a collections of case digests and laws that can help aspiring law students to become a lawyer.
|
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitions have been rendered moot and academic
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: The Petitions have been rendered moot and academic when GMA lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila.
0 Comments
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, President Joseph Estrada created the Preparatory Commission on Consitutional Reform (PCCR) by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Consitution, and the manner implementing the same. On November 9, 1999, Petitioner, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the consitutionality of the creation of the PCCR. On December 20, 1999, the PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President, and was dissolved by the President on the same day.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can take cognizance of the case DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The case has become moot and academic. An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d’etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. FACTS: The petitioner Malaya Lolas is an organization established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during World War II. Malaya Lolas filed a petition to compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals. According to them, the general waiver of claims by the Philippine government in the peace treaty with Japan is void.
ISSUE: Can the Supreme Court decide as to whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against Japan. DECISION: Dismissed. RATIO DECIDENDI: No. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question.
FACTS: Rolando Mendoza (Mendoza) was dismissed in the PNP on account of the extortion incident, which led him to hijack a tourist bus that resulted his death and several others on board. Said incident is on account of Mendoza’s plea to the Office of the Ombudsman to reconsider his case. President Benigno Aquino III created an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) to conduct an investigation relative to the incident of hostage-taking. Subsequently, IIRC charged and dismissed Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III (Gonzales), who handled Mendoza’s case. Gonzales argues that the Office of the President has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. RULING: The issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Here, in resolving the petitions, the Court does not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the President, but as to whether the statutory grant violates the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace is constitutional.
FACTS: RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) was enacted, which aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners filed petitions to declare several provisions of Cybercrime Law unconsitutional and void. One of the assailed provisions is Section 5, which punishes the aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of Cybercrimes such as libel. Petitioners argue that such provision suffers from overbreadth, creating chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression. The OSG, however, contends that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. RULING: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. Here, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity. FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RH Law cannot be challenged “on its face” because it is not a speech regulating measure RULING: While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7080 is unconstitutional for being vague
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed, however, that the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its failure to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to Estrada, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process. DECISION: No RATIO DECIDENDI: Tha Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases, but not to penal statutes. FACTS: On December 21, 2012, Congress enacted RH Law (RA 10354). RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health and population control. Petitioners assail its constitutionality because according to them, it violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. The proponents of the RH law, however, contend that the petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition present an actual case or controversy even though the RH Law is not yet effective DECISION: Yes RATIO DECIDENDI: The petition present an actual case or controversy even though RH Law is not yet effective. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination. The fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Here, an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Hence, the court shall take cognizance of the case. ISSUE: [1] Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB?
[2] Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the law? FACTS: President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial. DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents. It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the LNMB. The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence, anyone buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is an inspiration to the youth. ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati
FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional DECISION: The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: RATIO DECIDENDI: Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions." Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction imputable to respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners sought to prevent the postponement of the 2002 SK election to a later date since doing so may render them unqualified to vote or be voted for in view of the age limitation set by law for those who may participate. The SK elections was postponed since it was deemed "operationally very difficult" to hold both SK and Barangay elections simultaneously in May 2002. Petitioners also sought to enjoin the lowering of age for membership in the SK. DECISION: Denied RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court held that, in the present case, there was no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. Under the same law, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854
FACTS: The petitioners assails certain provisions of RA 7854, Section 51 on the ground that it attempts to alter or restart the "3-consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, disregarding the term previously served by them which collides with Section 8 Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the constitution DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.
FACTS: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate Justices of the Supreme Court was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution, “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within the period of one year.” Senator Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution. DECISION: The second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution RATIO DECIDENDI: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. ISSUE: Whether or Not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
FACTS: The GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). DECISION: Dismissed RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. G.R. No. 148560 , November 19, 2001 Joeseph Ejercito Estrada, Petitioner vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and People of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondents FACTS: Petitioner, Former President Joseph Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), assailed the constitutionality of the said law based on the following grounds: (1) the law suffers from vagueness; (2) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and (3) it abolishes the element of mens rea or criminal intent in the crimes already punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The foregoing, according to Estrada, violated his fundamental rights to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE: Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague? Ruling: No. The plunder law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Republic Act 7080 also known as Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7569, provides for comprehensive guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as its meaning and differ in application. However, the questioned law is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein or because of the employment of terms without defining them. The petitioner’s reliance on “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is clearly misplaced. It can only be invoked against the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. Being one of the senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and due observance to the constitution GR 152895 JUNE 15, 2004
OFELIA V. ARCETA, Petitioner vs. The Honorable Ma. Celistina C. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court , Navotas, Metro Manila, Reespondent FACTS: Petitioner, Ofelia V. Arceta issued a check amounting to 740,000 to Oscar Castro even with full knowledge that her account has no sufficient fund for the said amount. The check was subsequently dishonoured by the bank for reason “DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS”(DAIF). The City Prosecutor of Navotas charged Arceta of violating BP Blg 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). Petitioner did not move to have the charge against her dismissed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional in the arraignment. However, in the petition filed to the Supreme Court, Arceta indirectly attacked the constitutionality of the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of BP 22 is the Lis Mota of the case. RULING: Supreme Court held that the constitutional question raised by the petitioner is not the very lis mota of the case. Every case has in its favor presumption of constitutionality, and to say otherwise, there must be an apparent and clear breach of the constitution. Based on the contentions of the petitioners, they still have to convince the Court that BP 22 or its implementation violated any provision of the Constitution. As stressed in Lozano vs. Martinez, BP 22 does not punish the non-payment of debt per se and does not intend or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. It is the act of making worthless checks and putting them in circulation that is being punished. GR 131124 MARCH 29, 199
Osmundo G. Umali, Petitioner vs. Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Et al. , Respondents FACTS: Petitioner Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue by Former President Fidel Ramos. After almost a year, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director. Afterwards, Former President Ramos authorized the preventive suspension of OsmundoUmali and referred the complaint to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) for investigation wherein the commission issued a resolution to support the charges against the petitioner for gross disobedience and falsification of official documents. Fidel V. Ramos then dismissed Umali from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. Osmundo Umali then filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court dismissed the petition. Upon presenting a motion for reconsideration, Umali raised that the "PCAGC" is an unconstitutional office without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation against him. ISSUES: Whether petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner cannot raise the issue of constitutionality in its motion for reconsideration since it was certainly too late to raise it for the first time at such late stage of proceedings. The constitutional question should be raised at the earliest opportunity such that if not raised in the pleading, it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised before the trial, it will not be considered on appeal. |
Archives
December 2023
Categories
All
|