Simon which ruled that the underscored portion of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, i.e. the "offense is punished by any other law," indubitably refers to an offense under a special law where the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Hence, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum and seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. People vs. Recto
G.R. No.129069, October 17, 2001 Facts: On April 18, 1994, early afternoon, while SPO4 Rafol and SPO1 Male were leaving the premises, the group of appellant Julio Recto arrived. Barangay Captain Orbe advised them not to create trouble, but Dante Regis pulled a piece of wood and threw it towards them. Thereafter, appellant Recto, while holding a balisong or fan knife, approached Barangay Captain Orbe. The latter responded by telling the former to surrender the balisong. Appellant stepped backward, opened his jacket and pulled out a gun. Upon seeing the gun, Barangay Captain Orbe retreated, while Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay stepped forward with both arms raised and uttered the words: 'Do not do it. We'll just settle this.' Julio Recto, however, immediately pulled the trigger, hitting Barangay Kagawad Macalipay, causing him to fall down on the ground. Then Cornelio Regis, Jr. approached the fallen Macalipay and flipped his bolo at the latter who rolled and fell into the rice paddy. Melchor Recto saw the shooting from his hiding place behind a concrete pillar. He then ran inside the old dilapidated bathroom of the bodega. Barangay Captain Orbe also followed. Inside the bathroom, Melchor Recto peeped through the window and saw appellant Recto fire his gun at Emilio Santos. Santos also fired his revolver at appellant and later, turned around and crawled. While crawling, Santos fired another shot towards Regis, Jr., but the latter was able to reach and hack the former with a bolo. When Melchor could no longer see Julio Recto, he jumped out of the bathroom window and ran. While running, Julio Recto shot him hitting the latter's thigh. Barangay Captain Orbe also got out of the bathroom through the top and landed onto the ricefield. Before he could take a step, he was also shot by appellant Julio Recto at his right elbow, but was still able to continue running and cross the southern portion of the ricefield. He caught up with the wounded Melchor Recto and both went their separate ways. On the other hand, both Barangay Kagawad Antonio Macalipay and Emiliano 'Renato' Santos died due to multiple wounds inflicted on them by herein appellant. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of direct assault in Criminal Case Nos. 1970 and 1972 which accordingly resulted in his being convicted of complex crimes in those cases Held: Yes. First, in Criminal Case No. 1970. Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways. One of which is by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.” One way to aggravate this mode is when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. In this case, Melchor Recto was clearly an agent of a person in authority. Unquestionably, he was a barangay chief tanod; however, at the crime scene he was a mere bystander. Apparently, he was not acting and had no occasion to act in the performance of his official duties that afternoon. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault. Thus, appellant's liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide. Appellant shall be convicted of attempted homicide. Second, in Criminal Case No. 1972. The court erred in finding the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Evidently, the victim had all the opportunity to escape or defend himself from the aggression that was to ensue, yet chose not to grab the opportunity and instead placed himself in a position more open to attack. Equally important, his vulnerable position had not been deliberately sought by appellant. It was thrust on the latter by the former himself. In short, appellant did not deliberately choose the mode of attack to kill the victim with impunity and without risk to himself. Absent treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder. Appellant shall be convicted of qualified direct assault with homicide aggravated by the use of a weapon.
People vs. Barde G.R. No.183094, September 22, 2010 Facts: Around 12:00 midnight on April 15, 1999, Elmer, who was only more or less three (3) meters away from the appellant, saw the latter get a rounded object from his belt bag, which he believed to be a hand grenade as he has previously seen one from military men when he was in Manila. Later, appellant pulled something from that rounded object, rolled it to the ground towards the center of the dancing place where the people were dancing, and left immediately. Five seconds thereafter, the rounded object exploded. At that moment, appellant was already one-half meter away from the gate of the dancing place. The lights went off, people scampered away, and many died and were seriously injured as a result of the said explosion. Hence, this appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modifications, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding herein appellant Reynaldo Barde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. Issue: Whether or not the trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of murder committed by the appellant, per Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code Held: Yes. Article 48 of the RPC provides that “When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.” A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. Appellant’s single act of detonating an explosive device may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. Thus, applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime, which is murder, is death. Pursuant, however, to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the appellate court properly reduced the penalty of death, which it previously imposed upon the appellant, to reclusion perpetua. DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS WHICH CAN BE IMPOSED ON A LAWYER IN CASE OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
a. Disbarment b. Suspension c. Interim Suspension d. Reprimand e. Admonition f. Probation g. Other sanctions and remedies: i. Restitution ii. Assessment of costs iii. Limitation upon practice iv. Appointment of a receiver v. Requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination vi. Requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses vii. Other requirements that the state’s highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with purposes of lawyer sanctions; and h. Reciprocal Discipline (Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions) People vs. Macaspac
G.R. No.198954,February 22, 2017 Facts: On July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having drinks with Surban, Barcomo, Reyes, and Jebulan on Pangako Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the course of their drinking, an argument ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group: Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo, and then left. After around three minutes Macaspac returned wielding a kitchen knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan, saying: Ano? Jebulan simply replied: Tama na. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. Surban and the others witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. The case was archived for more than 15 years because Macaspac had gone into hiding and remained at large until his arrest on July 28, 2004. Upon his arraignment on August 31, 2004, he pleaded not guilty to the foregoing information. Issue: Whether or not evident premeditation must be appreciated in the case instead of treachery Held: No. The requisites for the appreciation of evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The first and second elements of evident premeditation were thereby established, but the third requisite is absent in this case; such that by quickly returning to the group with the knife, Macaspac let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the crime. Accordingly, we cannot appreciate the attendance of evident premeditation in the killing. Without the Prosecution having sufficiently proved the attendance of either treachery or evident premeditation, Macaspac was guilty only of homicide for the killing of Jebulan. People vs. Villanueva G.R. No.226475, March 13, 2017 Facts: At around past 5:00 a.m. of January 1, 2012, Amie Bafiaga (Bañaga) was selling tapsilog to a group of persons playing cara y cruz at the comer of an alley in Summitville, Barangay Putatan, Muntinlupa City. Thereupon, Bafiaga saw the accused-appellants and Valencia arrive and ask the group if they know Enrico Enriquez, to which they answered in the negative. Thereupon, the accused-appellants and Valencia went to the tricycle terminal, which was about 10 to 15 meters away, where they saw Enrico. They then simultaneously attacked Enrico. Villanueva punched Enrico on the face twice while Sayson hit the latter at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt. Valencia then stabbed Enrico on the left side of his armpit twice. Enrico tried to fight back to no avail. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) agreed on their conviction of the crime of murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength considering that Enrico was all alone when he was attacked by the accused-appellants and Valencia. Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA improperly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength Held: Yes. While abuse of superior strength is one of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 which qualifies the killing of the victim to murder, the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia, armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does not automatically merit the conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. Evidence must show that the assailants consciously sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. In the present case, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in age, size, strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, attacked the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, is not per se indicative of abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence of this circumstance. Nor can the circumstance be inferred solely from the victim's possibly weaker physical constitution. In fact, what the evidence shows in this case is a victim who is taller than the assailants and who was even able to deliver retaliatory fist blows against the knife-wielder. Accordingly, the Court is compelled to disregard the finding of the existence of abuse of superior strength by the lower courts. The accused-appellants' guilt is, thus, limited to the crime of homicide. |
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