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Facts: On 28 August 1991, Jose G. Garcia filed with an Affidavit of Complaint charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefore. She contended that by the petitioner's admissions in his testimony given on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty which prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by the petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Hence, this petition Issue: Whether or not the private respondent's many trips abroad suspended the running of the prescriptive period Held: No. The court held that that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period
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Facts:
SPO2 Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that Baxinela was already in the pub drinking with Regimen and Legarda for more than a couple of hours prior to the shooting incident. After witnessing an altercation between Lajo and another customer, Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why he had a gun with him. Baxinela approached Lajo from behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm with the other. As Lajo was turning around, to see who was confronting him, Baxinela shot him. Baxinela then got Lajo’s wallet and fled the scene with Regimen. The RTC and CA accepted the prosecution’s version. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the justifying circumstances of self- defense of in the alternative the lawful performance of official duty under Article 11 paragraphs 1 and 5, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code. Held: No. In order to avail justifying circumstance of lawful performance of an official duty under Article 11, Paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, it must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub. Facts:
The respondent spouses Gueco obtained a loan from petitioner now UnionBank to purchase a car. Hence, the Spouses executed promissory notes which were payable in monthly installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as security for the notes. The Spouses defaulted in payment. The Bank, therefore, filed a civil action for "Sum of Money with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin" before the MTC. The car was detained inside the Bank’s compound. Dr. Gueco delivered a manager's check in amount of P150,000.00 but the car was not released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss for they had not yet filed their Answer. The Bank insisted that the joint motion to dismiss is standard operating procedure in their bank to effect a compromise and to preclude future filing of claims, counterclaims or suits for damages. After several demand letters and meetings with bank representatives, the spouses initiated a civil action for damages. The RTC held that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties as to the reduction of the amount of indebtedness and the release of the car but said agreement did not include the signing of the joint motion to dismiss as a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of the compromise. Issue: 1. Whether or not there was an agreement with respect to the execution of the joint motion to dismiss as a condition for the compromise agreement 2. Whether or not the spouses are entitled for damages arising from fraud. Held: 1. No. Being an affirmative allegation, petitioner has the burden of evidence to prove his claim that the oral compromise entered into by the parties included the stipulation that the parties would jointly file a motion to dismiss. This petitioner failed to do. Notably, even the Metropolitan Trial Court, while ruling in favor of the petitioner and thereby dismissing the complaint, did not make a factual finding that the compromise agreement included the condition of the signing of a joint motion to dismiss. 2. No. The Court failed to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could constitute as fraud. Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. Petitioner may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint motion to dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this cannot in any way have prejudiced Dr. Gueco. The whole point of the parties entering into the compromise agreement was in order that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return petitioner would return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the compromise agreement and simply stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his obligation, hence, the dismissal of the case. Hence, petitioner's act of requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss cannot be said to be a deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the compromise agreement of the parties. |
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